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Finite Processes

Guenter Mahler

Published Dec 19, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Einstein’s notion of reality (cf. Section 3.2.1) combined with Feynman’s quest for machinery (cf. Remark 2.3) brings us back to the delicate relationship between physics and information: To what extent is a physical process “real?” Clearly, we always need a mathematical description-but does this description define what is “really” going on?

DOI
10.1201/b17955-10

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In his Reference Frame “What’s Bad About This Habit” (Physics Today, May 2009, page 8), N. David Mermin discusses what is real and what is abstract in physics—but without first defining what he means by those terms. The lack of definition is another bad habit that diminishes his otherwise interesting comments. In physics, we can give a concrete definition of “real”: phenomena or events that can be recorded by a device. The process of recording involves an irreversible transition that generally requires an interaction with a macroscopic device. The device can be our brains, but with some reservations, because sometimes we see or remember imaginary events that never happened. But “acquisition of knowledge or information,” pace Werner Heisenberg, although it occurs, is not relevant. Or as Richard Feynman remarked, “Nature … behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not.” 1 1. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA (1965), p. 3–7 By the above definition of reality, Mermin is correct to point out that operators in Hilbert space and quantum wavefunctions are abstractions. I also believe that one should not lose any more sleep over the collapse of a wavefunction than over the change of any probability function after one of the possible outcomes has been recorded. But it does not follow, for example, that because electromagnetic fields are operators in Hilbert space, the manifestations of those fields are also abstractions or that the spacetime continuum where those fields are located is devoid of reality. Ironically, Mermin’s article appears in an issue of Physics Today whose cover and associated article show photographs of the spectacular magnetic field lines located in space (the Sun’s corona) and recorded in time in a UV image taken by a NASA spacecraft. The fields are made visible by the radiation of charged particles, in a similar way that planets and their orbits are observed by the reflection of solar radiation or that subatomic particles are seen by tracks left in a cloud or a spark chamber. Likewise, in the two-slit experiment, the effect of quantum interference with single photons can be recorded; consequently, the manifestations of the associated quantum wavefunction that predicts the interference are also real.Mermin claims that “spacetime is an abstract four-dimensional mathematical continuum of points that approximately represent phenomena,” and that it “is nothing more than an extremely effective way to represent relations between distinct events.” But spacetime points do not represent phenomena; instead, they represent the locations of phenomena, which are determined by measurements of the relative distances and the time intervals between events. Mermin remarks that his point of view “may also be easiest to see in quantum physics, where time and space refer ultimately to the time and place at which information is acquired or, if you prefer, at which a measurement is made.” But in both quantum and classical mechanics, the location in spacetime is also obtained by measurements, as are other characteristics of the event. Hence, in accordance with our concrete definition of reality, spacetime is real, although special relativity tells us that our measurements of position and time are frame dependent.Mermin is also concerned with the habit of attaching reality to “spooky actions at a distance” associated with the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen effect. But what is measured in the associated experiments are correlations that are predicted by quantum theory to occur at any distance of separation for the entangled particle states. That includes the case in which the distance becomes vanishingly small, and then such concerns as “nonlocality” and “faster-than-light influences” are not relevant. What would be really spooky is if those correlations depended on distance, because it would show that quantum mechanics is flawed. However, measurements demonstrate that the correlations do not depend on distance; thus they confirm again that the manifestations of quantum entanglement are not abstractions.Bad habits in the interpretation of such quantum phenomena usually originate from attempts to impose on the microscopic world views of reality learned from classical physics.REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<1. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA (1965), p. 3–7 , Google Scholar© 2009 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Sep 1, 2009•0 citations
Einstein’s notion of reality (cf. Section 3.2.1) combined with Feynman’s quest for machinery (cf. Remark 2.3) brings us back to the delicate relationship between physics and information: To what extent is a physical process “real?” Clearly, we always need a mathematical description-but does this description define what is “really” going on?
Every physical measuring needs a finite, different from zero measurement time and provides information in form of the choice of a measurement result from all possible measurement results. If infinitely many (different) measurement results would be possible, the choice of a measurement result could deliver an infinite quantity of information. But the results of physical measurings (of finite duration) never deliver an infinite quantity of information, they describe past, finite reality. Therefore the set of all possible measurement results a priori is finite. In the physical reality only a finite information quantity can be processed within a finite time interval. For mathematical models whose representation requires a processing of an infinite quantity of information, for example irrational numbers, no (exact) equivalent exists in the physical reality. So mathematical calculations, which have an equivalent in physical reality, can include only rational (finitely many elementary) combinations of rational numbers. Conclusions arise from this for the foundations of mathematical physics.
We often discussed his notions on objective reality. I recall that during one walk Einstein suddenly stopped, turned to me and asked whether I really believed that the moon exists only when I look at it. A. Pais As O. Stern said recently, one should no more rack one's brain about the problem of whether something one cannot know anything about exists all the same, than about the ancient question of how many angels are able to sit on the point of a needle. But it seems to be that Einstein's questions are ultimately always of this kind. W. Pauli Pauli and Einstein were both wrong. The questions with which Einstein attacked the quantum theory do have answers; but they are not the answers Einstein expected them to have. We now know that the moon is demonstrably not there when nobody looks. The impact of this discovery on philosophy may have been blunted by the way in which it is conventionally stated, which leaves it fully accessible only to those with a working knowledge of quantum mechanics. I hope to remove that barrier by describing this remarkable aspect of nature in a way that presupposes no background whatever in the quantum theory or, for that matter, in classical physics either. I shall describe a piece of machinery that presents without any distortion one of the most strikingly peculiar features of the atomic world. No formal training in physics or mathematics is needed to grasp and ponder the extraordinary behavior of the device; it is only necessary to follow a simple counting argument on the level of a newspaper braintwister.
Mathematicians really understand what mathematics is. Theoretical physicists really understand what physics is. No matter how fruitful the interplay between the two subjects, the deep intersection of these two understandings seems to me to be quite modest. Of course, many theoretical physicists know a lot of mathematics. And many mathematicians know a fair amount of theoretical physics. This is very different from a deep understanding of the other subject. There is great advantage in the prospect of each camp increasing its appreciation of the other's goals, desires, methodology, and profound insights. I do not know how to really go about this in either case. However, the book in hand is a good first step for the mathematicians. The method of the text is to explain the meaning of a large number of ideas in theoretical physics via the splendid medium of mathematical communication. This means that there are descriptions of objects in terms of the precise definitions of mathematics. There are clearly defined statements about these objects, expressed as mathematical theorems. Finally, there are logical step-by-step proofs of these statements based on earlier results or precise references. The mathematically sympathetic reader at the graduate level can study this work with pleasure and come away with comprehensible information about many concepts from theoretical physics … quantization, particle, path integral … After closing the book, one has not arrived at the kind of understanding of physics referred to above; but then, maybe, armed with the information provided so elegantly by the authors, the process of infusion, assimilation, and deeper insight based on further rumination and study can begin.
In his Reference Frame “What’s Bad About This Habit” (Physics Today, May 2009, page 8), N. David Mermin discusses what is real and what is abstract in physics—but without first defining what he means by those terms. The lack of definition is another bad habit that diminishes his otherwise interesting comments. In physics, we can give a concrete definition of “real”: phenomena or events that can be recorded by a device. The process of recording involves an irreversible transition that generally requires an interaction with a macroscopic device. The device can be our brains, but with some reservations, because sometimes we see or remember imaginary events that never happened. But “acquisition of knowledge or information,” pace Werner Heisenberg, although it occurs, is not relevant. Or as Richard Feynman remarked, “Nature … behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not.” 1 1. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA (1965), p. 3–7 By the above definition of reality, Mermin is correct to point out that operators in Hilbert space and quantum wavefunctions are abstractions. I also believe that one should not lose any more sleep over the collapse of a wavefunction than over the change of any probability function after one of the possible outcomes has been recorded. But it does not follow, for example, that because electromagnetic fields are operators in Hilbert space, the manifestations of those fields are also abstractions or that the spacetime continuum where those fields are located is devoid of reality. Ironically, Mermin’s article appears in an issue of Physics Today whose cover and associated article show photographs of the spectacular magnetic field lines located in space (the Sun’s corona) and recorded in time in a UV image taken by a NASA spacecraft. The fields are made visible by the radiation of charged particles, in a similar way that planets and their orbits are observed by the reflection of solar radiation or that subatomic particles are seen by tracks left in a cloud or a spark chamber. Likewise, in the two-slit experiment, the effect of quantum interference with single photons can be recorded; consequently, the manifestations of the associated quantum wavefunction that predicts the interference are also real.Mermin claims that “spacetime is an abstract four-dimensional mathematical continuum of points that approximately represent phenomena,” and that it “is nothing more than an extremely effective way to represent relations between distinct events.” But spacetime points do not represent phenomena; instead, they represent the locations of phenomena, which are determined by measurements of the relative distances and the time intervals between events. Mermin remarks that his point of view “may also be easiest to see in quantum physics, where time and space refer ultimately to the time and place at which information is acquired or, if you prefer, at which a measurement is made.” But in both quantum and classical mechanics, the location in spacetime is also obtained by measurements, as are other characteristics of the event. Hence, in accordance with our concrete definition of reality, spacetime is real, although special relativity tells us that our measurements of position and time are frame dependent.Mermin is also concerned with the habit of attaching reality to “spooky actions at a distance” associated with the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen effect. But what is measured in the associated experiments are correlations that are predicted by quantum theory to occur at any distance of separation for the entangled particle states. That includes the case in which the distance becomes vanishingly small, and then such concerns as “nonlocality” and “faster-than-light influences” are not relevant. What would be really spooky is if those correlations depended on distance, because it would show that quantum mechanics is flawed. However, measurements demonstrate that the correlations do not depend on distance; thus they confirm again that the manifestations of quantum entanglement are not abstractions.Bad habits in the interpretation of such quantum phenomena usually originate from attempts to impose on the microscopic world views of reality learned from classical physics.REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<1. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA (1965), p. 3–7 , Google Scholar© 2009 American Institute of Physics.