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Annalen der Physik

From the margins to the mainstream: Foundations of quantum mechanics, 1950–1990

Olival Freire

Published Jun 1, 2015• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Research on the foundations of quantum mechanics ended the 20th century as a blossoming field including promises of applications related to the processing of information. The 2010 Wolf Prize in physics was awarded to John Clauser, Alain Aspect, and Anton Zeilinger, “for their fundamental conceptual and experimental contributions to the foundations of quantum physics, specifically an increasingly sophisticated series of tests of Bell's inequalities or extensions thereof using entangled quantum states.”1 Bell's inequalities and their related physical effect, namely quantum entanglement, encapsulate the historical changes undergone by research on the possibility of enlarging quantum mechanics through additional (thus hidden) variables. Indeed this subject once occupied a very marginal position, a philosophical issue beyond the pale of scientific research. In the 1950s, David Bohm's reinterpretation of quantum mechanics was considered either “analogous to the ‘angels’ which people introduced in the Middle Ages to explain things,” or an issue belonging “to the philosophy of science, rather than to the domain of physical science proper.”2 As late as the early 1970s some physicists still wondered whether such research was “real physics.”3 Considering foundational issues worthy of investigation is thus a kind of renaissance in the history of physics as they were present in the inception of quantum physics. This change in values requires a historical explanation and may shed light on the workings of recent science. I have presented elsewhere an account of the diverse factors which have played a role in this, calling their key actors the quantum dissidents.4 They were dissidents in the sense that they challenged the common wisdom at their time that foundational issues were already solved and not worth pursuing. As stated by John Bell and Michael Nauenberg in 1966, “the typical physicist feels that [foundational issues] have long been answered, and that he will fully understand just how if ever he can spare 20 minutes to think about it.”5 I present here a short summary of this story. Since its inception, quantum mechanics brought pressing conceptual issues requiring investigation. These issues had to include the possibility of completing quantum theory with additional variables in order to recover either realism or determinism. This possibility was exploited early on by Einstein through the EPR Gedankenexperiment and revisited by Bohm in the early 1950s. Bohm's causal interpretation was a sign that something was wrong in von Neumann's mathematical proof against additional variables, but it was not widely understood this way at the time. After 30 years without causing much ado, the proof was revised by John Bell. He showed that there was a factual conflict between predictions of quantum mechanics and the assumption of local realism. Since the early 1970s, a list of experiments—begun by Clauser, further developed by Aspect, and currently exploited by Zeilinger, among others—led to the confirmation of quantum mechanics predictions for the correlation in polarization of a pair of widely-separated photons. Empirical confirmation of entanglement as a physical property of quantum systems was thus found. However, even today, physicists struggle to understand entanglement as well as to harness it in subjects such as quantum cryptography and information. Another tough conceptual issue came to be known as the quantum measurement problem. Until World War II, two solutions had been available. For Niels Bohr, devices, if they are to be used as measurement devices, should be described using plain language enriched by concepts from classical physics. John von Neumann, on the other hand, identified two different evolutions of the quantum states, one represented by the Schrödinger equation and the other represented by the mathematical trick of an operator, a projection operator, to describe measurements. Bohr's solution was too philosophical and von Neumann's too mathematical. It thus comes as no surprise that from the 1950s physicists began to look for a physical solution to the problem. Hugh Everett's relative states were motivated by his abhorrence of two different evolutions for quantum states. Eugene Wigner considered a role for the mind during measurement and suggested formulating a nonlinear Schrödinger equation. In the 1960s, even committed Bohrians, such as Léon Rosenfeld, looked for a physical solution identifying irreversibility as the signature of measurements, and supporting the “thermodynamic amplification” approach formulated by Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi.6 Currently, the measurement problem remains unresolved from the conceptual point of view, but we have learned a lot of physics on the way. The problem was related to the issue of the transition