Yao first introduced a constant-round protocol for secure two-party computation (2PC) withstanding semi-honest adversaries by using a tool called "garbled circuit". Later, many protocols based on garbled circuit approach have been presented, most of which discussed malicious adversaries and efficiency about 2PC. However, there only have a few protocols dealing with the fundamental property of fairness for Yao's garbled circuit approach, in which one involved a trusted third party and the others are very expensive. In the paper, we propose' an efficient Yao's garbled circuit protocol for fair secure 2PC based on ElGamal encryption, Pedersen commitment, Cachin et al.'s verifiable oblivious transfer and Ou-Ruan et al.'s gradual release homomorphic timed commitment. The protocol achieves two advantages: it doesn't need the third party and it is more efficient than other fair secure Yao's protocols.
Yao first introduced a constant-round protocol for secure two-party computation (2PC) withstanding semi-honest adversaries by using a tool called "garbled circuit". Later, many protocols based on garbled circuit approach have been presented, most of which discussed malicious adversaries and efficiency about 2PC. However, there only have a few protocols dealing with the fundamental property of fairness for Yao's garbled circuit approach, in which one involved a trusted third party and the others are very expensive. In the paper, we propose' an efficient Yao's garbled circuit protocol for fair secure 2PC based on ElGamal encryption, Pedersen commitment, Cachin et al.'s verifiable oblivious transfer and Ou-Ruan et al.'s gradual release homomorphic timed commitment. The protocol achieves two advantages: it doesn't need the third party and it is more efficient than other fair secure Yao's protocols.
With the development of modern Internet and ad hoc networks, there is an increasing need for autonomous entities cooperating together to perform knowledge-and information-based decision making. Data in its original form, however, typically contains sensitive information about individuals and unmanaged data exchange may violate individual privacy. Secure multi-party computation is proposed to solve this problem and has become a hot topic. Yao's garbled circuit approach is a major method in designing protocols for secure two-party computation. However, only few papers dealt with the fundamental property of fairness for Yao's garbled circuit protocol, in which one introduced a third party and others were based on cut-and-choose techniques that are inherently expensive. In this paper, we propose an efficient fair UC-secure Yao's garbled circuit protocol in the malicious model based on Jarecki et al.'s construction and Ou Ruan et al.'s gradual release commitment. The protocol avoids involving any third party or using cut-and-choose techniques, and it is more bandwidth-efficient than other Yao-based protocols. Furthermore, its security could be proved within the UC framework.
Consider several parties that do not trust each other, yet they wish to correctly compute some common function of their local inputs while keeping these inputs private. This problem is known as "Secure Multi-Party Computation", and was introduced by Andrew Yao in 1982. Secure multi-party computations have some real world examples like electronic auctions, electronic voting or fingerprinting. In this thesis we consider the case where there are only two parties involved. This is known as "Secure Two-Party Computation". If there is a trusted third party called Carol, then the problem is pretty straightforward. The participating parties could hand their inputs in Carol who can compute the common function correctly and could return the outputs to the corresponding parties. The goal is to achieve (almost) the same result when there is no trusted third party. Cryptographic protocols are designed in order to solve these kinds of problems. These protocols are analyzed within an appropriate model in which the behavior of parties is structured. The basic level is called the Semi-Honest Model where parties are assumed to follow the protocol specification, but later can derive additional information based on the messages which have been received so far. A more realistic model is the so-called Malicious Model. The common approach is to first analyze a protocol in the semi-honest model and then later extend it into the malicious model. Any cryptographic protocol for secure two-party computation must satisfy the following security requirements: correctness, privacy and fairness. It must guarantee the correctness of the result while preserving the privacy of the parties’ inputs, even if one of the parties is malicious and behaves arbitrarily throughout the protocol. It must also guarantee fairness. This roughly means that whenever a party aborts the protocol prematurely, he or she should not have any advantage over the other party in discovering the output. The main question for researchers is to construct new protocols that achieve the above mentioned goals for secure multi-party computation. Of course, such protocols must be secure in a given model, as well as be as efficient as possible. In 1986, Yao presented the first general protocol for secure two-party computation which was applicable only to the semi-honest model. He uses a tool called "Garbled Circuit". Yao’s protocol uses the underlying primitives ("Pseudorandom Generator" and "Oblivious Transfer") as blackboxes which lead to efficient results. After Yao’s work many variants and improvements have been proposed for the malicious model. In this thesis, we design several new protocols for secure two-party computation based on Yao’s garbled circuit. Before we present the details of our new designs, we first show several weaknesses, security flaws or problems with the existing protocols in the literature. We first work in the semi-honest model and then extend it into the malicious model by presenting new protocols. Finally we add fairness to our protocol. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive in modern cryptography which is useful for implementing protocols for secure multi-party computation. We study several variants of oblivious transfer in this thesis. We present a new protocol for the so-called "Committed OT". This protocol is very efficient in the sense that it is quite good in comparison to the most efficient committed OT protocols in the literature. The abovementioned flaw with the use of OT can be fixed with our committed oblivious transfer protocol. Furthermore, it is more general than all previous protocols, and, therefore, it is of independent interest. We also deal with fairness in this thesis. For protocols based on garbled circuit, so far only Benny Pinkas has presented a protocol in the literature for achieving fairness. We show a subtle problem with this protocol where the privacy of the inputs of one party can be compromised. We also describe this problem in detail which is in fact related to the fairness, and finally propose a more efficient scheme that does achieve fairness.
