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The Journal of mind and behavior

Nature's psychogenic forces: Localized quantum consciousness

Zaman, L. Frederick

Published Jan 1, 2002• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

It has been suggested that the quantum of the microworld may constitute or be caused by an elementary consciousness in nature that could be the source of brain-mind consciousness as well. This essay explores the possibility that the espoused quantum consciousness, when the identity quantum fluctuations ≡ force classically manifested is assumed, extends upward into the macroscopic world of physics via the classical approximation of the Ehrenfest theorem. Newton's laws of motion then define localized forces of consciousness that are psychogenic rather than mechanistic, which are immanent, intentional, and self-directed. In this quantum-inspired, idealist reinterpretation of physics, gravitational, electrical and other fields in space-time are information supplied rather than force applied, to which matter's psychogenic forces purposefully and lawfully respond. Consciousness and change (fluctuation, oscillation, flow, movement, etc... ) are then an identity, whether the change is quantum (and non-local) or (and local) in character. The calculus of Newton and Leibniz in this quantum idealism is of and by conscious being, rather than blind mechanisms. When consciousness is thus understood, our being is a more ordered form of matter ensouled by psychogenic forces explained by more refined systems of physics.

Related papers

Physics From Consciousness

Donald D. Hoffman

Scientific investigation of the classic mind-body problem has failed to produce a viable theory. As McGinn puts it, We know that brains are the de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it seems, no understanding whatever of how this can be. I propose that the obstruction is commitment to a physicalist ontology: It is not possible to obtain consciousness from unconscious ingredients. I propose instead the ontology of conscious realism: Consciousness and its contents are all that exists. Matter, brains, and space-time are among the contents of consciousness, dependent on it for their existence. For a conscious realist the mind-body problem is to show precisely how conscious agents construct the macroscopic and microscopic physical world. I propose a mathematically rigorous account of conscious agents and their dynamics, and of their construction of the physical world. In particular, I propose that the physical world is a species-specific user interface, and that quantum physics represents properties of the stable dynamics of conscious agents. Symmetries of these stable dynamics are the source of the symmetries studied in quantum physics. I present a concrete dynamics for pairs of conscious agents that exhibits SL(2,C) symmetry, and from this obtain a physical representation of the dynamics in terms of relativistic spin half particles. This representation allows one to canonically associate a discrete patch of Minkowski space-time to each such pair of conscious agents, and suggests that, at the smallest scale, space-time is discrete. This suggestion comports well with current approaches to quantum gravity.

IMBS Colloquium•Sep 27, 2006•16 citations

Physicalism versus quantum mechanics

Henry Pierce Stapp

In the context of theories of the connection between mind and brain, physicalism is the demand that all is basically purely physical. But the concept of "physical" embodied in this demand is characterized essentially by the properties of the physical that hold in classical physical theories. Certain of these properties contradict the character of the physical in quantum mechanics, which provides a better, more comprehensive, and more fundamental account of phenomena. It is argued that the difficulties that have plaged physicalists for half a century, and that continue to do so, dissolve when the classical idea of the physical is replaced by its quantum successor. The argument is concretized in a way that makes it accessible to non-physicists by exploiting the recent evidence connecting our conscious experiences to macroscopic measurable synchronous oscillations occurring in well-separated parts of the brain. A specific new model of the mind-brain connection that is fundamentally quantum mechanical but that ties conscious experiences to these macroscopic synchronous oscillations is used to illustrate the essential disparities between the classical and quantum notions of the physical, and in particular to demonstrate the failure in the quantum world of the principle of the causal closure of the physical, a failure that goes beyond what is entailed by the randomness in the outcomes of observations, and that accommodates the efficacy in the brain of conscious intent.

arXiv:0803.1625•Mar 11, 2008•3 citations

Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics

Jonathan Simon

This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.

The Philosophical Review•Jul 1, 2024•0 citations

Consciousness in the quantum world: An Indian perspective

Ulrich Mohrhoff

In the first part of the paper a new interpretative principle for quantum mechanics is applied to two kinds of experimental situation. Applied to situations involving distinctions between regions of space, it implies that the spatial differentiation of the physical world is incomplete. This makes it possible to rigorously define the term “macroscopic” and to attribute measurement-independent reality to the positions of macroscopic objects. Applied to situations involving distinctions between things, it warrants the conclusion that intrinsically each fundamental particle is numerically identical with every other fundamental particle. Reality therefore cannot be modelled from the bottom up. Quantum theory’s explanatory arrow points in the opposite direction: from unity to multiplicity. It is the manifestation of an intrinsically undifferentiated Being. In the second part of the paper the work of the Indian philosopher Sri Aurobindo is made use of to explain how consciousness is present in this Being, how it is involved in each fundamental particle, and how it has evolved into our mental consciousness. The role played by the laws of physics in this evolutionary manifestation of Being is discussed, as is the evolution of free will.

