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arXiv:1408.0492 · IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics

Risk Analysis of Trojan-Horse Attacks on Practical Quantum Key Distribution Systems

Nitin Jain, Birgit Stiller, Imran Khan, Vadim Makarov, Christoph Marquardt, Gerd Leuchs

Published Nov 5, 2014• 142 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horse attacks can breach the security of the QKD system, if appropriate safeguards are not installed or if they can be fooled by the Eve. We present a risk analysis of such attacks based on extensive spectral measurements, such as transmittance, reflectivity, and detection sensitivity of some critical components used in a typical QKD systems. Our results indicate the existence of wavelength regimes, where the attacker gains considerable advantage as compared to launching an attack at 1550 nm. We also propose countermeasures to reduce the risk of such attacks.

DOI
10.1109/jstqe.2014.2365585

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An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horse attacks can breach the security of the QKD system, if appropriate safeguards are not installed or if they can be fooled by the Eve. We present a risk analysis of such attacks based on extensive spectral measurements, such as transmittance, reflectivity, and detection sensitivity of some critical components used in a typical QKD systems. Our results indicate the existence of wavelength regimes, where the attacker gains considerable advantage as compared to launching an attack at 1550 nm. We also propose countermeasures to reduce the risk of such attacks.
A quantum key distribution (QKD) system may be probed by an eavesdropper Eve by sending in bright light from the quantum channel and analyzing the back-reflections. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a setup for mounting such a Trojan-horse attack. We show it in operation against the quantum cryptosystem Clavis2 from ID Quantique, as a proof-of-principle. With just a few back-reflected photons, Eve discerns Bobʼs (secret) basis choice, and thus the raw key bit in the Scarani–Acín–Ribordy–Gisin 2004 protocol, with higher than 90% probability. This would clearly breach the security of the cryptosystem. Unfortunately, Eveʼs bright pulses have a side effect of causing a high level of afterpulsing in Bobʼs single-photon detectors, resulting in a large quantum bit error rate that effectively protects this system from our attack. However, in a Clavis2-like system equipped with detectors with less-noisy but realistic characteristics, an attack strategy with positive leakage of the key would exist. We confirm this by a numerical simulation. Both the eavesdropping setup and strategy can be generalized to attack most of the current QKD systems, especially if they lack proper safeguards. We also propose countermeasures to prevent such attacks.
As the existence of non-zero reflection coefficients in the real component of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems, Eve can probe the system by sending the bright light pulses into Alice’s set-up. With the analysis of back-reflections, Eve only takes a few back-reflected photons to intercept information and obtain the raw key bit. In this paper, the attack problems are converted into the information leakage problems. First, we analyzed the Trojan horse attacks with different wavelengths and confirmed its side effects, such as crosstalk and anti-Stokes Raman scattering, by a numerical simulation. Then, based on the wavelength-dependent property of beam splitter, we presented a practical way to estimate the deviation of shot noise and therefore correct the excess noise by inserting different wavelength pulses under joint attacks. Finally, we specified the security bounds of the system through quantifying the excess noise bounds caused by the Trojan horse attacks and provided a theoretical reference for the secret key transmission of system. As a consequence, the transmission errors within the security bounds can be negligible and the legitimate users will not perceive the presence of Eve.
Abstract The results of investigation of the spectral characteristics of some passive fiber-optic components, such as optical isolators, circulators, spectral filters and multiplexers, used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems and contributing to the protection of QKD system from active optical probing attacks are presented. An assessment of the required degree of isolation is also given, which ensures reliable protection of the QKD system against Trojan-horse attacks under the most stringent conditions for legitimate users. Based on the formulated requirements and measurement results, the effectiveness of protection using the investigated passive insulating components is analyzed. Using the example of calculating the insulation for the QKD system scheme presented in the work, the achievement of the required level of isolation (150 dB) in the entire considered spectral range is shown.
The Trojan-horse attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are known to be a threat to secure key sharing between two parties (Alice and Bob). To protect a QKD system against such attacks a variety of passive optical and active optical devices embedded in Alice’s and Bob’s setup are widely used. However, a security analysis against the Trojan-horse attack is required to ensure the unconditional security of a QKD system. We present a security analysis against the Trojan-horse attacks on a practical fiber-based QKD phase-coding system in 400–1700 nm spectral range. The obtained results made it possible to calculate the higher limit of average photon number returned to Eve and the probabilities of Eve’s success of the attack on a particular QKD system.
Vulnerabilities of components used in quantum-key-distribution systems affect its implementation security and must be taken into consideration during system development and security analysis. In this paper, we investigate transmission of fiber optical elements, which are commonly used in quantum-key-distribution systems for designing countermeasures against Trojan-horse attacks, in the 150015001500--210021002100-nm\mathrm{nm}nm range. As a result, we find loopholes in their transmission spectra that open possibilities for eavesdropping. We also consider a simple passive countermeasure based on the violation of total internal reflection in a single-mode fiber, that provides additional insertion losses of at least 60 dB for double-pass Trojan-horse probe pulses for wavelengths longer than 1830 nm.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers exceptionally high levels of data security during transmission by using principles of quantum physics.It is renowned for its provable security features.However, a gap between theoretical models and real-world applications, known as quantum hacking, challenges the reliability of QKD networks.Trojan-horse attacks represent a significant threat to the Bob subsystem in QKD, allowing Eve to infer Alice's basis choices through back-reflected pulses.This can compromise security without detection in severe cases, especially when quantum bit error rates (QBER) fall below the abort threshold.The proposed method combines a categorybased Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to estimate the posterior QBER distribution and assess risks in practical QKD systems.By processing the QBER, the approach also evaluates the dependability of the QKD scenario.Numerical results are presented using a state-of-theart point-to-point QKD device operating over optical quantum channels of 1 m, 1 km, and 30 km lengths.The results of the experimental analysis of a 30 km optical link suggest that the QKD device provided prior information to the proposed learner.Consequently, our proposed trustworthy monitor offers a defensive mechanism that identifies potential Eve attacks, effectively mitigating the risk of security vulnerabilities.