We present a brief non-technical introduction to the standing discussion on the relation between Quantum Mechanics and Determinism. Quantum Mechanics inherent randomness in the measurement process is sometimes presented as a door to explain free will. We argue against this interpretation. The possibility that Quantum Mechanics provides just an effective description of Nature which is only valid at our low-energy scales is also discussed.
We present a brief non-technical introduction to the standing discussion on the relation between Quantum Mechanics and Determinism. Quantum Mechanics inherent randomness in the measurement process is sometimes presented as a door to explain free will. We argue against this interpretation. The possibility that Quantum Mechanics provides just an effective description of Nature which is only valid at our low-energy scales is also discussed.
Abstract This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or ’t Hooft’s Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In three appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, review the notion of 1-randomness (or algorithmic randomness) that in various guises was investigated by Kolmogorov and others and treat Bell’s (Physics 1:195–200, 1964) Theorem and the Free Will Theorem with their implications for randomness.
This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or 't Hooft's Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, and review the notion of 1-randomness \nintroduced by Kolmogorov, Chaitin, Martin-Lo"f, Schnorr, and others.
The fundamental deterministic nature of quantum mechanics (QM) is mathematically demonstrated by the modeling of the quantum (multiple) slit experiments; hence this paper is written from a deterministic perspective (DP) in quantum mechanics. Due to approximately 90 years of indeterminism and probabilistic statistical results, the theory consists of many interpretations and is often regarded as counterintuitive. The latter is in the deterministic perspective not the case and is illustrated with some examples. After a brief historic perspective, ‘invisible’ i.e. invisible entities of reality in mathematical treatment, are introduced. These entities are handled by mathematics indirectly i.e. are described in a transformed domain without variables violating the Heisenberg relation. In nature, i.e. on micro and macro levels, causality is fully ‘entangled’ with energy, information - in the meaning of ordering or coding - as well as time. In contrast with the macro scale with many forms and types of memory functions, without a memory property of quanta, causality is the bearer of information symmetry on the quantum scale. Further on in this DP paper: mathematical and philosophical consequences and influences in several paragraphs, regarding subjects such as ‘free will’ and expected ‘threats to science’, the Bell inequalities, Alice and Bob & entanglement, causality, information, retro-causality, spooky action, encryption and computing, teleportation, and in general interpretations rooted in indeterminacy in QM as well as associated topics on independence, fine-tuning. The last paragraph outlines the mathematical treatment of QM more extensively and may clarify references to the above-mentioned topics of discussion in QM further.
In this final part I analyse the modal interpretations from a more philosophical point of view. In Chapter 12 I start by arguing that modal interpretations describe noumenal states of affairs and that therefore metaphysically tenable interpretations need only to meet the criteria of Consistency and Internal Completeness. Then I analyse the relations between properties, states and outcomes of measurements in the modal description of reality. I end by discussing how modal interpretations, when restricted to the description of measurement outcomes, recover the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. Chapter 13 concerns the relations between the properties ascribed to composite systems and subsystems. I show that the property ascriptions of the bi and spectral modal interpretations can be characterised as holistic and non-reductionistic, whereas the property ascription of the atomic modal interpretation is non-holistic and to a large extent reductionistic. I argue that notwithstanding the lack of reductionism, the bi and spectral modal interpretations are empirically adequate and metaphysically tenable. I also discuss the possibility of saving the metaphysical tenability of the atomic modal interpretation by taking holistic properties as dispositional properties. In Chapter 14 I give a survey of the possibilities and impossibilities of modal interpretations and in Chapter 15 I end with general conclusions.
Classical science and in fact Post-Newtonian science up till the early twentieth century were mired in a deterministic interpretation of realities. The deterministic hypothesis in science holds that everything in nature has a cause and if one could know the antecedent causes, he could predict the future with certainty. But quantum mechanics holds that sub-atomic particles, though the ultimate materials from which all the complexity of existence in the universe emerges, do not obey deterministic laws, hence, their activities are causally indeterminate and could only be understood with probability. This paper argues that quantum mechanics can not totally be free from determinism, for it has subtly conceded to determinism in holding that the sub-atomic particles are the building blocks of the macro world, and that there is interconnection between entities in the universe, even at the nonmanifest level. The probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics only betray our human limitation of the knowledge of nature, which, I believe still have lots of tricks in our sleeves over mankind. Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 8(1) 2005:72-79 Keywords: Keywords: