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Quantum hacking of continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems: realtime Trojan-horse attacks

Birgit Stiller, Imran Khan, Nitin Jain, Paul Jouguet, Sébastien Kunz-Jacques, Eleni Diamanti, Christoph Marquardt, Gerd Leuchs

Published Jan 1, 2015• 13 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We experimentally demonstrate successful Trojan-horse attacks on laboratory and commercial continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems with binary and Gaussian modulation. Furthermore, we analyze appropriate countermeasures regarding their spectral performance.
DOI
10.1364/cleo_qels.2015.ff1a.7

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We present a Trojan-horse attack on the practical two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution system. Our attack mainly focuses on the imperfection of the practical system that the modulator has a redundancy of modulation pulse-width, which leaves a loophole for the eavesdropper inserting a Trojan-horse pulse. Utilizing the unique characteristics of two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution that Alice only takes modulation operation on the received mode without any measurement, this attack allows the eavesdropper to render all of the final keys shared between the legitimate parties insecure without being detected. After analyzing the feasibility of the attack, the corresponding countermeasures are put forward.
We demonstrate the experimental feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that remains nearly invisible to the single-photon detectors employed in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, such as Clavis2 from ID Quantique. We perform a detailed numerical comparison of the attack performance against Scarani-Ac´ın-Ribordy-Gisin (SARG04) QKD protocol at 1924 nm versus that at 1536 nm. The attack strategy was proposed earlier but found to be unsuccessful at the latter wavelength, as reported in N. Jain et al., New J. Phys. 16, 123030 (2014). However at 1924 nm, we show experimentally that the noise response of the detectors to bright pulses is greatly reduced, and show by modeling that the same attack will succeed. The invisible nature of the attack poses a threat to the security of practical QKD if proper countermeasures are not adopted.