The aim of this book was to investigate the rationale for Pauli's principle, and the conditions under which we are justified in regarding a phenomenological and contingent rule as an important scientific principle. To this purpose, I urged a Kantian perspective. As a conclusion, I want to foreshadow how this perspective relates to contemporary discussions about images of science, and how it bears upon the on-going debate on scientific realism in philosophy of science. I shall barely scratch the surface of this complex topic and its vast literature. The best I can do in these concluding remarks is to suggest a philosophical position that I think deserves to be further explored. What follows should then be read more as an outline for future research, than as a conclusion. I began this book by reconstructing the origins of the exclusion principle as a phenomenological rule arising from the spectroscopic research of the 1920s. I argued that the rule was derived – in conjunction with the concept of the electron's Zweideutigkeit – from spectroscopic phenomena with the help of some theoretical assumptions, in the period of revolutionary transition from the old to the new quantum theory. I defended the prospective intelligibility of this revolutionary transition in the light of the piecemeal process of transformation of the old quantum theory, from which brand new scientific concepts and nomic generalizations followed.
The aim of this book was to investigate the rationale for Pauli's principle, and the conditions under which we are justified in regarding a phenomenological and contingent rule as an important scientific principle. To this purpose, I urged a Kantian perspective. As a conclusion, I want to foreshadow how this perspective relates to contemporary discussions about images of science, and how it bears upon the on-going debate on scientific realism in philosophy of science. I shall barely scratch the surface of this complex topic and its vast literature. The best I can do in these concluding remarks is to suggest a philosophical position that I think deserves to be further explored. What follows should then be read more as an outline for future research, than as a conclusion. I began this book by reconstructing the origins of the exclusion principle as a phenomenological rule arising from the spectroscopic research of the 1920s. I argued that the rule was derived – in conjunction with the concept of the electron's Zweideutigkeit – from spectroscopic phenomena with the help of some theoretical assumptions, in the period of revolutionary transition from the old to the new quantum theory. I defended the prospective intelligibility of this revolutionary transition in the light of the piecemeal process of transformation of the old quantum theory, from which brand new scientific concepts and nomic generalizations followed.
The history of the exclusion principle is already an old one, but its conclusion has not yet been written. It is now eighty years since Wolfgang Pauli introduced an ‘extremely natural’ prescriptive rule, while dealing with some spectroscopic anomalies that beset physicists in the heyday of the old quantum theory. The rule excluded the possibility that any two bound electrons in an atom were in the same dynamic state, identified by a set of four quantum numbers. Hence the name of Ausschlieβungsregel (exclusion rule), or Pauli's Verbot (Pauli's veto) as Werner Heisenberg nicknamed it. The far-reaching physical significance of this rule became clear only later. From spectroscopy to atomic physics, from quantum field theory to high-energy physics, there is hardly another scientific principle that has more far-reaching implications than Pauli's exclusion principle. It is thanks to Pauli's principle that one obtains the electronic configurations underlying the classification of chemical elements in Mendeleev's periodic table as well as atomic spectra. To this same principle we credit the statistical behaviour of any half-integral spin particles (protons, neutrons, among many others) and the stability of matter. Shifting to high-energy physics, it is the exclusion principle that fixes the crucial constraint for binding quarks in hadrons, which together with leptons compose our physical world. This book advances a philosophical analysis of the enduring and far-reaching validity of Pauli's principle. It does not aim to address what a scientific principle is.
In the Preface to this book, we started with Alice and Bob having very different views of their observations. Alice used an optical telescope and reported nothing unusual about a distant galaxy that she could see. Bob, on the other hand, detected intense radio activity in that galaxy. Our question was: who has the true view of that galaxy? We advised the reader that the answer is not Alice . Neither is it Bob . The answer is not both of them , nor is it neither of them . It is not a trick question either. So what is the answer that this book would supply? Our answer will come presently. While this book has set forth a definite mathematical perspective on empirical physics, it has contained quite a lot of commentary that might be disparaged as metaphysics or philosophy. Such commentary is generally frowned on in science, because it has no empirical content. It is vacuous. In our defense, we point out the obvious: science is not a robotic activity; it is carried out by humans and these are driven by their metaphysical, philosophical, and emotional imperatives. For instance, the hard-core scientific view that quantum theory needs no interpretation but only application is itself a philosophy. It is no more than a conditioned response, based on opinion and subscription to current scientific norms. It is, indeed, a philosophy of how to do quantum mechanics. So we all do it, in one way or another. Our concern in this book is that the way that we do it should be based soundly on scientific principles. The quantized detector approach that we describe and use in this book is our attempt to do just that. There is an excellent paper on all of this that has the provocative title “Quantum Theory Needs No Interpretation,” by Fuchs and Peres (2000). It seems on the face of it to dismiss any sort of “interpretation” of quantum mechanics. In fact, close reading of it confirms (to us at least) the agenda that we have set out in this book. Yes, quantum mechanics needs no interpretation, when it is being applied to processes that take place in the information void .
