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Lecture notes in computer science

Functional Encryption: Definitions and Challenges

Dan Boneh, Amit Sahai, Brent R. Waters

Published Jan 1, 2011• 1,048 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-19571-6_16

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Functional Encryption: Definitions and Challenges

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We initiate the formal study of functional encryption by giving precise definitions of the concept and its security. Roughly speaking, functional encryption supports restricted secret keys that enable a key holder to learn a specific function of encrypted data, but learn nothing else about the data. For example, given an encrypted program the secret key may enable the key holder to learn the output of the program on a specific input without learning anything else about the program. We show that defining security for functional encryption is non-trivial. First, we show that a natural game-based definition is inadequate for some functionalities. We then present a natural simulation-based definition and show that it (provably) cannot be satisfied in the standard model, but can be satisfied in the random oracle model. We show how to map many existing concepts to our formalization of functional encryption and conclude with several interesting open problems in this young area.

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Semantically-Secure Functional Encryption: Possibility Results, Impossibility Results and the Quest for a General Definition.

Mihir Bellare Y, Adam O’Neill

This paper explains that SS1-secure functional encryption (FE) as defined by Boneh, Sahai and Waters implicitly incorporates security under key-revealing selective opening attacks (SOA-K). This connection helps intuitively explain their impossibility results and also allows us to prove stronger ones. To fill this gap and move us closer to the (laudable) goal of a general and achievable notion of FE security, we seek and provide two “sans SOA-K ” definitions of FE security that we call SS2 and SS3. We prove various possibility results about these definitions. We view our work as a first step towards the challenging goal of a general, meaningful and achievable notion of FE security. 1

•Jan 1, 2012•5 citations
We initiate the formal study of functional encryption by giving precise definitions of the concept and its security. Roughly speaking, functional encryption supports restricted secret keys that enable a key holder to learn a specific function of encrypted data, but learn nothing else about the data. For example, given an encrypted program the secret key may enable the key holder to learn the output of the program on a specific input without learning anything else about the program. We show that defining security for functional encryption is non-trivial. First, we show that a natural game-based definition is inadequate for some functionalities. We then present a natural simulation-based definition and show that it (provably) cannot be satisfied in the standard model, but can be satisfied in the random oracle model. We show how to map many existing concepts to our formalization of functional encryption and conclude with several interesting open problems in this young area.
This paper explains that SS1-secure functional encryption (FE) as defined by Boneh, Sahai and Waters implicitly incorporates security under key-revealing selective opening attacks (SOA-K). This connection helps intuitively explain their impossibility results and also allows us to prove stronger ones. To fill this gap and move us closer to the (laudable) goal of a general and achievable notion of FE security, we seek and provide two “sans SOA-K ” definitions of FE security that we call SS2 and SS3. We prove various possibility results about these definitions. We view our work as a first step towards the challenging goal of a general, meaningful and achievable notion of FE security. 1