between the quantum and the classical description, and both issues were at the heart of what we call decoherence, the physical process through which quantum states lose their coherence, i.e., the process by which a pure state becomes a mixed one. Decoherence emerged along different and independent paths and involved the work of Heinz Dieter Zeh and Erich Joos, Anthony Leggett and Amir Caldeira, and Wojciech H. Zurek, among others. The connection between quantum and gravity is far from being solved even today. The quest for this connection has, however, stimulated research in the foundations of quantum mechanics. Bryce DeWitt's career was devoted to this search and through it he became a vocal advocate of an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics, that is, Everett's relative states, dubbed by DeWitt as the many worlds interpretation. Philosophical issues have also motivated physicists to reconsider the foundations of quantum physics. Paramount among these issues has been the quest for determinism and attempts to accommodate realism into the quantum mathematical formalism. In hindsight, the mere listing of these issues, from which entanglement and decoherence emerged, would be enough to explain the change in the professional status of research on foundations, but this would be an anachronistic reading of events, as these issues were not always considered meaningful in physics. As important as they are considered now, these foundational issues could have lain dormant for a long time if not for the role played by the physicists who worked on them. An example of an inactive issue in the history of physics was the nature of inertia and the relationship between gravitational and inertial masses in Newton's times. Centuries later, it was revisited by Ernst Mach and later by Einstein. Likewise, research on quantum foundations flourished because a bunch of maverick physicists raised the stakes. They supported the view that there was good physics to be done concerning foundations of quantum mechanics. I think of Bohm, Everett, Bell, Wigner, Abner Shimony, Clauser, Bernard d’Espagnat, Aspect, Zeh, Franco Selleri, Leggett, and others. They took a professional and cultural stand against the prevailing wisdom of the times among physicists which was that foundational issues had already been solved by the founding fathers of the discipline. I call them quantum dissidents using a metaphor related to political dissidents in the 20th century. Eventually, all of them have gained recognition in their respective contexts as their causes became widely acknowledged. In the case of the quantum dissidents, they won insofar as foundations became a highly-valued research topic on the agenda of physics. The quantum dissidents also faced professional biases against their research. Bell, after publishing his seminal papers exhibiting flaws in von Neumann's proof and presenting the theorem now called after him, in 1966 received a letter from Rosenfeld stating: “I need not tell you that I regard your hunting hidden parameters as a waste of your talent.”7 Familiar with such bias, Bell's first question to the young Aspect, who looked for advice for his planned experiments, was “Do you have a permanent job?” Aspect did, and this made all the difference. For some of the dissidents prejudices were highly effective. Indeed they paid a high professional price for their dissidence. Two cases illustrate this. In the early 1970s, Clauser was a promising young physicist. He did his PhD at Columbia under Patrick Thaddeus working on microwave measurements of cosmic background radiation and then experimented with Bell's theorem. Together with Shimony, Horne, and Holt, he translated the theorem to real labs. He performed the first experiment and obtained a corroboration of quantum predictions, which was a landmark in physics considering the limited techniques available at the time. He further developed Bell's theorem, replicated experiments on it, and participated in the debates during the inception of quantum optics. Despite these achievements, Clauser never got a permanent position in American academia, as many department heads in a position to hire him doubted if Bell's theorem was real physics.8 About the same time, Zeh was working on nuclear physics and wrote a paper which may now be considered a forerunner of the decoherence approach. The paper suggested that the ensemble of a system plus a measurement device cannot be considered a closed system, thus approximations are required when using the Schrödinger equation to describe it. The paper was not accepted by Il Nuovo Cimento and Die Naturwissenschaften. At that juncture, Zeh's senior at Heidelberg, the Nobel Prize winner J. H. D. Jensen decided to ask Rosenfeld's advice on the paper. Rosenfeld's opinion was devastating. “I have all the reasons in the world to assume that such a concentrate of wildest nonsense is not being distributed around the world with your blessing, and I think to be of service to you by directing your attention to this misfortune.”9 Zeh did not read