De Gruyter eBooks•Aug 6, 2014•4 citations

NEWS ON QUANTUM FOUNDATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Alexander A. Berezin

This note was written by a theoretical physicist currently working on physical aspects of consciousness, mind-matter relationships, and mind-body interactions. My purpose here is to inform the readers of this journal, in not too technical terms, of some recent ideas relating quantum mechanics, gravitation, and psychological phenomena. Attempts to relate the nature of consciousness to quantum mechanics have been known almost from the be+g of quantum mechanics. For an extended discussion and earlier references see, e.g., Stapp (1982). The common thread of the majority of the suggested hypotheses linking consciousness to a quantum level of description is a drawing of a between the spontaneous localization of mental patterns and (spontaneous or induced) reduction of the wave function in quantum mechanics. The latter essentially means that quantum systems are inherently described in probabilistic terms and any external observation reduces the manyfold of all potential possibilia to a single given realization. Interpretation of this process is one of the most difficult and controversial topics of quantum mechanics since in quantum mechanics it is thus far essentially impossible to demarcate unambiguously the observer from the quantum system itself. Despite that gravitational effects are usually deemed to be too weak at atomic level, a few authors recently discussed gravity as an inherent route used by nature to achieve an automatic spontaneous reduction of the wave functions of extended objects. In his recent book, Roger Penrose (1989) looks for the possible connections between consciousness, quantum mechanical reduction and gravitational phenomena. To simplify, the essence of these hypotheses is that subtle gravitational effects at the atomic-molecular level lock the brain into a particular mental state, thereby providing the materialization of the potential (quantum) mental image by the route similar to the reduction of the wave function in quantum mechanics. Isotopic diversity of chemical elements can substantially contribute to this picture, as well as to life processes in general (Berezin, 1988). Since gravity is a mass-sensitive effect, the fact that different stable isotopes of the same element (e.g., carbon, oxygen, nitrogen) have different atomic masses may affect the path of mental processing.

Perceptual and Motor Skills•Jan 1, 1990•1 citation

The Effect of Mind upon Brain

Henry Pierce Stapp

A physics-based understanding of how our conscious thoughts can affect our physically described brains is presented. This understanding depends on the shift from the mechanical conception of nature that prevailed in science from the time of Isaac Newton until the dawn of the twentieth century to the psychophysical conception that emerged from the findings of Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, and von Neumann. This shift converted the role of our conscious thoughts from that of passive observers of a causally closed physically described universe to that of active participants in an essentially psychophysical understanding of nature. 1. The Basic Question and Why It Is Important. Science’s conception of the physical world changed radically during the twentieth century. At the end of the nineteenth century most scientists still viewed the physical universe as essentially a giant machine. This mechanical view emerged from the seventeenth century work of Isaac Newton, who built his conception of nature on the ideas of Rene Descartes. According to Descartes, the universe is composed of two kinds of elements, the first consisting of elements each of which occupies at each instant of time a definite region in space, and the second consisting of elements that include our human thoughts. Descartes allowed these two parts of nature to interact causally within our brains, but Newton specified that the motions of the elements of the first kind are completely determined by laws of motion that refer exclusively to elements of this kind. In Newtonian-type physics these elements of the first kind are, moreover, essentially mechanical, in the sense that they have been stripped of the experiential qualities that characterize our thoughts, such as the conscious awareness of feelings, and the capacity to grasp meanings. Consequently there is in Newtonian-type physics no possibility for any causally effective role for any aspects of our being that are essentially different in kind from the mechanical elements that occur in that type of physics. Descartes’ views accommodated our intuitive feeling that our conscious thoughts can influence our bodily movements – my conscious intent to raise my arm seems to cause my arm to rise – whereas Newton’s physics leads to the contrary conclusion that, in spite of what may seem to be the case, the notion that human thoughts, per se, can affect human actions is a deeply misleading illusion. Newton’s ideas led eventually to the classical physics of the late nineteenth century. Its main premises are these: 2 1. There exists a material universe that develops over the course of time by means of interactions of its tiny mechanical parts with neighboring tiny mechanical parts. 2. These interactions are governed by mathematical laws. 3. These laws entail that the mechanically described future is completely determined by the mechanically described past, with no reference to human thoughts, choices, or

