This note was written by a theoretical physicist currently working on physical aspects of consciousness, mind-matter relationships, and mind-body interactions. My purpose here is to inform the readers of this journal, in not too technical terms, of some recent ideas relating quantum mechanics, gravitation, and psychological phenomena. Attempts to relate the nature of consciousness to quantum mechanics have been known almost from the be+g of quantum mechanics. For an extended discussion and earlier references see, e.g., Stapp (1982). The common thread of the majority of the suggested hypotheses linking consciousness to a quantum level of description is a drawing of a between the spontaneous localization of mental patterns and (spontaneous or induced) reduction of the wave function in quantum mechanics. The latter essentially means that quantum systems are inherently described in probabilistic terms and any external observation reduces the manyfold of all potential possibilia to a single given realization. Interpretation of this process is one of the most difficult and controversial topics of quantum mechanics since in quantum mechanics it is thus far essentially impossible to demarcate unambiguously the observer from the quantum system itself. Despite that gravitational effects are usually deemed to be too weak at atomic level, a few authors recently discussed gravity as an inherent route used by nature to achieve an automatic spontaneous reduction of the wave functions of extended objects. In his recent book, Roger Penrose (1989) looks for the possible connections between consciousness, quantum mechanical reduction and gravitational phenomena. To simplify, the essence of these hypotheses is that subtle gravitational effects at the atomic-molecular level lock the brain into a particular mental state, thereby providing the materialization of the potential (quantum) mental image by the route similar to the reduction of the wave function in quantum mechanics. Isotopic diversity of chemical elements can substantially contribute to this picture, as well as to life processes in general (Berezin, 1988). Since gravity is a mass-sensitive effect, the fact that different stable isotopes of the same element (e.g., carbon, oxygen, nitrogen) have different atomic masses may affect the path of mental processing.
This note was written by a theoretical physicist currently working on physical aspects of consciousness, mind-matter relationships, and mind-body interactions. My purpose here is to inform the readers of this journal, in not too technical terms, of some recent ideas relating quantum mechanics, gravitation, and psychological phenomena. Attempts to relate the nature of consciousness to quantum mechanics have been known almost from the be+g of quantum mechanics. For an extended discussion and earlier references see, e.g., Stapp (1982). The common thread of the majority of the suggested hypotheses linking consciousness to a quantum level of description is a drawing of a between the spontaneous localization of mental patterns and (spontaneous or induced) reduction of the wave function in quantum mechanics. The latter essentially means that quantum systems are inherently described in probabilistic terms and any external observation reduces the manyfold of all potential possibilia to a single given realization. Interpretation of this process is one of the most difficult and controversial topics of quantum mechanics since in quantum mechanics it is thus far essentially impossible to demarcate unambiguously the observer from the quantum system itself. Despite that gravitational effects are usually deemed to be too weak at atomic level, a few authors recently discussed gravity as an inherent route used by nature to achieve an automatic spontaneous reduction of the wave functions of extended objects. In his recent book, Roger Penrose (1989) looks for the possible connections between consciousness, quantum mechanical reduction and gravitational phenomena. To simplify, the essence of these hypotheses is that subtle gravitational effects at the atomic-molecular level lock the brain into a particular mental state, thereby providing the materialization of the potential (quantum) mental image by the route similar to the reduction of the wave function in quantum mechanics. Isotopic diversity of chemical elements can substantially contribute to this picture, as well as to life processes in general (Berezin, 1988). Since gravity is a mass-sensitive effect, the fact that different stable isotopes of the same element (e.g., carbon, oxygen, nitrogen) have different atomic masses may affect the path of mental processing.
