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The Copenhagen interpretation, and pragmatism 1

de Wm Willem Muynck, Michel Willem

Published May 15, 2007• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In the past both instrumentalism and empiricism have inspired certain pragmatic elements into the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The relation of such pragmatisms with the correspondence principle is discussed. It is argued that neither Bohr nor Heisenberg did take ‘correspondence’ in one of these forms, and that it, in particular, was Bohr’s classical attitude which caused him to apply in an inconsistent way his correspondence principle to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, thus causing much confusion. It is demonstrated that an empiricist pragmatism is conducive to an explanation of violation of the Bell inequalities as a consequence of ‘complementarity’ in the sense of ‘mutual disturbance in a joint nonideal measurement of incompatible observables’ rather than as being caused by ‘nonlocal influences’.

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In the past both instrumentalism and empiricism have inspired certain pragmatic elements into the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The relation of such pragmatisms with the correspondence principle is discussed. It is argued that neither Bohr nor Heisenberg did take ‘correspondence’ in one of these forms, and that it, in particular, was Bohr’s classical attitude which caused him to apply in an inconsistent way his correspondence principle to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, thus causing much confusion. It is demonstrated that an empiricist pragmatism is conducive to an explanation of violation of the Bell inequalities as a consequence of ‘complementarity’ in the sense of ‘mutual disturbance in a joint nonideal measurement of incompatible observables’ rather than as being caused by ‘nonlocal influences’.
In the past both instrumentalism and empiricism have inspired certain pragmatic elements into the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The relation of such pragmatisms with the correspondence principle is discussed. It is argued that neither Bohr nor Heisenberg did take `correspondence' in one of these forms, and that it, in particular, was Bohr's classical attitude which caused him to apply in an inconsistent way his correspondence principle to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, thus causing much confusion. It is demonstrated that an empiricist pragmatism is conducive to an explanation of violation of the Bell inequalities as a consequence of `complementarity' in the sense of `mutual disturbance in a joint nonideal measurement of incompatible observables' rather than as being caused by `nonlocal influences'.
Positive and negative features of the Copenhagen interpretation are discussed. As positive features can be mentioned its pragmatism and its awareness of the crucial role of measurement. However, the main part of the contribution is devoted to the negative features, to wit, its pragmatism (once again), its confounding of preparation and measurement, its classical account of measurement, its completeness claims, the ambiguity of its notion of correspondence, its confused notion of complementarity. It is demonstrated how confusions and paradoxes stemming from the negative features of the Copenhagen interpretation can be dealt with in an amended interpretation, to be referred to as `neo-Copenhagen interpretation', in which the role of the measuring instrument is taken seriously by recognizing the quantum mechanical character of its interaction with the microscopic object. The ensuing necessity of extending the notion of a quantum mechanical observable from the Hermitian operator of the standard formalism to the positive operator-valued measure of a generalized formalism is demonstrated to yield a sound mathematical basis for a transition from the Copenhagen contextualistic-realist interpretation to the neo-Copenhagen empiricist one. Applications to the uncertainty relations and to the Bell inequalities are briefly discussed.
In this article, we argue that although Bohr's version of the Copenhagen interpretation is in line with several key elements of logical positivism, pragmatism is the closest approximation to a classification of the Copenhagen interpretation, whether or not pragmatists directly influenced the key figures of the interpretation. Pragmatism already encompasses important elements of operationalism and logical positivism, especially the liberalized Carnapian reading of logical positivism. We suggest that some elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, which are in line with logical positivism, are also supported by pragmatism. Some of these elements are empirical realism, fallibilism, holism, and instrumentalism. However, pragmatism goes beyond logical positivism in espousing some other key elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, though imperfectly, such as the correspondence principle, complementarity, and indeterminism.
Positive and negative features of the Copenhagen interpretation are dis-cussed. As positive features can be mentioned its pragmatism and its aware-ness of the crucial role of measurement. However, the main part of the con-tribution is devoted to the negative features, to wit, its pragmatism (once again), its confounding of preparation and measurement, its classical account of measurement, its completeness claims, the ambiguity of its notion of cor-respondence, its confused notion of complementarity. It is demonstrated how confusions and paradoxes stemming from the negative features of the Copen-hagen interpretation can be dealt with in an amended interpretation, to be referred to as ‘neo-Copenhagen interpretation’, in which the role of the mea-suring instrument is taken seriously by recognizing the quantum mechanical character of its interaction with the microscopic object. The ensuing neces-sity of extending the notion of a quantum mechanical observable from the Hermitian operator of the standard formalism to the positive operator-valued measure of a generalized formalism is demonstrated to yield a sound math-ematical basis for a transition from the Copenhagen contextualistic-realist interpretation to the neo-Copenhagen empiricist one. Applications to the uncertainty relations and to the Bell inequalities are briefly discussed. 1
xi 4.5.24.5.3The double-slit experiment The microscope 4.6 Meaning of the 'complementarity' concept 4.6.1 4.6.24.6.34.6.44.6.5 4.6.6 4.6.7 Two meanings of 'to determine' Heisenberg's disturbance theory of measurement Complementarity according to Bohr Particle-wave duality Parallel and circular complementarity Complementarity and the projection postulate Complementarity and consciousness 4.7 Critique of the complementarity principle Einstein Margenau Ballentine Recent developments Complementarity and empiricist interpretation The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem 6 Individual-particle and ensemble interpretations of quantum mechanics 275 6.
One of the various interpretations of quantum mechanics occupies a privileged position in the opinion of the majority of physicists. This is the Copenhagen view, which owes its fame and popularity not only to historical reasons but also to its simplicity and practical efficiency. As is well known, the Copenhagen outlook was elaborated collectively. Nevertheless, Niels Bohr's and W. Heisenberg's contributions should be singled out as particularly outstanding. This chapter describes two principles, which are in fact the two pillars on which Bohr's doctrine is built. These are: The working of measuring instruments must be accounted for in purely classical terms . Another one is quantum systems that should not even be thought of as possessing individual properties independently of the experimental arrangement. In the particular case of the pair of observables "position" and "momentum," the Heisenberg uncertainty relations can be considered as a generalization of the complementarity principle.