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International Conference on Security and Cryptography

SERVER-ASSISTED LONG-TERM SECURE 3-PARTY KEY ESTABLISHMENT

Kashi Neupane, Rainer Steinwandt

Published Jan 1, 2010• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Consider a scenario where a server S shares a symmetric key k U with each user U. Building on a 2-party solution of Bohli et al., we describe an authenticated 3-party key establishment which remains secure if a computational Bilinear Diffie Hellman problem is hard or the server is uncorrupted. If the BDH assumption holds during a protocol execution, but is invalidated later, entity authentication and integrity of the protocol are still guaranteed.

DOI
10.5220/0002983503720378

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Consider a scenario where a server S shares a symmetric key k U with each user U. Building on a 2-party solution of Bohli et al., we describe an authenticated 3-party key establishment which remains secure if a computational Bilinear Diffie Hellman problem is hard or the server is uncorrupted. If the BDH assumption holds during a protocol execution, but is invalidated later, entity authentication and integrity of the protocol are still guaranteed.
Authenticated key-exchange protocols allow two participants A and B , communicating over a public network and each holding an authentication means to exchange a shared secret value. Methods designed to deal with this cryptographic problem ensure A (resp. B ) that no other participants aside from B (resp. A ) can learn any information about the agreed value and often also ensure A and B that their respective partner has actually computed this value. A natural extension to this cryptographic method is to consider a pool of participants exchanging a shared secret value and to provide a formal treatment for it. Starting from the famous two-party Diffie--Hellman (DH) key-exchange protocol and from its authenticated variants, security experts have extended it to the multiparty setting for over a decade and, in the past few years, completed a formal analysis in the framework of modern cryptography. The present paper synthesizes this body of work on the provably-secure authenticated group DH key exchange.
Recently,Lippold et al.proposed certificateless authenticated two-party key agreement with provable security,their scheme suffers from computation burden.Basesd on twin diffie-hellman problem introduced by Cash,Kiltz and Shoup,A new scheme using bilinear pair is proposed.When compared with Lippold's scheme,the proposed protocol,with the same message bandwidth,achieves efficiency in computational cost.The security of the proposed scheme has been proven in the random oracle model under CDH assumption and BDH assumption.
Dynamic group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE) are designed to work in scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance but where parties may join and may also leave the multicast group at any given time. While several schemes have been proposed to deal with this scenario no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we define a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) with ''implicit'' authentication as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of a protocol modified from a dynamic group Diffie-Hellman scheme offered in the literature and prove its security.
Key agreement is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives in public key cryptography. It plays an important role for securing systems in practice. In this paper, we present the first certificateless one-way authenticated two-party key agreement protocol. The security of the proposed protocol is analyzed based on the intractability of the standard discrete logarithm (DL) and bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problems. For efficiency, our protocol enjoys low complexity in both communication and computation.
The authentication key exchange protocol enables communication participants to authenticate each other and agree on the session key over an insecure public network. Recently, a three-party authentication key exchange protocol based on Elliptic curve cryptograph is proposed. In this paper, we improve the three-party encrypted key exchange protocol by bilinear maps. The proposed threeparty authentication key exchange protocol is provable secure under Computational Diffie-Hellman assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, the novel protocol is more efficient.
In this paper, we present a new ID-based two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which makes use of a new technique called twin Diffie-Hellman problem proposed by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup. We show that our scheme is secure under bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, which better supports the adversary's queries than previous AKE models. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first ID-based AKE protocol provably secure in eCK model.