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Lecture notes in computer science

Passive Corruption in Statistical Multi-Party Computation

Martin Hirt, Christoph Lucas, Ueli M. Maurer, Dominik Raub

Published Jan 1, 2012• 10 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-32284-6_8

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Passive Corruption in Statistical Multi-Party Computation.

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Abstract. The goal of Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is to perform an arbitrary computation in a distributed, private, and fault-tolerant way. For this purpose, a fixed set of n parties runs a protocol that tolerates an adversary corrupting a subset of the parties, preserving certain security guarantees like correctness, secrecy, robustness, and fairness. Corruptions can be either passive or active: A passively corrupted party follows the protocol correctly, but the adversary learns the entire internal state of this party. An actively corrupted party is completely controlled by the adversary, and may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. A mixed adversary may at the same time corrupt some parties actively and some additional parties passively. In this work, we consider the statistical setting with mixed adversaries and study the exact consequences of active and passive corruptions on secrecy, correctness, robustness, and fairness separately (i.e., hybrid security). Clearly, the number of passive corruptions affects the thresholds for secrecy, while the number of active corruptions affects all thresholds. It turns out that in the statistical setting, the number of passive corruptions in particular also affects the threshold for correctness, i.e., in all protocols there are (tolerated) adversaries for which a single additional passive corruption is sufficient to break correctness. This is in contrast to both the perfect and the computational setting, where such an influence cannot be observed. Apparently, this effect arises from the use of information-theoretic signatures, which are part of most (if not all) statistical protocols.

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A Dynamic Tradeoff Between Active and Passive Corruptions in Secure Multi-Party Computation

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Abstract. At STOC ’87, Goldreich et al. presented two protocols for secure multi-party computation (MPC) among n parties: The first protocol provides passive security against t < n corrupted parties. The second protocolprovidesevenactive security,butonlyagainstt < n/2corrupted parties. Although these protocols provide security against the provably highest possible number of corruptions, each of them has its limitation: The first protocol is rendered completely insecure in presence of a single active corruption, and the second protocol is rendered completely insecure in presence of ⌈n/2 ⌉ passive corruptions. At Crypto 2006, Ishai et al. combined these two protocols into a single protocol which provides passive security against t < n corruptions and active security against t < n/2 corruptions. This protocol unifies the security guarantees of the passive world and the active world (“best of both worlds”). However, the corruption threshold t < n can be tolerated only when all corruptions are passive. With a single active corruption,

•Aug 2, 2013•0 citations
Abstract. The goal of Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is to perform an arbitrary computation in a distributed, private, and fault-tolerant way. For this purpose, a fixed set of n parties runs a protocol that tolerates an adversary corrupting a subset of the parties, preserving certain security guarantees like correctness, secrecy, robustness, and fairness. Corruptions can be either passive or active: A passively corrupted party follows the protocol correctly, but the adversary learns the entire internal state of this party. An actively corrupted party is completely controlled by the adversary, and may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. A mixed adversary may at the same time corrupt some parties actively and some additional parties passively. In this work, we consider the statistical setting with mixed adversaries and study the exact consequences of active and passive corruptions on secrecy, correctness, robustness, and fairness separately (i.e., hybrid security). Clearly, the number of passive corruptions affects the thresholds for secrecy, while the number of active corruptions affects all thresholds. It turns out that in the statistical setting, the number of passive corruptions in particular also affects the threshold for correctness, i.e., in all protocols there are (tolerated) adversaries for which a single additional passive corruption is sufficient to break correctness. This is in contrast to both the perfect and the computational setting, where such an influence cannot be observed. Apparently, this effect arises from the use of information-theoretic signatures, which are part of most (if not all) statistical protocols.
Abstract. At STOC ’87, Goldreich et al. presented two protocols for secure multi-party computation (MPC) among n parties: The first protocol provides passive security against t < n corrupted parties. The second protocolprovidesevenactive security,butonlyagainstt < n/2corrupted parties. Although these protocols provide security against the provably highest possible number of corruptions, each of them has its limitation: The first protocol is rendered completely insecure in presence of a single active corruption, and the second protocol is rendered completely insecure in presence of ⌈n/2 ⌉ passive corruptions. At Crypto 2006, Ishai et al. combined these two protocols into a single protocol which provides passive security against t < n corruptions and active security against t < n/2 corruptions. This protocol unifies the security guarantees of the passive world and the active world (“best of both worlds”). However, the corruption threshold t < n can be tolerated only when all corruptions are passive. With a single active corruption,