De Gruyter eBooks•May 16, 2014•3 citations
It has been suggested that the quantum of the microworld may constitute or be caused by an elementary consciousness in nature that could be the source of brain-mind consciousness as well. This essay explores the possibility that the espoused quantum consciousness, when the identity quantum fluctuations ≡ force classically manifested is assumed, extends upward into the macroscopic world of physics via the classical approximation of the Ehrenfest theorem. Newton's laws of motion then define localized forces of consciousness that are psychogenic rather than mechanistic, which are immanent, intentional, and self-directed. In this quantum-inspired, idealist reinterpretation of physics, gravitational, electrical and other fields in space-time are information supplied rather than force applied, to which matter's psychogenic forces purposefully and lawfully respond. Consciousness and change (fluctuation, oscillation, flow, movement, etc... ) are then an identity, whether the change is quantum (and non-local) or (and local) in character. The calculus of Newton and Leibniz in this quantum idealism is of and by conscious being, rather than blind mechanisms. When consciousness is thus understood, our being is a more ordered form of matter ensouled by psychogenic forces explained by more refined systems of physics.
Scientific investigation of the classic mind-body problem has failed to produce a viable theory. As McGinn puts it, We know that brains are the de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it seems, no understanding whatever of how this can be. I propose that the obstruction is commitment to a physicalist ontology: It is not possible to obtain consciousness from unconscious ingredients. I propose instead the ontology of conscious realism: Consciousness and its contents are all that exists. Matter, brains, and space-time are among the contents of consciousness, dependent on it for their existence. For a conscious realist the mind-body problem is to show precisely how conscious agents construct the macroscopic and microscopic physical world. I propose a mathematically rigorous account of conscious agents and their dynamics, and of their construction of the physical world. In particular, I propose that the physical world is a species-specific user interface, and that quantum physics represents properties of the stable dynamics of conscious agents. Symmetries of these stable dynamics are the source of the symmetries studied in quantum physics. I present a concrete dynamics for pairs of conscious agents that exhibits SL(2,C) symmetry, and from this obtain a physical representation of the dynamics in terms of relativistic spin half particles. This representation allows one to canonically associate a discrete patch of Minkowski space-time to each such pair of conscious agents, and suggests that, at the smallest scale, space-time is discrete. This suggestion comports well with current approaches to quantum gravity.
In the context of theories of the connection between mind and brain, physicalism is the demand that all is basically purely physical. But the concept of "physical" embodied in this demand is characterized essentially by the properties of the physical that hold in classical physical theories. Certain of these properties contradict the character of the physical in quantum mechanics, which provides a better, more comprehensive, and more fundamental account of phenomena. It is argued that the difficulties that have plaged physicalists for half a century, and that continue to do so, dissolve when the classical idea of the physical is replaced by its quantum successor. The argument is concretized in a way that makes it accessible to non-physicists by exploiting the recent evidence connecting our conscious experiences to macroscopic measurable synchronous oscillations occurring in well-separated parts of the brain. A specific new model of the mind-brain connection that is fundamentally quantum mechanical but that ties conscious experiences to these macroscopic synchronous oscillations is used to illustrate the essential disparities between the classical and quantum notions of the physical, and in particular to demonstrate the failure in the quantum world of the principle of the causal closure of the physical, a failure that goes beyond what is entailed by the randomness in the outcomes of observations, and that accommodates the efficacy in the brain of conscious intent.
This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.
In the first part of the paper a new interpretative principle for quantum mechanics is applied to two kinds of experimental situation. Applied to situations involving distinctions between regions of space, it implies that the spatial differentiation of the physical world is incomplete. This makes it possible to rigorously define the term “macroscopic” and to attribute measurement-independent reality to the positions of macroscopic objects. Applied to situations involving distinctions between things, it warrants the conclusion that intrinsically each fundamental particle is numerically identical with every other fundamental particle. Reality therefore cannot be modelled from the bottom up. Quantum theory’s explanatory arrow points in the opposite direction: from unity to multiplicity. It is the manifestation of an intrinsically undifferentiated Being. In the second part of the paper the work of the Indian philosopher Sri Aurobindo is made use of to explain how consciousness is present in this Being, how it is involved in each fundamental particle, and how it has evolved into our mental consciousness. The role played by the laws of physics in this evolutionary manifestation of Being is discussed, as is the evolution of free will.
