This article considers a partly philosophical question: What are the ontological and epistemological reasons for using quantum-like models or theories (models and theories based on the mathematical formalism of quantum theory) vs. classical-like ones (based on the mathematics of classical physics), in considering human thinking and decision making? This question is only partly philosophical because it also concerns the scientific understanding of the phenomena considered by the theories that use mathematical models of either type, just as in physics itself, where this question also arises as a physical question. This is because this question is in effect: What are the physical reasons for using, even if not requiring, these types of theories in considering quantum phenomena, which these theories predict fully in accord with the experiment? This is clearly also a physical, rather than only philosophical, question and so is, accordingly, the question of whether one needs classical-like or quantum-like theories or both (just as in physics we use both classical and quantum theories) in considering human thinking in psychology and related fields, such as decision science. It comes as no surprise that many of these reasons are parallel to those that are responsible for the use of QM and QFT in the case of quantum phenomena. Still, the corresponding situations should be understood and justified in terms of the phenomena considered, phenomena defined by human thinking, because there are important differences between these phenomena and quantum phenomena, which this article aims to address. In order to do so, this article will first consider quantum phenomena and quantum theory, before turning to human thinking and decision making, in addressing which it will also discuss two recent quantum-like approaches to human thinking, that by M. G. D'Ariano and F. Faggin and that by A. Khrennikov. Both approaches are ontological in the sense of offering representations, different in character in each approach, of human thinking by the formalism of quantum theory. Whether such a representation, as opposed to only predicting the outcomes of relevant experiments, is possible either in quantum theory or in quantum-like theories of human thinking is one of the questions addressed in this article. The philosophical position adopted in it is that it may not be possible to make this assumption, which, however, is not the same as saying that it is impossible. I designate this view as the reality-without-realism, RWR, view and in considering strictly mental processes as the ideality-without-idealism, IWI, view, in the second case in part following, but also moving beyond, I. Kant's philosophy.
This article considers a partly philosophical question: What are the ontological and epistemological reasons for using quantum-like models or theories (models and theories based on the mathematical formalism of quantum theory) vs. classical-like ones (based on the mathematics of classical physics), in considering human thinking and decision making? This question is only partly philosophical because it also concerns the scientific understanding of the phenomena considered by the theories that use mathematical models of either type, just as in physics itself, where this question also arises as a physical question. This is because this question is in effect: What are the physical reasons for using, even if not requiring, these types of theories in considering quantum phenomena, which these theories predict fully in accord with the experiment? This is clearly also a physical, rather than only philosophical, question and so is, accordingly, the question of whether one needs classical-like or quantum-like theories or both (just as in physics we use both classical and quantum theories) in considering human thinking in psychology and related fields, such as decision science. It comes as no surprise that many of these reasons are parallel to those that are responsible for the use of QM and QFT in the case of quantum phenomena. Still, the corresponding situations should be understood and justified in terms of the phenomena considered, phenomena defined by human thinking, because there are important differences between these phenomena and quantum phenomena, which this article aims to address. In order to do so, this article will first consider quantum phenomena and quantum theory, before turning to human thinking and decision making, in addressing which it will also discuss two recent quantum-like approaches to human thinking, that by M. G. D'Ariano and F. Faggin and that by A. Khrennikov. Both approaches are ontological in the sense of offering representations, different in character in each approach, of human thinking by the formalism of quantum theory. Whether such a representation, as opposed to only predicting the outcomes of relevant experiments, is possible either in quantum theory or in quantum-like theories of human thinking is one of the questions addressed in this article. The philosophical position adopted in it is that it may not be possible to make this assumption, which, however, is not the same as saying that it is impossible. I designate this view as the reality-without-realism, RWR, view and in considering strictly mental processes as the ideality-without-idealism, IWI, view, in the second case in part following, but also moving beyond, I. Kant's philosophy.
Is mind quantum-like? Is consciousness quantum physical? Does consciousness have a role to play in the emergence of the classical world from the underlying quantum universe? Or is this dichotomy between classical and quantum an illusion? How can world philosophies enrich our views on these matters and interact with the best scientific theories? These are some questions that motivated us to conceive the current book. We also felt an urgent need to discuss the central philosophical questions haunting the emerging frameworks of quantum cognition and quantum-like framework (QLF). We have observed that there are very good technical or mathematical works being done in the emerging fields of quantum cognition and QLF, but there is still a great need for exploring the underlying and open philosophical questions they demand. Quantum cognition developed as a frontier research programme in understanding various cognitive phenomena that are hard or impossible to describe based on classical cognitive science paradigm. Classical cognitive science draws philosophically and mathematically from classical physics and classical probability theory. For example, cognitive realism thinking is deeply motivated by the scientific realism of classical physics. However, as we explore, there are numerous empirical findings which demonstrate clearly that human mind and cognitive processes exhibit features that are more quantum-like. Central to these features are indeterminacy, context dependence, and complementarity of cognitive phenomena, for example, perception, information retrieval, and even qualia. Many good works in the previous decade have demonstrated the efficacy of quantum-like mathematical modelling in such cases. However, given that efficacy, we cannot simply conclude that mind is quantum. Rather there are features that go beyond what is allowed in standard quantum formalism.