ConclusionsIn the Preface to this book, we started with Alice and Bob having very different views of their observations.Alice used an optical telescope and reported nothing unusual about a distant galaxy that she could see.Bob, on the other hand, detected intense radio activity in that galaxy.Our question was: who has the true view of that galaxy?We advised the reader that the answer is not Alice.Neither is it Bob.The answer is not both of them, nor is it neither of them.It is not a trick question either.So what is the answer that this book would supply?Our answer will come presently.While this book has set forth a definite mathematical perspective on empirical physics, it has contained quite a lot of commentary that might be disparaged as metaphysics or philosophy.Such commentary is generally frowned on in science, because it has no empirical content.It is vacuous.In our defense, we point out the obvious: science is not a robotic activity; it is carried out by humans and these are driven by their metaphysical, philosophical, and emotional imperatives.For instance, the hard-core scientific view that quantum theory needs no interpretation but only application is itself a philosophy.It is no more than a conditioned response, based on opinion and subscription to current scientific norms.It is, indeed, a philosophy of how to do quantum mechanics.So we all do it, in one way or another.Our concern in this book is that the way that we do it should be based soundly on scientific principles.The quantized detector approach that we describe and use in this book is our attempt to do just that.There is an excellent paper on all of this that has the provocative title "Quantum Theory Needs No Interpretation," by Fuchs and Peres (2000).It seems on the face of it to dismiss any sort of "interpretation" of quantum mechanics.In fact, close reading of it confirms (to us at least) the agenda that we have set out in this book.Yes, quantum mechanics needs no interpretation, when it is being applied to processes that take place in the information void.
There are several (general) philosophy of physics textbooks on the market.1 An
obvious question to ask at the outset then is: Why another one? In his “Some
Philosophical Aspects of Particle Physics”, Michael Redhead bemoans the common practice of philosophers of science of dealing with examples “which are no
longer of current research interest in science” ((1980), p. 279). This practice is
still common even among many philosophers of physics, and, for the most part,
the available textbooks continue to engage in this practice. Generally, one finds a
little spacetime, a little statistical mechanics, and a little quantum theory. Now,
these are of course the ‘pillars’ of modern physics, so it is what we should expect
to be covered in any textbook on the philosophy of physics worth its salt (and,
indeed, they are well represented in this book). However, the issues that are
dealt with are usually very old fashioned and very limited in scope: ‘spacetime’
means ‘the twins paradox’ (and possibly conventionalism); ‘statistical mechanics’
means ‘time asymmetry’; and ‘quantum theory’ means ‘the measurement problem’. Redhead is surely right that this leads physicists to “regard philosophy of
science as somewhat irrelevant”. Rightly so, too, if this were in fact representative of much of what actually goes on in philosophy of physics. However, the
state of play as represented in philosophy of physics and (some) philosophy of
science journals shows a very different level of engagement, with philosophers
of physics investigating the frontiers of scientific research. This disparity (or the
impression of such) is the raison d’eˆtre for the book you are now reading. The result is an introductory textbook covering those portions of philosophy of physics
research that other textbooks fail to cover, or cover only very briefly or very
simplistically. The three pillars of modern physics-relativity, quantum theory
and statistical mechanics-are still represented, then, but from a more advanced
and contemporary perspective.
It is strange to note so little discussion of the exclusion principle in the philosophical literature. Philosophers, largely engrossed in their perennial problems, are hardly aware of the fact that, during the last two decades, there has been introduced into physical methodology a principle of utmost philosophical importance, easily rivaling that of relativity and, in some respects, indeed that of causality. Discovered by Pauli in 1925, it immediately elucidated a whole realm of physical facts and was accepted by physicists with wide acclaim. Called the exclusion principle—or Pauli principle, or principle of anti-symmetry—it was embodied in the axiomatics of quantum mechanics; its peculiar methodological significance passed out of view.
The transition from the atomic core model to the electron's spin, the debate on the adequacy of semi-classical models, and the lack of an appropriate scientific terminology are symptomatic of the revolutionary transition from the old quantum theory to the new quantum theory around 1921–5. As such, they provide us with a foil for rethinking Kuhn's view on scientific revolutions. In this view, scientific revolutions are distinctively accompanied by incommensurability between paradigms, or – to use Kuhn's later terminology – untranslatability between scientific lexicons. In the light of the historical reconstruction offered in Chapter 2, I shall here argue for the prospective intelligibility of the revolutionary transition around 1924 via a two-step argument that (1) reconsiders Kuhn's notion of incommensurability as untranslatability (Section 3.2), and (2) offers a positive account of the way the electron's Zweideutigkeit and the exclusion rule came out of the old quantum theory (Section 3.3). The revolutionary transition from the old quantum theory to the new quantum theory On 5 November 1980, Thomas Kuhn delivered a lecture at Harvard University entitled ‘The crisis of the old quantum theory: 1922–25’. In his distinctive style of reasoning, Kuhn presented the rise of quantum mechanics after 1925 as the result of a period of crisis of the old quantum theory between 1922 and 1925. The old quantum theory – in Kuhn's view – cannot be regarded as a full-blown theory but rather as a set of algorithms to solve problems and paradoxes.