A theoretical framework is proposed that starts from the assumption that information processing by a brain, while it is sustaining consciousness, is restoring the break in time symmetry in physics. No specifics are given with regard to which physical formalism, either quantum or classical, is the basis of the subsequent apparently anomalous consequences: "apparent" because the proposed model doesn’t require a radical extension or modification of existing physics. Rather it is argued that time symmetry that is already present in current physics should be taken seriously, and a simple initial mathematical formulation is given that allows for specific quantitative predictions. The elusiveness of psi phenomena, the experimenter effect, and the relationship of psi to other theoretical frameworks like decision augmentation theory (DAT), observational theory, and several others, are discussed. One of the major advantages of CIRTS is that it offers handles to link this theory to psychological theories that might explain individual differences. Specific testable predictions are given.
A theoretical framework is proposed that starts from the assumption that information processing by a brain, while it is sustaining consciousness, is restoring the break in time symmetry in physics. No specifics are given with regard to which physical formalism, either quantum or classical, is the basis of the subsequent apparently anomalous consequences: "apparent" because the proposed model doesn’t require a radical extension or modification of existing physics. Rather it is argued that time symmetry that is already present in current physics should be taken seriously, and a simple initial mathematical formulation is given that allows for specific quantitative predictions. The elusiveness of psi phenomena, the experimenter effect, and the relationship of psi to other theoretical frameworks like decision augmentation theory (DAT), observational theory, and several others, are discussed. One of the major advantages of CIRTS is that it offers handles to link this theory to psychological theories that might explain individual differences. Specific testable predictions are given.
This paper explores the relationship between consciousness and future information from a quantum mechanical perspective and proposes an experimental framework for empirical validation. Classical causality suggests that future events do not influence the present; however, non-locality and time symmetry in quantum mechanics suggest that future states may exert an influence on the present.We introduce a probabilistic framework and investigate the inequality P(C_t | F) \neq P(C_t), which suggests that future information influences present consciousness. The theoretical model is supported by the following considerations:1.Delayed-Choice Quantum Effects: Future measurements in quantum systems have been shown to influence past states, suggesting a possible analogy for consciousness.2.Wave Function Evolution and Future Constraints: The state evolution equation is modified by a correction term proportional to future constraints, described as \hat{H}^{\prime} \Psi (t) = i \hbar \frac{d}{dt} \Psi (t) + \lambda F.3.Experimental Framework: We propose an experimental methodology to test this hypothesis through EEG measurements, delayed stimulus presentations, and statistical analyses of brain activity under predetermined future conditions.This work lays the foundation for testing the causal influence of future information on consciousness and provides a new perspective on the intersection between quantum mechanics and cognitive science.
This article considers a partly philosophical question: What are the ontological and epistemological reasons for using quantum-like models or theories (models and theories based on the mathematical formalism of quantum theory) vs. classical-like ones (based on the mathematics of classical physics), in considering human thinking and decision making? This question is only partly philosophical because it also concerns the scientific understanding of the phenomena considered by the theories that use mathematical models of either type, just as in physics itself, where this question also arises as a physical question. This is because this question is in effect: What are the physical reasons for using, even if not requiring, these types of theories in considering quantum phenomena, which these theories predict fully in accord with the experiment? This is clearly also a physical, rather than only philosophical, question and so is, accordingly, the question of whether one needs classical-like or quantum-like theories or both (just as in physics we use both classical and quantum theories) in considering human thinking in psychology and related fields, such as decision science. It comes as no surprise that many of these reasons are parallel to those that are responsible for the use of QM and QFT in the case of quantum phenomena. Still, the corresponding situations should be understood and justified in terms of the phenomena considered, phenomena defined by human thinking, because there are important differences between these phenomena and quantum phenomena, which this article aims to address. In order to do so, this article will first consider quantum phenomena and quantum theory, before turning to human thinking and decision making, in addressing which it will also discuss two recent quantum-like approaches to human thinking, that by M. G. D'Ariano and F. Faggin and that by A. Khrennikov. Both approaches are ontological in the sense of offering representations, different in character in each approach, of human thinking by the formalism of quantum theory. Whether such a representation, as opposed to only predicting the outcomes of relevant experiments, is possible either in quantum theory or in quantum-like theories of human thinking is one of the questions addressed in this article. The philosophical position adopted in it is that it may not be possible to make this assumption, which, however, is not the same as saying that it is impossible. I designate this view as the reality-without-realism, RWR, view and in considering strictly mental processes as the ideality-without-idealism, IWI, view, in the second case in part following, but also moving beyond, I. Kant's philosophy.