This note was written by a theoretical physicist currently working on physical aspects of consciousness, mind-matter relationships, and mind-body interactions. My purpose here is to inform the readers of this journal, in not too technical terms, of some recent ideas relating quantum mechanics, gravitation, and psychological phenomena. Attempts to relate the nature of consciousness to quantum mechanics have been known almost from the be+g of quantum mechanics. For an extended discussion and earlier references see, e.g., Stapp (1982). The common thread of the majority of the suggested hypotheses linking consciousness to a quantum level of description is a drawing of a between the spontaneous localization of mental patterns and (spontaneous or induced) reduction of the wave function in quantum mechanics. The latter essentially means that quantum systems are inherently described in probabilistic terms and any external observation reduces the manyfold of all potential possibilia to a single given realization. Interpretation of this process is one of the most difficult and controversial topics of quantum mechanics since in quantum mechanics it is thus far essentially impossible to demarcate unambiguously the observer from the quantum system itself. Despite that gravitational effects are usually deemed to be too weak at atomic level, a few authors recently discussed gravity as an inherent route used by nature to achieve an automatic spontaneous reduction of the wave functions of extended objects. In his recent book, Roger Penrose (1989) looks for the possible connections between consciousness, quantum mechanical reduction and gravitational phenomena. To simplify, the essence of these hypotheses is that subtle gravitational effects at the atomic-molecular level lock the brain into a particular mental state, thereby providing the materialization of the potential (quantum) mental image by the route similar to the reduction of the wave function in quantum mechanics. Isotopic diversity of chemical elements can substantially contribute to this picture, as well as to life processes in general (Berezin, 1988). Since gravity is a mass-sensitive effect, the fact that different stable isotopes of the same element (e.g., carbon, oxygen, nitrogen) have different atomic masses may affect the path of mental processing.
A physics-based understanding of how our conscious thoughts can affect our physically described brains is presented. This understanding depends on the shift from the mechanical conception of nature that prevailed in science from the time of Isaac Newton until the dawn of the twentieth century to the psychophysical conception that emerged from the findings of Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, and von Neumann. This shift converted the role of our conscious thoughts from that of passive observers of a causally closed physically described universe to that of active participants in an essentially psychophysical understanding of nature. 1. The Basic Question and Why It Is Important. Science’s conception of the physical world changed radically during the twentieth century. At the end of the nineteenth century most scientists still viewed the physical universe as essentially a giant machine. This mechanical view emerged from the seventeenth century work of Isaac Newton, who built his conception of nature on the ideas of Rene Descartes. According to Descartes, the universe is composed of two kinds of elements, the first consisting of elements each of which occupies at each instant of time a definite region in space, and the second consisting of elements that include our human thoughts. Descartes allowed these two parts of nature to interact causally within our brains, but Newton specified that the motions of the elements of the first kind are completely determined by laws of motion that refer exclusively to elements of this kind. In Newtonian-type physics these elements of the first kind are, moreover, essentially mechanical, in the sense that they have been stripped of the experiential qualities that characterize our thoughts, such as the conscious awareness of feelings, and the capacity to grasp meanings. Consequently there is in Newtonian-type physics no possibility for any causally effective role for any aspects of our being that are essentially different in kind from the mechanical elements that occur in that type of physics. Descartes’ views accommodated our intuitive feeling that our conscious thoughts can influence our bodily movements – my conscious intent to raise my arm seems to cause my arm to rise – whereas Newton’s physics leads to the contrary conclusion that, in spite of what may seem to be the case, the notion that human thoughts, per se, can affect human actions is a deeply misleading illusion. Newton’s ideas led eventually to the classical physics of the late nineteenth century. Its main premises are these: 2 1. There exists a material universe that develops over the course of time by means of interactions of its tiny mechanical parts with neighboring tiny mechanical parts. 2. These interactions are governed by mathematical laws. 3. These laws entail that the mechanically described future is completely determined by the mechanically described past, with no reference to human thoughts, choices, or