Abstract. We demonstrate a transformation of Yao’s protocol for secure two-party computation to a fair protocol in which neither party gains any substantial advantage by terminating the protocol prematurely. The transformation adds additional steps before and after the execution of the original protocol, but does not change it otherwise, and does not use a trusted third party. It is based on the use of gradual release timed commitments, which are a new variant of timed commitments, and on a novel use of blind signatures for verifying that the committed values are correct. 1
Abstract. We demonstrate a transformation of Yao’s protocol for secure two-party computation to a fair protocol in which neither party gains any substantial advantage by terminating the protocol prematurely. The transformation adds additional steps before and after the execution of the original protocol, but does not change it otherwise, and does not use a trusted third party. It is based on the use of gradual release timed commitments, which are a new variant of timed commitments, and on a novel use of blind signatures for verifying that the committed values are correct. 1
Yao first introduced a constant-round protocol for secure two-party computation (2PC) withstanding semi-honest adversaries by using a tool called "garbled circuit". Later, many protocols based on garbled circuit approach have been presented, most of which discussed malicious adversaries and efficiency about 2PC. However, there only have a few protocols dealing with the fundamental property of fairness for Yao's garbled circuit approach, in which one involved a trusted third party and the others are very expensive. In the paper, we propose' an efficient Yao's garbled circuit protocol for fair secure 2PC based on ElGamal encryption, Pedersen commitment, Cachin et al.'s verifiable oblivious transfer and Ou-Ruan et al.'s gradual release homomorphic timed commitment. The protocol achieves two advantages: it doesn't need the third party and it is more efficient than other fair secure Yao's protocols.
Consider several parties that do not trust each other, yet they wish to correctly compute some common function of their local inputs while keeping these inputs private. This problem is known as "Secure Multi-Party Computation", and was introduced by Andrew Yao in 1982. Secure multi-party computations have some real world examples like electronic auctions, electronic voting or fingerprinting. In this thesis we consider the case where there are only two parties involved. This is known as "Secure Two-Party Computation". If there is a trusted third party called Carol, then the problem is pretty straightforward. The participating parties could hand their inputs in Carol who can compute the common function correctly and could return the outputs to the corresponding parties. The goal is to achieve (almost) the same result when there is no trusted third party. Cryptographic protocols are designed in order to solve these kinds of problems. These protocols are analyzed within an appropriate model in which the behavior of parties is structured. The basic level is called the Semi-Honest Model where parties are assumed to follow the protocol specification, but later can derive additional information based on the messages which have been received so far. A more realistic model is the so-called Malicious Model. The common approach is to first analyze a protocol in the semi-honest model and then later extend it into the malicious model. Any cryptographic protocol for secure two-party computation must satisfy the following security requirements: correctness, privacy and fairness. It must guarantee the correctness of the result while preserving the privacy of the parties’ inputs, even if one of the parties is malicious and behaves arbitrarily throughout the protocol. It must also guarantee fairness. This roughly means that whenever a party aborts the protocol prematurely, he or she should not have any advantage over the other party in discovering the output. The main question for researchers is to construct new protocols that achieve the above mentioned goals for secure multi-party computation. Of course, such protocols must be secure in a given model, as well as be as efficient as possible. In 1986, Yao presented the first general protocol for secure two-party computation which was applicable only to the semi-honest model. He uses a tool called "Garbled Circuit". Yao’s protocol uses the underlying primitives ("Pseudorandom Generator" and "Oblivious Transfer") as blackboxes which lead to efficient results. After Yao’s work many variants and improvements have been proposed for the malicious model. In this thesis, we design several new protocols for secure two-party computation based on Yao’s garbled circuit. Before we present the details of our new designs, we first show several weaknesses, security flaws or problems with the existing protocols in the literature. We first work in the semi-honest model and then extend it into the malicious model by presenting new protocols. Finally we add fairness to our protocol. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive in modern cryptography which is useful for implementing protocols for secure multi-party computation. We study several variants of oblivious transfer in this thesis. We present a new protocol for the so-called "Committed OT". This protocol is very efficient in the sense that it is quite good in comparison to the most efficient committed OT protocols in the literature. The abovementioned flaw with the use of OT can be fixed with our committed oblivious transfer protocol. Furthermore, it is more general than all previous protocols, and, therefore, it is of independent interest. We also deal with fairness in this thesis. For protocols based on garbled circuit, so far only Benny Pinkas has presented a protocol in the literature for achieving fairness. We show a subtle problem with this protocol where the privacy of the inputs of one party can be compromised. We also describe this problem in detail which is in fact related to the fairness, and finally propose a more efficient scheme that does achieve fairness.
Abstract. We present an efficient and fair protocol for secure two-party computation in the optimistic model, where a partially trusted third party T is available, but not involved in normal protocol executions. T is needed only if communication is disrupted or if one of the two parties misbehaves. The protocol guarantees that although one party may terminate the protocol at any time, the computation remains fair for the other party. Communication is over an asynchronous network. All our protocols are based on efficient proofs of knowledge and involve no general zero-knowledge tools. As intermediate steps we describe efficient verifiable oblivious transfer and verifiable secure function evaluation protocols, whose security is proved under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. 1
With the development of modern Internet and ad hoc networks, there is an increasing need for autonomous entities cooperating together to perform knowledge-and information-based decision making. Data in its original form, however, typically contains sensitive information about individuals and unmanaged data exchange may violate individual privacy. Secure multi-party computation is proposed to solve this problem and has become a hot topic. Yao's garbled circuit approach is a major method in designing protocols for secure two-party computation. However, only few papers dealt with the fundamental property of fairness for Yao's garbled circuit protocol, in which one introduced a third party and others were based on cut-and-choose techniques that are inherently expensive. In this paper, we propose an efficient fair UC-secure Yao's garbled circuit protocol in the malicious model based on Jarecki et al.'s construction and Ou Ruan et al.'s gradual release commitment. The protocol avoids involving any third party or using cut-and-choose techniques, and it is more bandwidth-efficient than other Yao-based protocols. Furthermore, its security could be proved within the UC framework.
We present new protocols for two parties to exchange documents with fairness, i.e., such that no party can gain an advantage by quitting prematurely or otherwise misbehaving.We use a third party that is L'semi-trusted", in the sense that it may misbehave on its own but will not conspire with either of the main parties.In our solutions, disruption by any one of the three parties will not allow the disrupter gain any useful new information about the documents.Our solutions are efficient and can be based on any of several cryptographic assumptions (e.g., factoring, discrete log, graph isomorpbism).We also discuss the application of our techniques to electronic commerce protocols to achieve fair payment.
We show efficient, practical (server-aided) secure two-party computation protocols ensuring privacy, correctness and fairness in the presence of malicious (Byzantine) faults. Our requirements from the server are modest. To ensure privacy and correctness, we only assume trusted execution service, executing an initialization program provided by both parties. To further ensure fairness, we further assume a trusted-decryption service, providing decryption service using known public key. Both of these trusted services are feasible in practice, and may be useful for additional tasks; both can also be distributed, with linear overhead, for redundancy. Formally, we model them as ideal functionalities, allowing proof of security using the hybrid model. Our fairness-ensuring protocol is optimistic, i.e., the decryption service is invoked only in case of faults. We believe that the protocols are sufficiently efficient, to allow deployment, in particular for financial applications.