In this paper, I propose a set of ideas to explain the phenomena of life and consciousness in the universe and their relation to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Consciousness is described as a result of specific dynamical configurations of matter and fields aided by fundamental properties of nature proposed in this paper. First, I review the various theories of consciousness in current literature and come up with various hypotheses, definitions, and propositions to build a physical theory of consciousness. I introduce the concept of interaction binding of consciousness and discuss in detail how the brain gives rise to consciousness. I propose three sets of postulates on the physical foundations of consciousness from a quantum general relativistic background using the Quantum General Relativistic Framework, 5 proposals to understand time and reduction. A Quantum Reduction Free Will Equivalence Principle is discussed to link quantum reduction to conscious free will. I discuss the potential possibility of retrocausal effects on consciousness-influenced reduction probability. I discuss the concept of conscious being as a more general concept than conscious identity, as separate from conscious content, and its nature. I introduce the concept of classicum as an analog of the quantum, and discuss its relation to consciousness. I discuss mathematical measures to calculate the complexity of harmonic relational structures. I put these together in a set of propositions on the nature of consciousness and its relation to the nature of quantum phenomena. I discuss a mathematical model of interaction binding, and free will. I discuss theory and experiments to verify these
This paper proposes a theory-neutral formal framework designed to accommodate data that implicates consciousness in anomalous observer-linked phenomena, including structured accounts sometimes interpreted as involving alleged non-human intelligence. Motivated by growing empirical reports in which observer phenomenology appears coupled to system behavior, the paper introduces an explanatory workspace that expands the standard quantum state space to include a phenomenal dimension. Specifically, it augments the conventional Hilbert space Hphysical with an orthogonal tensor factor Hphenomenal, allowing conscious states to be structurally represented without reducing them to conventional observables. The goal is not to offer a reductive theory of consciousness, but to supply a lawful representational space into which empirically grounded anomalies—such as psi effects, attentional modulation, or UAP-linked phenomenology—might coherently fit. The framework is grounded in an epistemic tradition articulated by Newton, Eddington, Russell, and Chomsky, all of whom emphasize the distinction between the structural apparatus of science and its ontological reach. It does not seek to redefine physics, but to expand its structural vocabulary—offering a formal arena in which observer-linked anomalies may become empirically visible and testable.
Scientific investigation of the classic mind-body problem has failed to produce a viable theory. As McGinn puts it, We know that brains are the de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it seems, no understanding whatever of how this can be. I propose that the obstruction is commitment to a physicalist ontology: It is not possible to obtain consciousness from unconscious ingredients. I propose instead the ontology of conscious realism: Consciousness and its contents are all that exists. Matter, brains, and space-time are among the contents of consciousness, dependent on it for their existence. For a conscious realist the mind-body problem is to show precisely how conscious agents construct the macroscopic and microscopic physical world. I propose a mathematically rigorous account of conscious agents and their dynamics, and of their construction of the physical world. In particular, I propose that the physical world is a species-specific user interface, and that quantum physics represents properties of the stable dynamics of conscious agents. Symmetries of these stable dynamics are the source of the symmetries studied in quantum physics. I present a concrete dynamics for pairs of conscious agents that exhibits SL(2,C) symmetry, and from this obtain a physical representation of the dynamics in terms of relativistic spin half particles. This representation allows one to canonically associate a discrete patch of Minkowski space-time to each such pair of conscious agents, and suggests that, at the smallest scale, space-time is discrete. This suggestion comports well with current approaches to quantum gravity.
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. 'feeling', 'knowing' and 'effort') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.