this letter at the time—only recently was it unearthed—but he realized that the professional ambiance at Heidelberg had changed towards him. Jensen frankly informed him that any further activities on this subject would end his academic career. The paper was rescued by Wigner and eventually published. However, Zeh considered that his career had been destroyed and therefore he could dedicate himself to the forbidden subject, foundations of quantum physics. The quantum dissidents did not defend their research in a vacuum. If the professional ambiance was against them, devaluing their research, other factors played a favorable role. In the 1950s, the Cold War brought unforeseen benefits for the dissidents. As part of the ideological battles of the time, Soviet philosophers and physicists criticized the usual interpretation of quantum mechanics, namely complementarity, for being subjectivist. Unlike other cultural criticisms, this one resonated with similar criticisms made in the West. As cogitated by the historian of physics Max Jammer, the decline in the influence of the complementarity interpretation may have been fomented and supported by social-cultural movements and political factors such as the growing interest in Marxist ideology in the West.10 This stands in spite of the fact that there were Marxist physicists on both sides of the controversy, some pro, others counter to Bohr's complementarity principle. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the old guard of the founding fathers of quantum physics were retreating from the lines of philosophical battle. A new generation emerged which was more inclined to criticize the usual interpretation of quantum physics. In addition, some of the old guard clashed among themselves, Rosenfeld defending Bohr's views and Wigner sharing von Neumann's approach. Moreover, Wigner entered these disputes considering himself the defender of the orthodoxy and ended up considering himself heterodox. The monocracy of the Copenhagen school, to use a term from Jammer, broke from the inside. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the cultural and social unrest surrounding the Vietnam War encouraged physicists to set their research agenda to heterodox subjects, such as foundations. In Italy the Italian Physical Society promoted foundations as a highly valid topic for physics research opening the doors of its traditional summer school, in Varenna, to the subject “foundations of quantum mechanics.” D'Espagnat chaired the school while Wigner gave the opening lecture presenting the diversity of solutions for the measurement problem. Bell's theorem and the first experiments attracted the attention of many, including Franco Selleri, who went on to devote much of his energy to the subject. The 1970 Varenna school was the Woodstock of all quantum dissidents (Fig. 2). According to the recollections of Anders Barany, then 28 years old, “what most impressed me was that many (maybe even most) of the highly qualified scientists lecturing at the school could not cooperate to try and help the students form a coherent picture of the different problems connected with the foundations of quantum physics.”11 On the other side of the Atlantic, similar trends were operating. Physics Today, the prestigious magazine of the American physics community, editorialized the debate on the interpretation of quantum physics, opening it with an article by DeWitt in which the diversity of possible interpretations was presented and Everett's views were supported. On the West coast, physicists who followed the bourgeoning hippie counterculture became fascinated by entanglement and by the apparent possibilities of superluminal communication. Ultimately this latter hope did not pan out, but in the process good physics was produced.12 In the early 1980s, particularly after Aspect's 1982 experiments on entanglement, foundations became good physics. From the mid 1980s onwards, technical advances in the manipulation of single quantum systems and even applied research facilitated new experiments in foundations such as the delayed-choice experiment advocated by John Wheeler.13 Later, the merging of foundations and computer science sealed the fate of research on foundations as it became one of the pillars for the blossoming field of quantum information. This fascinating story shows us the many and varied factors shaping the cultural enterprise we call physics. The story cannot be ended without a ruse of history. The quantum dissidents won the day insofar as foundations became good physics. However, they had higher expectations. John Bell, the iconic figure among the physicists who work on these issues, used to say that quantum mechanics is “rotten,” Hamlet's famous line, in an oblique reference to the father of the standard interpretation of this theory, the Danish physicist Niels Bohr. The ruse is that in trying to attack the foundations of quantum mechanics, they ended up consolidating and developing quantum mechanics itself and quantum theory entered the 21st century as vindicated as ever.