In this thesis we design and implement three approaches to provide efficient Secure Two- Party Computation (2PC) protocols that are secure in presence of malicious adversaries. The field of secure two-party computation enables two mutually distrusting parties, each with their own private input, to run a computation of an arbitrary program. At the end of the computation, nothing about their private input is leaked except for what can be learned from the output of the computation. The seminal work of Yao in 1986 provided the first proof that such a computation is feasible using the so called garbled circuits and given an Oblivious Transfer protocol. In this thesis, we follow Yao’s garbled circuit approach and focus on efficient protocols that are secure against malicious adversaries. We examine three different categories of optimization. In each category, we present a 2PC protocol, prove its security, and implement it as a proof of concept to demonstrate its running time in practice. Non-interactive Secure Computation: In this category, we offer the first implementation of a malicious 2PC protocol that reduces the required rounds of interaction between the two parties to only two rounds (i.e., each party sends only one message to the other party). Mixed Secure Two-Party Computation: In the second category we target big and complex programs and break them into subprograms. Then, we compute each subprogram using the most efficient 2PC protocol that is suitable for it. Finally, we securely connect these subprograms together. The goal is to reduce the overhead of the garbled circuits significantly, which results in a more efficient overall 2PC protocol for programs with specific properties. Secure Computation for Random Access Machine Programs: In the third category, we target programs that require random access to the memory (as opposed to a sequential access). We present the first efficient maliciously-secure protocol for computing such programs.
Many deployments of secure multi-party computation (MPC) in practice have used information-theoretic three-party protocols that tolerate a single, semi-honest corrupt party, since these protocols enjoy very high efficiency. We propose a new approach for secure three-party computation (3PC) that improves security while maintaining practical efficiency that is competitive with traditional information-theoretic protocols. Our protocol is based on garbled circuits and provides security against a single, malicious corrupt party. Unlike information-theoretic 3PC protocols, ours uses a constant number of rounds. Our protocol only uses inexpensive symmetric-key cryptography: hash functions, block ciphers, pseudorandom generators (in particular, no oblivious transfers) and has performance that is comparable to that of Yao’s (semi-honest) 2PC protocol. We demonstrate the practicality of our protocol with an implementation based on the JustGarble framework of Bellare et al. (S&P 2013). The implementation incorporates various optimizations including the most recent techniques for efficient circuit garbling. We perform experiments on several benchmarking circuits, in different setups. Our experiments confirm that, despite providing a more demanding security guarantee, our protocol has performance comparable to existing information-theoretic 3PC. 1
Abstract. We propose a new two-party computation protocol using Yao’s garbled circuits, which is secure in the case of malicious behavior. To illustrate the need for the new protocol, we first discuss security issues of three existing protocols for secure two-party computation using garbled circuits, in the case of malicious behavior. The first is a protocol by Pinkas (Eurocrypt 2003), and the other two are the committed-input scheme and the k-leaked model, both presented by Mohassel and Franklin (PKC 2006). We address security flaws in all schemes, which allow leaking of information on the private inputs. In the k-leaked model leaking of some information is permitted if a participant is cheating, but then the honest participant should be aware of it. We show that this is not the case. After discussing these security issues of the known schemes, we describe our new protocol. It is based on the protocol by Pinkas, and the correction of the flaw of the scheme by Pinkas makes our protocol not only more secure, but also more efficient. We provide a detailed informal security analysis of our new protocol. Keywords: Secure two-party computation, Yao’s garbled circuit, active adversary 1