This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
The mind–matter relationship remained in the domain of philosophers for aeons. However, the inquisitiveness of the scientific minds has always been trying to understand the science behind its various functions. The scientific temper ushered in by the Renaissance about the 15th century saw the scientists exploring this problem from a science point of view. Technological advances during the later part of the 20th century enabled neuroscientists to explore and localise functions of the brain. However, the most difficult has been understanding the origin of a conscious experience scientifically or materialistically. Despite the delineation of many functions of the brain, the origin of conscious experience, the qualia, in the material brain remains elusive, so much so it came to be called the holy grail of neuroscience. Heisenberg wrote: ‘Physics entered the domain of philosophy with the emergence of consciousness in quantum observation, which incidentally opened the door for reconciliation of science and philosophy’,[1] an event which enabled the predictions of Snow of the merging of arts and sciences.[2,3] Quantum mechanics is a branch of physics relating to very small particles – subatomic particles – electrons, photons, and everything in the submolecular realm, being the smallest units in matter. Quantum theory is the most fundamental theory of matter available at present. Some basic concepts of quantum physics need to be understood. These include “superposition”, where in subatomic particles exist either as waves or particles in a dual nature, never simultaneously. They exist as waves in more than one place at a time and once an observer observes or interferes with (such as measuring) their superposition state collapses to particle state. Quantum entanglement is the phenomenon that occurs when a group of particles which are generated, interact with or share special proximity such that they remain connected even when separated by vast distances. Consciousness is a manifestation of quantum process. Q mind or Q consciousness comprises a group of hypotheses proposing that quantum mechanical phenomena such as entanglement and superposition may play an important part in the functions of the brain and could thus explain the origin of consciousness. Several theories of quantum consciousness have been proposed. Wigner proposed the idea that quantum mechanics has something to do with the workings of the mind and proposed that the wave function collapse in the interaction with conscious observation creates consciousness.[4] Vitiello and Freeman[5] proposed quantum field theory (QFT) of brain states. This theory deals with systems and provides formal elements from which a standard description of brain activity can be inferred. According to QFT, particles are only excited states or simply manifestations of a field. Every particle has its own field that covers all of the universe, which means that, according to QFT, all of the electrons of the universe belong to the same field and could be regarded as one. Bohm formulated the QFT as a deeper theory of quantum theory plus relativity.[6] He viewed mind and matter as projections into our explicate order underlying the implicate order. Quantum brain dynamics (QBD) hypothesis explains the function of the brain within the framework of QFT.[7] It is not yet known exactly how quantum superpositions and their collapse result in the genesis of the raw feels of consciousness, the qualia. Feynman stated ‘if you think you understand quantum mechanics then you do not!’[8] Pribram proposed the holonomic brain theory (quantum holography). He invoked quantum mechanics to explain the higher-order processing by the mind. Pribram provided evidence on how much of the processes in the brain take place in a distributed fashion.[9,10] The composite model of Pribram-Bohm of holoflux hypothesis addresses observed phenomenon of non-locality both spacially and temporally. Bose and Einstein, who first predicted Bose Einstein condensate proposed that water at dendritic membrane surfaces might operate by structuring condensation,[11] supporting QBD. Penrose and Hamoreff proposed the orchestrated-objective reduction (ORCH-OR) in 1989 through 2013. According to them, the microtubules in the neurons (neurotubules), the tubulin protein polymer at the site of quantum collapse, leads to conscious experience. The quantum superposed states which develop in the tubulins remain coherent and recruit more superposed tubulins until a mass-time-energy threshold is reached. At this point, self-collapse or objective reduction occurs, which is equated to a discrete conscious event. Cascades of ORCH-OR events give rise to the stream of consciousness.[12,13] Penrose suggested that objective reduction represents neither randomness nor algorithmic processing but instead a non-computable influence in spacetime geometry from which mathematical understanding and, by later extension, consciousness derives.[14] Quantum vibrations in the microtubules proposed by Bandyopadhyay[15] have been shown to be source of conscious experience by corroborating the Penrose-Hemeroff’s ORCH-OR hypothesis.[13,16] In April 2022, the results of two related experiments at the University of Alberta and Princeton University, announced at The Science of Consciousness conference, provided further evidence to support quantum processes operating within microtubules. However, in another experiment, Gregory D. Scholes and Aarat Kalra of Princeton University used lasers to excite molecules within tubulins, causing a prolonged excitation to diffuse through microtubules further than expected, which did not occur when repeated under anaesthesia.[17,18] Beck and Eccles considered quantum mechanics at the synaptic level. If Orchestrated objective reduction (ORCH-OR) theory is applicable, a similar phenomenon in the microtubules at the presynaptic level, the axon terminal could be invoked for the genesis of consciousness.[19] A recent study by scientists at Trinity College, Dublin, in October 2022,[20] suggests that quantum processes underlie the cognitive and conscious brain functions. The brain–mind operational architectonics is the boundary between and integration point of quantum physics and eastern metaphysics and that it may inspire building a richer and more inclusive paradigm of the brain–mind relation, where quantum physics and eastern metaphysics are inherently intertwined. A body of empirical evidence[21-24] supports these possibilities, strengthening the proposal that the mind–brain relationship may be partially quantum. Quantum information theory clarifies the distinction between the unobservable mind and the observable brain and supports a solid physical foundation for consciousness research. With all these theories trying to explain and understand the theoretical/hypothetical framework for consciousness to explain the subjective experience of consciousness, the experts of this field feel it is still a long way to bridge the gap between current neurobiological and physical–mathematical concepts with their associated quantum–mind theories. Though there is still a long way to go for explaining conscious experience scientifically, when ever this happens, it will become one of the benchmarks in science. Financial support and sponsorship Nil. Conflicts of interest There are no conflicts of interest. Use of artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted technology for manuscript preparation The authors confirm that there was no use of artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted technology for assisting in the preparation of the manuscript and no images were manipulated using AI.