DOI
10.1002/andp.201570056

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Routledge eBooks•Sep 8, 2017•0 citations
Research on the foundations of quantum mechanics ended the 20th century as a blossoming field including promises of applications related to the processing of information. The 2010 Wolf Prize in physics was awarded to John Clauser, Alain Aspect, and Anton Zeilinger, “for their fundamental conceptual and experimental contributions to the foundations of quantum physics, specifically an increasingly sophisticated series of tests of Bell's inequalities or extensions thereof using entangled quantum states.”1 Bell's inequalities and their related physical effect, namely quantum entanglement, encapsulate the historical changes undergone by research on the possibility of enlarging quantum mechanics through additional (thus hidden) variables. Indeed this subject once occupied a very marginal position, a philosophical issue beyond the pale of scientific research. In the 1950s, David Bohm's reinterpretation of quantum mechanics was considered either “analogous to the ‘angels’ which people introduced in the Middle Ages to explain things,” or an issue belonging “to the philosophy of science, rather than to the domain of physical science proper.”2 As late as the early 1970s some physicists still wondered whether such research was “real physics.”3 Considering foundational issues worthy of investigation is thus a kind of renaissance in the history of physics as they were present in the inception of quantum physics. This change in values requires a historical explanation and may shed light on the workings of recent science. I have presented elsewhere an account of the diverse factors which have played a role in this, calling their key actors the quantum dissidents.4 They were dissidents in the sense that they challenged the common wisdom at their time that foundational issues were already solved and not worth pursuing. As stated by John Bell and Michael Nauenberg in 1966, “the typical physicist feels that [foundational issues] have long been answered, and that he will fully understand just how if ever he can spare 20 minutes to think about it.”5 I present here a short summary of this story. Since its inception, quantum mechanics brought pressing conceptual issues requiring investigation. These issues had to include the possibility of completing quantum theory with additional variables in order to recover either realism or determinism. This possibility was exploited early on by Einstein through the EPR Gedankenexperiment and revisited by Bohm in the early 1950s. Bohm's causal interpretation was a sign that something was wrong in von Neumann's mathematical proof against additional variables, but it was not widely understood this way at the time. After 30 years without causing much ado, the proof was revised by John Bell. He showed that there was a factual conflict between predictions of quantum mechanics and the assumption of local realism. Since the early 1970s, a list of experiments—begun by Clauser, further developed by Aspect, and currently exploited by Zeilinger, among others—led to the confirmation of quantum mechanics predictions for the correlation in polarization of a pair of widely-separated photons. Empirical confirmation of entanglement as a physical property of quantum systems was thus found. However, even today, physicists struggle to understand entanglement as well as to harness it in subjects such as quantum cryptography and information. Another tough conceptual issue came to be known as the quantum measurement problem. Until World War II, two solutions had been available. For Niels Bohr, devices, if they are to be used as measurement devices, should be described using plain language enriched by concepts from classical physics. John von Neumann, on the other hand, identified two different evolutions of the quantum states, one represented by the Schrödinger equation and the other represented by the mathematical trick of an operator, a projection operator, to describe measurements. Bohr's solution was too philosophical and von Neumann's too mathematical. It thus comes as no surprise that from the 1950s physicists began to look for a physical solution to the problem. Hugh Everett's relative states were motivated by his abhorrence of two different evolutions for quantum states. Eugene Wigner considered a role for the mind during measurement and suggested formulating a nonlinear Schrödinger equation. In the 1960s, even committed Bohrians, such as Léon Rosenfeld, looked for a physical solution identifying irreversibility as the signature of measurements, and supporting the “thermodynamic amplification” approach formulated by Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi.6 Currently, the measurement problem remains unresolved from the conceptual point of view, but we have learned a lot of physics on the way. The problem was related to the issue of the transition between the quantum and the classical description, and both issues were at the heart of what we call decoherence, the physical process through which quantum states lose their coherence, i.e., the process by which a pure state becomes a mixed one. Decoherence emerged along different and independent paths and involved the work of Heinz Dieter Zeh and Erich Joos, Anthony Leggett and Amir Caldeira, and Wojciech H. Zurek, among others. The connection between quantum and gravity is far from being solved even today. The quest for this connection has, however, stimulated research in the foundations of quantum mechanics. Bryce DeWitt's career was devoted to this search and through it he became a vocal advocate of an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics, that is, Everett's relative states, dubbed by DeWitt as the many worlds interpretation. Philosophical issues have also motivated physicists to reconsider the foundations of quantum physics. Paramount among these issues has been the quest for determinism and attempts to accommodate realism into the quantum mathematical formalism. In hindsight, the mere listing of these issues, from which entanglement and decoherence emerged, would be enough to explain the change in the professional status of research on foundations, but this would be an anachronistic reading of events, as these issues were not always considered meaningful in physics. As important as they are considered now, these foundational issues could have lain dormant for a long time if not for the role played by the physicists who worked on them. An example of an inactive issue in the history of physics was the nature of inertia and the relationship between gravitational and inertial masses in Newton's times. Centuries later, it was revisited by Ernst Mach and later by Einstein. Likewise, research on quantum foundations flourished because a bunch of maverick physicists raised the stakes. They supported the view that there was good physics to be done concerning foundations of quantum mechanics. I think of Bohm, Everett, Bell, Wigner, Abner Shimony, Clauser, Bernard d’Espagnat, Aspect, Zeh, Franco Selleri, Leggett, and others. They took a professional and cultural stand against the prevailing wisdom of the times among physicists which was that foundational issues had already been solved by the founding fathers of the discipline. I call them quantum dissidents using a metaphor related to political dissidents in the 20th century. Eventually, all of them have gained recognition in their respective contexts as their causes became widely acknowledged. In the case of the quantum dissidents, they won insofar as foundations became a highly-valued research topic on the agenda of physics. The quantum dissidents also faced professional biases against their research. Bell, after publishing his seminal papers exhibiting flaws in von Neumann's proof and presenting the theorem now called after him, in 1966 received a letter from Rosenfeld stating: “I need not tell you that I regard your hunting hidden parameters as a waste of your talent.”7 Familiar with such bias, Bell's first question to the young Aspect, who looked for advice for his planned experiments, was “Do you have a permanent job?” Aspect did, and this made all the difference. For some of the dissidents prejudices were highly effective. Indeed they paid a high professional price for their dissidence. Two cases illustrate this. In the early 1970s, Clauser was a promising young physicist. He did his PhD at Columbia under Patrick Thaddeus working on microwave measurements of cosmic background radiation and then experimented with Bell's theorem. Together with Shimony, Horne, and Holt, he translated the theorem to real labs. He performed the first experiment and obtained a corroboration of quantum predictions, which was a landmark in physics considering the limited techniques available at the time. He further developed Bell's theorem, replicated experiments on it, and participated in the debates during the inception of quantum optics. Despite these achievements, Clauser never got a permanent position in American academia, as many department heads in a position to hire him doubted if Bell's theorem was real physics.8 About the same time, Zeh was working on nuclear physics and wrote a paper which may now be considered a forerunner of the decoherence approach. The paper suggested that the ensemble of a system plus a measurement device cannot be considered a closed system, thus approximations are required when using the Schrödinger equation to describe it. The paper was not accepted by Il Nuovo Cimento and Die Naturwissenschaften. At that juncture, Zeh's senior at Heidelberg, the Nobel Prize winner J. H. D. Jensen decided to ask Rosenfeld's advice on the paper. Rosenfeld's opinion was devastating. “I have all the reasons in the world to assume that such a concentrate of wildest nonsense is not being distributed around the world with your blessing, and I think to be of service to you by directing your attention to this misfortune.”9 Zeh did not read this letter at the time—only recently