The coexistence of several interpretations of one theory is considered through the example of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The problem considered is whether physicists manage to work properly in spite of the several interpretations. The criterion adopted is the possibility of re-using others ’ works for another research: this is called “fruitfulness of works”. It is argued that such a fruitfulness is possible between works made in different quantum interpretations. Quantum interpretations in conflict Quantum mechanics (QM) is famous nowadays for having several interpretations. Here are some quotations which illustrate some oppositions: People who have not grasped the ideas of [Bohm’s] papers [...] are handicapped in any discussion of the meaning of quantum mechanics. (Bell, 1987, p. 173) The quantum theory of parallel universes [...] is the explanation — the only one that is tenable.
The coexistence of several interpretations of one theory is considered through the example of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The problem considered is whether physicists manage to work properly in spite of the several interpretations. The criterion adopted is the possibility of re-using others ’ works for another research: this is called “fruitfulness of works”. It is argued that such a fruitfulness is possible between works made in different quantum interpretations. Quantum interpretations in conflict Quantum mechanics (QM) is famous nowadays for having several interpretations. Here are some quotations which illustrate some oppositions: People who have not grasped the ideas of [Bohm’s] papers [...] are handicapped in any discussion of the meaning of quantum mechanics. (Bell, 1987, p. 173) The quantum theory of parallel universes [...] is the explanation — the only one that is tenable.
‘A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics’ (Putnam [1965]) explained why the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a philosophical problem in detail, but with only the necessary minimum of technicalities, in the hope of making the difficulties intelligible to as wide an audience as possible. When I wrote it, I had not seen Bell ([1964]), nor (of course) had I seen Ghirardi et al. ([1986]). And I did not discuss the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation. For all these reasons, I have decided to make a similar attempt forty years later, taking account of additional interpretations and of our knowledge concerning non-locality. (The Quantum Logical interpretation proposed in Putnam [1968] is not considered in the present paper, however, because Putnam [1994b] concluded that it was unworkable.) Rather than advocate a particular interpretation, this paper classifies the possible kinds of interpretation, subject only to the constraints of a very broadly construed scientific realism. Section 7 does, however, argue that two sorts of interpretation—ones according to which a ‘collapse’ is brought about by the measurement (e.g. the traditional ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation), and the Many Worlds interpretation or interpretations—should be ruled out. The concluding section suggests some possible morals of a cosmological character. 1. Background 2. Scientific realism is the premise of my discussion 3. What ‘quantum mechanics’ says—and some problems 4. Other interpretations of quantum mechanics 5. The problem of Einstein's bed 6. Classification of the possible kinds of interpretation 7. Which interpretations I think we can rule out 8. The ‘moral’ of this discussion
In this monograph I present the basic structure of an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Chapter 1 outlines the central ideas behind the interpretation and illustrates them by means of examples: Subsequent chapters fill in the details of the interpretation. But it is important to begin by explaining what I take an interpretation of quantum mechanics to be, and why any further interpretation needs to be offered. After all, quantum mechanics (in some form) is by now both a foundation for much of contemporary physics and a veteran of more than sixty years of intermittent but sometimes intense reflection on its content and meaning. What more can be, or should be, said about the interpretation of this theory? Many physicists believe that no more needs to be said: that there is basically only one way of understanding quantum mechanics, due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others, and that the only remaining interpretative task is that of the physics teacher, who seeks to perfect ways of conveying this understanding to new generations of students. Sir Rudolf Peierls, one of the more lucid and distinguished of these physicists, even objects to the use of the familiar term ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ to refer to the way of understanding quantum mechanics due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others. Because this sounds as if there were several interpretations of quantum mechanics. There is only one. There is only one way in which you can understand quantum mechanics.[…]
Quantum mechanics has become the rising trend in modern physics and has completely changed people’s views of physics. This essay delves into the once-existing problems underlying quantum mechanics such as the conflict between substantiality and completeness in quantum mechanics and the relationship between causality and observation and analyzes the solutions to the controversies. The Copenhagen Interpretation is widely considered the most orthodox explanation of quantum mechanics; therefore, this paper focuses on the Copenhagen Interpretation and examines how it delicately manages to explain quantum mechanics. It also examines its alternative theories, such as Einstein’s local hidden variable theory, and disproves them with Bell’s inequality and other reasonings. The essay aims to clarify and systematize the historical development of quantum mechanics, showing the current progress of quantum mechanics.
Next year, there will be a 100-year celebration of quantum mechanics, but there is no consensus on the interpretation of this theory. This reprint presents recent works on one of the most intriguing interpretations, the many-worlds interpretation, presented at a workshop in October 2022 at Tel Aviv University. The many-worlds interpretation solves the measurement problem, avoids action at a distance and indeterminism, and does not contradict empirical evidence. The main question discussed in the workshop was as follows: why is it not in the consensus? Major issues such as preferred basis, the meaning of probability, non-locality, and alternative approaches were discussed, which are increasingly drawing attention in physics and philosophy. The contributions demonstrated a striking diversity in understanding the basic concepts. What are the worlds in the many-worlds interpretation? Do the worlds diverge or split? Is probability objective or subjective, or is it just an illusion? Can we avoid the non-separability of quantum mechanics? Many questions were raised and significant progress in understanding was achieved, but the papers showed that consensus is still far away. This reprint describes the current status of the research and will be invaluable for physicists and philosophers who want to resolve the long-standing problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
We still lack any consensus about what one is actually talking about as one uses quantum mechanics. There is a gap between the abstract terms in which the theory is couched and the phenomena the theory enables each of us to account for so well. Because it has no practical consequences for how we each use quantum mechanics to deal with physical problems, this cognitive dissonance has managed to coexist with the quantum theory from the very beginning. The absence of conceptual clarity for almost a century suggests that the problem might lie in some implicit misconceptions about the nature of scientific explanation that are deeply held by virtually all physicists, but are rarely explicitly acknowledged. I describe here such unvoiced but widely shared assumptions. Rejecting them clarifies and unifies a range of obscure remarks about quantum mechanics made almost from the beginning by some of the giants of physics, many of whom are held to be in deep disagreement. This new view of physics requires physicists to think about science in an unfamiliar way. My primary purpose is to explain the new perspective and urge that it be taken seriously. My secondary aims are to explain why this perspective differs significantly from what Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli had been saying from the very beginning, and why it is not solipsism, as some have maintained. To emphasize that this is a general view of science, and not just of quantum mechanics, I apply it to a long-standing puzzle in classical physics: the apparent inability of physics to give any meaning to 'Now'-the present moment.
Abstract The purpose of this book is to present an interpretation of quantum mechanics. But what are we talking about when we speak of “quantum mechanics?” Are we talking about a single theory or about many related theories? And what do we mean by “interpretation” here? In this chapter, I will address these questions in an introductory way. Of course, I do not intend to take part in the extensive discussions about what a scientific theory is, what is meant by interpreting a theory, in what situation we encounter equivalent theories, and many other questions related to or derived from these. My aim here is to present some preliminary ideas in a way that I hope will be sufficient to avoid misunderstandings in the following chapters. But, above all, I will state my position as to why, after so many years and so much literature on the subject, the interpretation of quantum mechanics deserves further discussion.