In this paper, I propose a set of ideas to explain the phenomena of life and consciousness in the universe and their relation to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Consciousness is described as a result of specific dynamical configurations of matter and fields aided by fundamental properties of nature proposed in this paper. First, I review the various theories of consciousness in current literature and come up with various hypotheses, definitions, and propositions to build a physical theory of consciousness. I introduce the concept of interaction binding of consciousness and discuss in detail how the brain gives rise to consciousness. I propose three sets of postulates on the physical foundations of consciousness from a quantum general relativistic background using the Quantum General Relativistic Framework, 5 proposals to understand time and reduction. A Quantum Reduction Free Will Equivalence Principle is discussed to link quantum reduction to conscious free will. I discuss the potential possibility of retrocausal effects on consciousness-influenced reduction probability. I discuss the concept of conscious being as a more general concept than conscious identity, as separate from conscious content, and its nature. I introduce the concept of classicum as an analog of the quantum, and discuss its relation to consciousness. I discuss mathematical measures to calculate the complexity of harmonic relational structures. I put these together in a set of propositions on the nature of consciousness and its relation to the nature of quantum phenomena. I discuss a mathematical model of interaction binding, and free will. I discuss theory and experiments to verify these
The nature and idea of consciousness is very mysterious and has profound importance, with existential, medical and spiritual implications and productivity. Behavior and functioning of the brain or, in other words, material brain activity is in some way correlated to the consciousness or mental activity. Since it is the most fundamental theory about the matter that is currently available, in efforts to understand the consciousness we can assume that the Quantum theory can be helpful. Various steps and studies have been carried out to achieve the extent of relation of quantum theory to the different neurophysiological levels of descriptions. In past and in current scenario efforts have been made to adopt quantum theory in different ways that correlate it to consciousness. The concept that this is solely a quantum effect and does not work for a classical case is also discussed. Researchers studied this about the notorious puzzles and contradiction of quantum mechanics, the theory physicists use to describe the tiniest objects in the Universe.
What is consciousness? Conventional approaches see it as an emergent property of complex interactions among individual neurons; however these approaches fail to address enigmatic features of consciousness. Accordingly, some philosophers have contended that "qualia," or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived, exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, described the universe as being composed of "occasions of experience." To examine this possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality must be re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of spacetime--as described by Einstein's general theory of relativity, and its relation to the fundamental theory of matter--as described by quantum theory. Roger Penrose has proposed a new physics of objective reduction: "OR," which appeals to a form of quantum gravity to provide a useful description of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline. Within the OR scheme, we consider that consciousness occurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintain quantum coherent superposition until a specific "objective" criterion (a threshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system then self-reduces (objective reduction: OR). We contend that this type of objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential feature of consciousness which distinguishes our minds from classical computers. Each OR is taken as an instantaneous event--the climax of a self-organizing process in fundamental spacetime--and a candidate for a conscious Whitehead "occasion of experience." How could an OR process occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and account for other features of consciousness? We nominate a quantum computational OR process with the requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal micro-tubules within the brain's neurons. In this model, quantum-superposed states develop in microtubule subunit proteins ("tubulins") within certain brain neurons, remain coherent, and recruit more superposed tubulins until a mass-time-energy threshold (related to quantum gravity) is reached. At that point, self-collapse, or objective reduction (OR), abruptly occurs. We equate the pre-reduction, coherent superposition ("quantum computing") phase with pre-conscious processes, and each instantaneous (and non-computable) OR, or self-collapse, with a discrete conscious event. Sequences of OR events give rise to a "stream" of consciousness. Microtubule-associated proteins can "tune" the quantum oscillations of the coherent superposed states; the OR is thus self-organized, or "orchestrated" ("Orch OR"). Each Orch OR event selects (non-computably) microtubule subunit states which regulate synaptic/neural functions using classical signaling. The quantum gravity threshold for self-collapse is relevant to consciousness, according to our arguments, because macroscopic superposed quantum states each have their own spacetime geometries. These geometries are also superposed, and in some way "separated," but when sufficiently separated, the superposition of spacetime geometries becomes significantly unstable and reduces to a single universe state. Quantum gravity determines the limits of the instability; we contend that the actual choice of state made by Nature is non-computable. Thus each Orch OR event is a self-selection of spacetime geometry, coupled to the brain through microtubules and other biomolecules. If conscious experience is intimately connected with the very physics underlying spacetime structure, then Orch OR in microtubules indeed provides us with a completely new and uniquely promising perspective on the difficult problems of consciousness.