was it unearthed—but he realized that the professional ambiance at Heidelberg had changed towards him. Jensen frankly informed him that any further activities on this subject would end his academic career. The paper was rescued by Wigner and eventually published. However, Zeh considered that his career had been destroyed and therefore he could dedicate himself to the forbidden subject, foundations of quantum physics. The quantum dissidents did not defend their research in a vacuum. If the professional ambiance was against them, devaluing their research, other factors played a favorable role. In the 1950s, the Cold War brought unforeseen benefits for the dissidents. As part of the ideological battles of the time, Soviet philosophers and physicists criticized the usual interpretation of quantum mechanics, namely complementarity, for being subjectivist. Unlike other cultural criticisms, this one resonated with similar criticisms made in the West. As cogitated by the historian of physics Max Jammer, the decline in the influence of the complementarity interpretation may have been fomented and supported by social-cultural movements and political factors such as the growing interest in Marxist ideology in the West.10 This stands in spite of the fact that there were Marxist physicists on both sides of the controversy, some pro, others counter to Bohr's complementarity principle. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the old guard of the founding fathers of quantum physics were retreating from the lines of philosophical battle. A new generation emerged which was more inclined to criticize the usual interpretation of quantum physics. In addition, some of the old guard clashed among themselves, Rosenfeld defending Bohr's views and Wigner sharing von Neumann's approach. Moreover, Wigner entered these disputes considering himself the defender of the orthodoxy and ended up considering himself heterodox. The monocracy of the Copenhagen school, to use a term from Jammer, broke from the inside. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the cultural and social unrest surrounding the Vietnam War encouraged physicists to set their research agenda to heterodox subjects, such as foundations. In Italy the Italian Physical Society promoted foundations as a highly valid topic for physics research opening the doors of its traditional summer school, in Varenna, to the subject “foundations of quantum mechanics.” D'Espagnat chaired the school while Wigner gave the opening lecture presenting the diversity of solutions for the measurement problem. Bell's theorem and the first experiments attracted the attention of many, including Franco Selleri, who went on to devote much of his energy to the subject. The 1970 Varenna school was the Woodstock of all quantum dissidents (Fig. 2). According to the recollections of Anders Barany, then 28 years old, “what most impressed me was that many (maybe even most) of the highly qualified scientists lecturing at the school could not cooperate to try and help the students form a coherent picture of the different problems connected with the foundations of quantum physics.”11 On the other side of the Atlantic, similar trends were operating. Physics Today, the prestigious magazine of the American physics community, editorialized the debate on the interpretation of quantum physics, opening it with an article by DeWitt in which the diversity of possible interpretations was presented and Everett's views were supported. On the West coast, physicists who followed the bourgeoning hippie counterculture became fascinated by entanglement and by the apparent possibilities of superluminal communication. Ultimately this latter hope did not pan out, but in the process good physics was produced.12 In the early 1980s, particularly after Aspect's 1982 experiments on entanglement, foundations became good physics. From the mid 1980s onwards, technical advances in the manipulation of single quantum systems and even applied research facilitated new experiments in foundations such as the delayed-choice experiment advocated by John Wheeler.13 Later, the merging of foundations and computer science sealed the fate of research on foundations as it became one of the pillars for the blossoming field of quantum information. This fascinating story shows us the many and varied factors shaping the cultural enterprise we call physics. The story cannot be ended without a ruse of history. The quantum dissidents won the day insofar as foundations became good physics. However, they had higher expectations. John Bell, the iconic figure among the physicists who work on these issues, used to say that quantum mechanics is “rotten,” Hamlet's famous line, in an oblique reference to the father of the standard interpretation of this theory, the Danish physicist Niels Bohr. The ruse is that in trying to attack the foundations of quantum mechanics, they ended up consolidating and developing quantum mechanics itself and quantum theory entered the 21st century as vindicated as ever.