This article addresses the effectiveness of the predictive modeling of cognition and behavior based on quantum principles and some of the reasons for this effectiveness. It also aims, however, to explore the limitations of mathematical modeling so based, quantum-like (Q-L) modeling, and all mathematical modeling, including classical-like (C-L), in considering human cognition and behavior. It will discuss certain alternative approaches to both, essentially philosophical in nature, although sometimes found in literary works, approaches that, while not quantitative, may help compensate for limitations of mathematical modeling there. Most Q-L and C-L approaches beyond physics are realist, insofar as they offer representations of human thinking by the formalism of quantum or classical physical theories. The position adopted in this article is based on the non-realist assumption that such a representation may not be possible, which is not the same as that it is impossible. I designate interpretations that do not make this assumption reality-without-realism, RWR, interpretations, and in considering mental processes as ideality-without-idealism, IWI, interpretations.
A number of modern scientists adheres to the point of view that, despite the fact that quantum mechanics does not allow to explain the existence of mental phenomena in the physical world, with the help of its inherent ontological principles and mathematical formalism, it is possible to understand the functioning of consciousness and the unconscious. Based on the analogy between quantum and mental processes, the unconscious can be represented as a superposition of mental states, and consciousness — in the form of decoherence of unconscious experiences. From an evolutionary point of view, consciousness can be considered as a consequence of the accumulation of a sufficient amount of information during the interaction of the organism with the surrounding environment, when the transition from the quantum state of the unconscious to the classical state of consciousness is carried out at the psychic level of being, by analogy with the accumulation of a sufficient amount of information by a quantum system during interaction with the environment, when at the physical level of being the collapse of the wave function. In psychotherapy and psychodiagnostics, one can see an analogy with the measurement process in quantum mechanics and a quantum leap from one mental state to another. However, the analysis of this point of view carried out in the article shows that the parallels between quantum mechanics and psychology today look insufficiently substantiated, since the mathematical model of the psyche, which allows describing human behavior on the basis of the laws of quantum mechanics, has not yet been built, which is why, firstly, the use of quantum-physical terminology in the understanding of mental experience does not rise to the level of scientific theory, remaining a metaphor, and, secondly, quantum psychology has a predictive potential, in contrast to the psychology of the classical type.
The history of mathematical modeling outside physics has been dominated by the use of classical mathematical models, C-models, primarily those of a probabilistic or statistical nature. More recently, however, quantum mathematical models, Q-models, based in the mathematical formalism of quantum theory have become more prominent in psychology, economics, and decision science. The use of Q-models in these fields remains controversial, in part because it is not entirely clear whether Q-models are necessary for dealing with the phenomena in question or whether C-models would still suffice. My aim, however, is not to assess the necessity of Q-models in these fields, but instead to reflect on what the possible applicability of Q-models may tell us about the corresponding phenomena there, vis-à-vis quantum phenomena in physics. In order to do so, I shall first discuss the key reasons for the use of Q-models in physics. In particular, I shall examine the fundamental principles that led to the development of quantum mechanics. Then I shall consider a possible role of similar principles in using Q-models outside physics. Psychology, economics, and decision science borrow already available Q-models from quantum theory, rather than derive them from their own internal principles, while quantum mechanics was derived from such principles, because there was no readily available mathematical model to handle quantum phenomena, although the mathematics ultimately used in quantum did in fact exist then. I shall argue, however, that the principle perspective on mathematical modeling outside physics might help us to understand better the role of Q-models in these fields and possibly to envision new models, conceptually analogous to but mathematically different from those of quantum theory, helpful or even necessary there or in physics itself. I shall suggest one possible type of such models, singularized probabilistic, SP, models, some of which are time-dependent, TDSP-models. The necessity of using such models may change the nature of mathematical modeling in science and, thus, the nature of science, as it happened in the case of Q-models, which not only led to a revolutionary transformation of physics but also opened new possibilities for scientific thinking and mathematical modeling beyond physics.
This article examines some experimental conditions that invite and possibly require recourse to quantum-mechanical-like mathematical models (QMLMs), models based on the key mathematical features of quantum mechanics, in scientific fields outside physics, such as biology, cognitive psychology, or economics. In particular, I consider whether the following two correlative features of quantum phenomena that were decisive for establishing the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics play similarly important roles in QMLMs elsewhere. The first is the individuality and discreteness of quantum phenomena, and the second is the irreducibly probabilistic nature of our predictions concerning them, coupled to the particular character of the probabilities involved, as different from the character of probabilities found in classical physics. I also argue that these features could be interpreted in terms of a particular form of epistemology that suspends and even precludes a causal and, in the first place, realist description of quantum objects and processes. This epistemology limits the descriptive capacity of quantum theory to the description, classical in nature, of the observed quantum phenomena manifested in measuring instruments. Quantum mechanics itself only provides descriptions, probabilistic in nature, concerning numerical data pertaining to such phenomena, without offering a physical description of quantum objects and processes. While QMLMs share their use of the quantum-mechanical or analogous mathematical formalism, they may differ by the roles, if any, the two features in question play in them and by different ways of interpreting the phenomena they considered and this formalism itself. This article will address those differences as well.
There have been numerous neurobiological theories positing that quantum mechanics is importantly responsible for certain psychological phenomena, such as consciousness and conscious decision-making. In this respect, such theories understand the relevant aspects of the brain to be “quantum mechanical.” Although it is highly questionable whether any of these theories have the requisite or sufficient empirical evidence strictly within the domain of neuroscience to appropriately justify their views, a different approach to arguing that quantum mechanics is importantly relevant to human decisionmaking will be discussed. By putting various puzzle pieces together of empirical evidence in psychology that quantum probability models describe certain human cognitive decision-making processes, I contend that human decision-making overall is best described by quantum mechanical processes. Finally, I at times provide a novel defense of this view from a number of objections.