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Field, Formon, Superspace, and Inceptive Cyborg: A Paraphysical Theory of Noncausal Phenomena

Thomas E. Bearden

Published Dec 1, 1974• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract : In searching for a way to break the deadlock in which physics, mathematics, and philosophy are all entangled, the author was struck by the fact that the process of physical perception was the key to all three locks. An effort was made to formulate a basic theory of the fundamental perception process. The paper represents an initial attempt to sketch out a brief theory of noncausal phenomena.

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Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences•Jun 29, 2005•305 citations
Abstract : In searching for a way to break the deadlock in which physics, mathematics, and philosophy are all entangled, the author was struck by the fact that the process of physical perception was the key to all three locks. An effort was made to formulate a basic theory of the fundamental perception process. The paper represents an initial attempt to sketch out a brief theory of noncausal phenomena.
The deadlock in physics is explained due to moral-epistemological aspects of basic principles and adopted methodology. A way out of crisis is suggested. It has shown that the long-term infertility of physical science is not due to technical difficulties (limited opportunities of mathematics, insufficient experimental means, etc.) as it is usually represented. However, the crisis in physics has arisen due to arbitrary, non-critical interpretation of key facts and with imposed speculative-artificial instructions. Building a harmonious and self-consistent physics becomes an implementable task with returning to cause-effect, conceptual representation of phenomena and to naturally analytical methodology Key words: Physics ’ problems, Einstein, Schrodinger, de Broglie, elementary particle, nuclear structure 1. Critical review of the current state The crisis of basic science can be considered as an accomplished fact, despite the recent experimental results with LHC, the new impressive theories, high awards and media-company inspiring opposite. Nevertheless, the oppressed new questions permanently become more than the received answers, if we look at the reality deeply-pragmatically,
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g., ''feeling,'' ''knowing,'' and ''effort'') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classical physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, due to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analyzing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classical-physics-based predecessor is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics, and is able to represent more adequately than classical concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. 'feeling', 'knowing' and 'effort') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.