Prologue A memorial conference for John Bell, open to the public, was held at Rutgers University around 20 years ago. I gave a short talk there on Bell's views about David Bohm's “hidden variables” formulation of quantum mechanics, a version of quantum mechanics often called the de Broglie–Bohm theory or Bohmian mechanics. This theory was in fact discovered by Louis de Broglie in 1927. In 1952, it was rediscovered and developed by Bohm, who was the first to appreciate its connection to the predictions of standard quantum mechanics. I did not publish the talk. I have decided that it would be appropriate to publish a very lightly edited version of it here, in this volume devoted to the work of Bell on the foundation of quantum mechanics. One reason for doing so is that the connection between Bell and Bohm continues to be somewhat underplayed, with the strength of his advocacy of Bohmian mechanics not properly appreciated. For example, about half of the papers in Bell's collected works on the foundations of quantum mechanics deal with Bohmian mechanics. But in his fine introduction to the revised edition of this great book [1], Alain Aspect mentions this theory in only a single sentence, and parenthetically at that. For several decades after Bell proved his nonlocality theorem, based in part on Bell's inequality, it was widely claimed that Bell had shown that hidden variables – and Bohmian mechanics in particular – were impossible, that they were incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. For example, the great physicist Eugene Wigner, who, unlike most of his contemporaries, was profoundly concerned with the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics and usually wrote on the subject with great clarity and insight, has written that This [hidden variables] is an interesting idea and even though few of us were ready to accept it, it must be admitted that the truly telling argument against it was produced as late as 1965, by J. S. Bell … This appears to give a convincing argument against the hidden variables theory.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
Quantum mechanics approaches its centenary with an impressive record. It became the backbone of most research in physics, led to applications such as the transistor and laser, and prompted an upheaval in the philosophy of science. Its scope and its precision have been constantly growing, and it is now promising more powerful computers and safer cryptography. This century of conquests has also been a time of ongoing debates about the foundations and interpretation of the theory, which has been referred to as the quantum controversy. The controversy has been unusually long and remains open. Jammer called it “a story without an ending” and Laloë described this coexistence of successes and doubts with the metaphor of the colossus with feet of clay. This Handbook is a survey on this history. Some of the so-called “interpretations” are not interpretations of a fixed formalism, they are different theories, thus it has been a debate about the interpretations and the foundations of quantum mechanics. In this volume, the “history of interpretations” is used for the sake of brevity. The successive parts of the Handbook deal with the scientific and philosophical issues under debate, historical landmarks, places and contexts, historical and philosophical theses, and the proliferation of interpretations. This Handbook may serve those interested in the history of quantum mechanics and those who are engaged with, or attracted by current research on quantum information, as it may give them a flavor of the history that led to or lay the groundwork for the current investigations.
Quantum mechanics is our most successful physical theory. It underlies our very detailed understanding of atomic physics, chemistry, and nuclear physics, and the many technologies to which physical systems in these regimes give rise. Additionally, relativistic quantum mechanics is the basis for the standard model of elementary particles, which very successfully gives a partial unification of the forces operating at the atomic, nuclear, and subnuclear levels. However, from its inception the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, and the fact that “quantum measurements” in the orthodox formulation appear to require the intervention of non-quantum mechanical “classical systems,” have led to speculations by many physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers of science that quantum mechanics may be incomplete. Among the Founding Fathers of quantum theory, Einstein and Schrödinger were both of the opinion that quantum mechanics is in some way unsatisfactory, and this view has been amplified in more recent profound work of John Bell, among others. In an opposing camp, many others in the physics, mathematics, and philosophy communities have attempted to provide an interpretational foundation in which quantum mechanics remains a complete and self-contained system. Among the Founding Fathers, Bohr, Born, and Heisenberg maintained that quantum mechanics is a complete system, and a number of recent proposals have been made to improve upon or to provide alternatives to their “Copenhagen Interpretation.” The debate continues, and has spawned an enormous literature.
The first famous thought experiment of Einstein gives rise to his theories of relativity, the bedrock of modern astrophysics and cosmology. His second famous thought experiment begins the investigation into the foundations of quantum mechanics. It leads to a paradox, inspiring various 'no-go' theorems proven by Bell, Kochen, and Specker. Physicists and philosophers worldwide become increasingly dissatisfied with the probabilistic complementarity interpretation (Born-Bohr) and eventually offer their own accounts of the theory. By the end of the 20th century two alternative approaches stand out as the best candidates: Both the hidden variables interpretation (de Broglie-Bohm) and the many worlds interpretation (Everett-DeWitt) give compelling descriptions of what the true nature of quantum reality could be. In this paper, a chronological overview of all these events is given, followed by a philosophical analysis of the three aforementioned interpretations. Ultimately it is concluded that the many worlds interpretation should be adopted as the best understanding of the formalism of quantum mechanics and, therefore, should be used in the multiversity textbooks.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.