We demonstrate, for the first time, quantum key distribution over 101 km of standard telecom fibre. The system is characterized by a quantum bit error rate of /spl sim/7.1 % and a bit rate of 15 Hz.
A method for exceeding the 100 km barrier for quantum key distribution (QKD) over a standard telecom fiber was described. The system was based upon a time division Mach-Zender interferometer using phase modulation. The single photon detector was optimized by minimizing the contribution to the intrinsic error rate of detector dark count noise and stray photons. It was observed that a quantum bit error ratio (QBER) of 8.9% was achieved for a 122 km link, allowing a secure shared key to be formed after error correction and privacy amplification.
We report a demonstration of quantum key distribution over a standard telecom fiber exceeding 100 km in length. Through careful optimization of the interferometer and single photon detector, we achieve a quantum bit error ratio of 8.9% for a 122 km link, allowing a secure shared key to be formed after error correction and privacy amplification. Key formation rates of up to 1.9 kbit/s are achieved depending upon fiber length. We discuss the factors limiting the maximum fiber length in quantum cryptography.
We report a demonstration of quantum key distribution (QKD) over a standard telecom fiber exceeding 50 dB in loss and 250 km in length. The differential phase shift QKD protocol was chosen and implemented with a 2 GHz system clock rate. By careful optimization of the 1 bit delayed Faraday-Michelson interferometer and the use of the superconducting single photon detector (SSPD), we achieved a quantum bit error rate below 2% when the fiber length was no more than 205 km, and of 3.45% for a 260 km fiber with 52.9 dB loss. We also improved the quantum efficiency of SSPD to obtain a high key rate for 50 km length.
Our system is based upon a Mach-Zender interferometer using phase modulation. Photons are generated by a 1.55 pm DFB pulsed laser diode operating with a repetition rate of 2 MHz. The pulses are strongly attenuated so that on average 0. I photons/clock cycle leaves the senders apparatus. Phase modulators. controlled by custom electronics, in the two interfering arms were used to encode the bit information. The signal is multiplexed with pulses from a 1.3 pm clock laser which serves as a timing reference. Cooled InGaAs avalanche photodiodes operating in Geiger mode are used to detect the single photons. It is imperative for operation over long fibres that the dark count rate in the single photon detector is as low as possible. Our detectors typically have a dark count probability of 3.2~10.~ er gate, along with a detection efficiency of 12% at 1.55 pm. This yields a Noise Equivalent Power of I .OXIO-'~ WHz- , whcch IS one of the lowest reported to date. R ' . The interferometer displayed a single photon interference fringe visibility between 99.1% and 99.7% for fibre lengths up to 65km. For longer fibre lengths the visibility falls, but remains around 96% at IOlkm, see Figure 1. The QBER, shown in Figure 2, remains virtually constant at around 3.6% for fibre length up to 50km, suggesting that the dominant contribution derives from inaccuracy in the phase modulation. Beyond 50km the QBER increases with fibre length, due to dark count noise. At 101 km, the QBER averaged over a 2-minute key transfer is typically 7. I %. This error rate is below the 1 I .5% limit, thus allowing us to perform error correction and privacy amplification to form a secure key. The sifted bit rate (shown in Figure 2) decreases with increasing fibre length at a rate of -0.20 dB/km, close to the specified value. At IOOkm the average bit rate was typically 15 Hz, sufficient to allow a cryptographic key to be transferred in several tens of seconds. 100