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arXiv:0709.2613 · AIP conference proceedings

From Copenhagen to Neo-Copenhagen Interpretation

Willem M. de Muynck, Guillaume Adenier, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov, Pekka Lahti, Vladimir I. Man'ko, Theo M. Nieuwenhuizen

Published Jan 1, 2007• 2 citations
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Abstract

Positive and negative features of the Copenhagen interpretation are discussed. As positive features can be mentioned its pragmatism and its awareness of the crucial role of measurement. However, the main part of the contribution is devoted to the negative features, to wit, its pragmatism (once again), its confounding of preparation and measurement, its classical account of measurement, its completeness claims, the ambiguity of its notion of correspondence, its confused notion of complementarity. It is demonstrated how confusions and paradoxes stemming from the negative features of the Copenhagen interpretation can be dealt with in an amended interpretation, to be referred to as `neo-Copenhagen interpretation', in which the role of the measuring instrument is taken seriously by recognizing the quantum mechanical character of its interaction with the microscopic object. The ensuing necessity of extending the notion of a quantum mechanical observable from the Hermitian operator of the standard formalism to the positive operator-valued measure of a generalized formalism is demonstrated to yield a sound mathematical basis for a transition from the Copenhagen contextualistic-realist interpretation to the neo-Copenhagen empiricist one. Applications to the uncertainty relations and to the Bell inequalities are briefly discussed.

DOI
10.1063/1.2827339

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Positive and negative features of the Copenhagen interpretation are discussed. As positive features can be mentioned its pragmatism and its awareness of the crucial role of measurement. However, the main part of the contribution is devoted to the negative features, to wit, its pragmatism (once again), its confounding of preparation and measurement, its classical account of measurement, its completeness claims, the ambiguity of its notion of correspondence, its confused notion of complementarity. It is demonstrated how confusions and paradoxes stemming from the negative features of the Copenhagen interpretation can be dealt with in an amended interpretation, to be referred to as `neo-Copenhagen interpretation', in which the role of the measuring instrument is taken seriously by recognizing the quantum mechanical character of its interaction with the microscopic object. The ensuing necessity of extending the notion of a quantum mechanical observable from the Hermitian operator of the standard formalism to the positive operator-valued measure of a generalized formalism is demonstrated to yield a sound mathematical basis for a transition from the Copenhagen contextualistic-realist interpretation to the neo-Copenhagen empiricist one. Applications to the uncertainty relations and to the Bell inequalities are briefly discussed.
Positive and negative features of the Copenhagen interpretation are dis-cussed. As positive features can be mentioned its pragmatism and its aware-ness of the crucial role of measurement. However, the main part of the con-tribution is devoted to the negative features, to wit, its pragmatism (once again), its confounding of preparation and measurement, its classical account of measurement, its completeness claims, the ambiguity of its notion of cor-respondence, its confused notion of complementarity. It is demonstrated how confusions and paradoxes stemming from the negative features of the Copen-hagen interpretation can be dealt with in an amended interpretation, to be referred to as ‘neo-Copenhagen interpretation’, in which the role of the mea-suring instrument is taken seriously by recognizing the quantum mechanical character of its interaction with the microscopic object. The ensuing neces-sity of extending the notion of a quantum mechanical observable from the Hermitian operator of the standard formalism to the positive operator-valued measure of a generalized formalism is demonstrated to yield a sound math-ematical basis for a transition from the Copenhagen contextualistic-realist interpretation to the neo-Copenhagen empiricist one. Applications to the uncertainty relations and to the Bell inequalities are briefly discussed. 1
In the past both instrumentalism and empiricism have inspired certain pragmatic elements into the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The relation of such pragmatisms with the correspondence principle is discussed. It is argued that neither Bohr nor Heisenberg did take ‘correspondence’ in one of these forms, and that it, in particular, was Bohr’s classical attitude which caused him to apply in an inconsistent way his correspondence principle to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, thus causing much confusion. It is demonstrated that an empiricist pragmatism is conducive to an explanation of violation of the Bell inequalities as a consequence of ‘complementarity’ in the sense of ‘mutual disturbance in a joint nonideal measurement of incompatible observables’ rather than as being caused by ‘nonlocal influences’.
In the past both instrumentalism and empiricism have inspired certain pragmatic elements into the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The relation of such pragmatisms with the correspondence principle is discussed. It is argued that neither Bohr nor Heisenberg did take `correspondence' in one of these forms, and that it, in particular, was Bohr's classical attitude which caused him to apply in an inconsistent way his correspondence principle to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, thus causing much confusion. It is demonstrated that an empiricist pragmatism is conducive to an explanation of violation of the Bell inequalities as a consequence of `complementarity' in the sense of `mutual disturbance in a joint nonideal measurement of incompatible observables' rather than as being caused by `nonlocal influences'.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is investigated from a philosophical point of view. It is justified the opinion that the philosophical attitude the Copenhagen interpretation is based on is in principle inevitable for a real comprehension of quantum theory. This attitude is mainly related to epistemological arguments. However, the measurement problem often seems not to be treated clearly enough within the interpretation. By referring to the property of the necessity to use macroscopic measurement instruments obeying classical concepts it is made the attempt to solve the measurement problem. According to this consideration the indeterministic character of quantum theory seems to have its origin in a lack of knowledge and thus it appears in a similar but more principle way than in statistical mechanics. It is emphasized the ontological character of the uncertainty relation and the related non locality of quantum theory suggesting that the existence of a position space is not as fundamental as the assumptions of general quantum theory.
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
Foundational attitudes towards quantum theory have recently thrown off much of the old philosophical baggage largely associated with Niels Bohr to which Einstein famously objected, including the central ‘collapse of the wavefunction’ concept. A ‘neo-Copenhagen’ interpretation, it is suggested, has arisen. This development is placed in its historical context and contrasted to philosophical allegations of anti-realism. The neo-Copenhagen interpretation remains wedded to Heisenberg's uncertainty and observer-dependent values of particles. However a discussion of Nick Herbert's ‘rainbow analogy’ suggests that subatomic particles are emergent from a ‘nonlocal’ level of reality outside the domain of space and time. Critical realism recognizes that emergent systems have an irreducibly ontologically character, and in its combination of epistemological relativism and ontological realism, provides a basis for the proposition that realists who support Einstein's objections must now recognize that their realism must be redefined.