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International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security

Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange - The dynamic case (Extended abstract)

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval

Published Sep 20, 2001• 13 citations
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Abstract

Dynamic group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE) are designed to work in scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance but where parties may join and may also leave the multicast group at any given time. While several schemes have been proposed to deal with this scenario no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we define a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) with ''implicit'' authentication as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of a protocol modified from a dynamic group Diffie-Hellman scheme offered in the literature and prove its security.

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Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange - The dynamic case (Extended abstract) - eScholarship

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval

Dynamic group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE) are designed to work in scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance but where parties may join and may also leave the multicast group at any given time. While several schemes have been proposed to deal with this scenario no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we define a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) with implicit authentication as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of a protocol modified from a dynamic group Diffie-Hellman scheme offered in the literature and prove its security.

•Sep 20, 2001•1 citation

Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange - The dynamic \ncase (Extended abstract)

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval

Dynamic group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE) are designed to work in scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance but where parties may join and may also leave the multicast group at any given time. While several schemes have been proposed to deal with this scenario no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we define a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) with "implicit" authentication as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of a protocol modified from a dynamic group Diffie-Hellman scheme offered in the literature and prove its security.

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Provably Authenticated Group Die-Hellman Key Exchange { The Dynamic Case (Full version)

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval

Dynamic group Die-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to work in a scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance but where parties may join and may also leave the multicast group at any given time. While several schemes have been proposed to deal with this scenario no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we dene a security model for this problem and use it to precisely dene Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) with \implicit authentication as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then dene in this model the execution of a protocol modied from a dynamic group Die-Hellman scheme oered in the litterature and prove its security. Group Die-Hellman schemes for Authenticated Key Exchange are designed to provide a pool of players communicating over a public network and holding long-lived secrets with a session key to be used to achieve multicast message conden tiality or multicast data integrity. In this paper, we consider the scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance { dynamic rather than static { where parties may join and leave the multicast group at any given time. After the initialization phase, and throughout the lifetime of the multicast group, the parties need to be able to engage in a conversation after each change in the membership at the end of which the session key is updated to be sk 0 . The secret value sk 0 is only known to the party in the multicast group during the period when sk 0 is the session key. The adversary may generate repeated and arbitrarily ordered changes in the membership for subsets of parties of his choice. The above scenario is a distributed application in which up to one hundred parties work together in order to get a task done where many of the parties may be sending data to the multicast group (12). Examples of such applications include replicated server (21), audio-video conferencing (20) and collaborative tools (2).

•Jan 1, 2001•0 citations

Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval +1 more

Group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to provide a pool of players with a shared secret key which may later be used, for example, to achieve multicast message integrity. Over the years, several schemes have been offered. However, no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we present a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define AKE (with "implicit" authentication) as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of an authenticated group Diffie-Hellman scheme and prove its security.

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)•Jan 1, 2001•48 citations

Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval +1 more

Group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to provide a pool of players with a shared secret key which may later be used, for example, to achieve multicast message integrity. Over the years, several schemes have been offered. However, no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we present a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define AKE (with "implicit" authentication) as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of an authenticated group Diffie-Hellman scheme and prove its security.

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)•Nov 5, 2001•372 citations

Provably secure authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval

Authenticated key-exchange protocols allow two participants A and B , communicating over a public network and each holding an authentication means to exchange a shared secret value. Methods designed to deal with this cryptographic problem ensure A (resp. B ) that no other participants aside from B (resp. A ) can learn any information about the agreed value and often also ensure A and B that their respective partner has actually computed this value. A natural extension to this cryptographic method is to consider a pool of participants exchanging a shared secret value and to provide a formal treatment for it. Starting from the famous two-party Diffie--Hellman (DH) key-exchange protocol and from its authenticated variants, security experts have extended it to the multiparty setting for over a decade and, in the past few years, completed a formal analysis in the framework of modern cryptography. The present paper synthesizes this body of work on the provably-secure authenticated group DH key exchange.

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security•Jul 1, 2007•88 citations
Dynamic group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE) are designed to work in scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance but where parties may join and may also leave the multicast group at any given time. While several schemes have been proposed to deal with this scenario no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we define a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) with ''implicit'' authentication as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of a protocol modified from a dynamic group Diffie-Hellman scheme offered in the literature and prove its security.
Dynamic group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE) are designed to work in scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance but where parties may join and may also leave the multicast group at any given time. While several schemes have been proposed to deal with this scenario no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we define a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) with implicit authentication as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of a protocol modified from a dynamic group Diffie-Hellman scheme offered in the literature and prove its security.
Dynamic group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE) are designed to work in scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance but where parties may join and may also leave the multicast group at any given time. While several schemes have been proposed to deal with this scenario no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we define a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) with "implicit" authentication as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of a protocol modified from a dynamic group Diffie-Hellman scheme offered in the literature and prove its security.
Dynamic group Die-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to work in a scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance but where parties may join and may also leave the multicast group at any given time. While several schemes have been proposed to deal with this scenario no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we dene a security model for this problem and use it to precisely dene Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) with \implicit authentication as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then dene in this model the execution of a protocol modied from a dynamic group Die-Hellman scheme oered in the litterature and prove its security. Group Die-Hellman schemes for Authenticated Key Exchange are designed to provide a pool of players communicating over a public network and holding long-lived secrets with a session key to be used to achieve multicast message conden tiality or multicast data integrity. In this paper, we consider the scenario in which the group membership is not known in advance { dynamic rather than static { where parties may join and leave the multicast group at any given time. After the initialization phase, and throughout the lifetime of the multicast group, the parties need to be able to engage in a conversation after each change in the membership at the end of which the session key is updated to be sk 0 . The secret value sk 0 is only known to the party in the multicast group during the period when sk 0 is the session key. The adversary may generate repeated and arbitrarily ordered changes in the membership for subsets of parties of his choice. The above scenario is a distributed application in which up to one hundred parties work together in order to get a task done where many of the parties may be sending data to the multicast group (12). Examples of such applications include replicated server (21), audio-video conferencing (20) and collaborative tools (2).
Group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to provide a pool of players with a shared secret key which may later be used, for example, to achieve multicast message integrity. Over the years, several schemes have been offered. However, no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we present a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define AKE (with "implicit" authentication) as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of an authenticated group Diffie-Hellman scheme and prove its security.
Group Diffie-Hellman protocols for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) are designed to provide a pool of players with a shared secret key which may later be used, for example, to achieve multicast message integrity. Over the years, several schemes have been offered. However, no formal treatment for this cryptographic problem has ever been suggested. In this paper, we present a security model for this problem and use it to precisely define AKE (with "implicit" authentication) as the fundamental goal, and the entity-authentication goal as well. We then define in this model the execution of an authenticated group Diffie-Hellman scheme and prove its security.
Authenticated key-exchange protocols allow two participants A and B , communicating over a public network and each holding an authentication means to exchange a shared secret value. Methods designed to deal with this cryptographic problem ensure A (resp. B ) that no other participants aside from B (resp. A ) can learn any information about the agreed value and often also ensure A and B that their respective partner has actually computed this value. A natural extension to this cryptographic method is to consider a pool of participants exchanging a shared secret value and to provide a formal treatment for it. Starting from the famous two-party Diffie--Hellman (DH) key-exchange protocol and from its authenticated variants, security experts have extended it to the multiparty setting for over a decade and, in the past few years, completed a formal analysis in the framework of modern cryptography. The present paper synthesizes this body of work on the provably-secure authenticated group DH key exchange.