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Philosophy of Science

How Determinism Can Fail in Classical Physics and How Quantum Physics Can (Sometimes) Provide a Cure

John Earman

Published Dec 1, 2008• 29 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Various fault modes of determinism in classical physics are outlined. It is shown how quantum mechanics can cure some forms of classical indeterminism.
DOI
10.1086/594526

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Abstract Uses a historical approach to explore the extent to which quantum theory mandates indeterminism. Drawing on important examples in the history of physics, it discusses explicitly the crucial distinction – often overlooked in the philosophical literature – between indeterminacy of physical quantities and causal indeterminism. It pursues at a more sophisticated level, issues raised in Ch. 2 concerning determinism and indeterminism in modern science. It concludes that quantum indeterminacy is an objective feature of the world, but that the jury is still out regarding quantum indeterminism.
This paper aims to demonstrate how a rigorous definition of determinism can be formulated and applied to a formal axiomatization of a physical theory. Examining an example of Newtonian classical particle mechanics (CPM) formalized in set-theoretical axioms by Patrick Suppes, the paper shows why definitions of determinism based on the temporal development of physical systems—such as those proposed by Suppes (2002) and Montague (1974)—fail to assess determinism correctly. It is argued that, to deliver a meaningful verdict, the definition of determinism cannot be applied to the entire framework of CPM itself, but rather to its particular theories : definitions of specific physical systems that incorporate the force equation. Therefore, the verdict of determinism or indeterminism typically depends on the uniqueness (or non-uniqueness) of solutions to the differential equations governing the system’s behavior. The paper concludes with a demonstration of how a formally correct definition of determinism can be used to show the indeterminism of the theory of Norton’s dome stated within the framework of CPM. Although the example concerns pre-relativistic Newtonian mechanics, the crucial philosophical distinction between frameworks and theories extends beyond this case and suggests that assessing the determinism of any physical theory requires special caution to distinguish it properly from its framework.
Quantum physics works exceptionally well in practice. It has justifiably been called most successful scientific theory ever. Its problems are interpretational: how to make sense of its various rational contradictions. The question having occupied some of humanity's best brains for nearly a century, with spectacular lack of success, one is led to suspect its fundamental assumptions. Two such are that a) the quantum/photon is the minimum existing energy/matter packet; b) subatomic reality is inherently indeterminate. Neither is justified. The quantum could be our minimum observable energy/matter packet. Physical reality could be essentially determinate. But due to quantum measurement uncertainty, in the subatomic domain it appears to be indeterminate. In each case there are two hypotheses, neither of which can be proved nor refuted, meaning that both must be considered. Mainstream QM fails to do this. The present article adopts a realist approach. Physical reality is conceived as essentially classical and determinate. But due to the limitations of our neurone-based perceptual mechanism, we experience it in terms of three 'perceptual categories': 1) 'classical', where observations don't affect the observed, and our knowledge is certain to within experimental error; 2) 'quantum' where they do, and our knowledge is uncertain; 3) a hypothetical undetectable 'subliminal substrate'. Our overall universe view is then inherently incomplete, and apparent quantum indeterminacy is due to this. Imagine trying to model the behaviour of icebergs based only on what we see above the sea surface. We would be postulating 'dark iceberg matter'. Being based on the differing ways in which we obtain knowledge, we call it the Epistemological Interpretation of quantum physics. It is conceptual and 98% non-mathematical.