The topic of probabilty in quantum mechanics is rather vast, and in this article, we shall choose to discuss it from the perspective of whether and in what sense quantum mechanics requires a generalisation of the usual (Kolmogorovian) concept of probability. We shall focus on the case of finite-dimensional quantum mechanics (which is analogous to that of discrete probability spaces), partly for simplicity and partly for ease of generalisation. While we shall largely focus on formal aspects of quantum probability (in particular the non-existence of joint distributions for incompatible observables), our discussion will relate also to notorious issues in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Indeed, whether quantum probability can or cannot be ultimately reduced to classical probability connects rather nicely to the question of 'hidden variables' in quantum mechanics. An abridged version of this essay will appear in A. Hajek and C. Hitchcock (eds.), 'The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy', Oxford University Press. The present version includes in particular many more footnotes and references and the Appendix with the proofs of the Lemma and Proposition of Section 5.
The topic of probabilty in quantum mechanics is rather vast, and in this article, we shall choose to discuss it from the perspective of whether and in what sense quantum mechanics requires a generalisation of the usual (Kolmogorovian) concept of probability. We shall focus on the case of finite-dimensional quantum mechanics (which is analogous to that of discrete probability spaces), partly for simplicity and partly for ease of generalisation. While we shall largely focus on formal aspects of quantum probability (in particular the non-existence of joint distributions for incompatible observables), our discussion will relate also to notorious issues in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Indeed, whether quantum probability can or cannot be ultimately reduced to classical probability connects rather nicely to the question of 'hidden variables' in quantum mechanics. An abridged version of this essay will appear in A. Hajek and C. Hitchcock (eds.), 'The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy', Oxford University Press. The present version includes in particular many more footnotes and references and the Appendix with the proofs of the Lemma and Proposition of Section 5.
The topic of probability in quantum mechanics is rather vast. In this chapter it is discussed from the perspective of whether and in what sense quantum mechanics requires a generalization of the usual (Kolmogorovian) concept of probability. The focus is on the case of finite-dimensional quantum mechanics (which is analogous to that of discrete probability spaces), partly for simplicity and partly for ease of generalization. While the main emphasis is on formal aspects of quantum probability (in particular the non-existence of joint distributions for incompatible observables), the discussion relates also to notorious issues in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Indeed, whether quantum probability can or cannot be ultimately reduced to classical probability connects rather nicely to the question of 'hidden variables' in quantum mechanics.
The aim of the article is to argue that the interpretations of quantum mechanics and of probability are much closer than usually thought. Indeed, a detailed analysis of the concept of probability (within the standard frequency interpretation of R. von Mises) reveals that this notion always refers to an observing system. Therefore the instrumentalist aspects of quantum mechanics, and in particular the enigmatic role of the observer in the Copenhagen interpretation, derive from a precise understanding of probability.
Introduction Quantum probability is a generalization of both classical probability theory and quantum mechanics that allows to describe the probabilistic aspects of quantum mechanics. This generalization is formulated in two steps. First, the theory is reformulated in terms of algebras of functions on probability spaces. Therefore, the notion of a probability space (Ω, ℱ , P ) is replaced by the pair ( L ∞ (Ω), E (.) = ∫ Ω . d P ) consisting of the commutative von Neumann algebra of bounded random variables and the expectation functional. Then, the commutativity condition is dropped. In this way we arrive at the notion of a (von Neumann) algebraic probability space ( N ,Φ) consisting of a von Neumann algebra N and a normal (faithful tracial) state Φ. As we have seen this includes classical probability spaces in the form ( L ∞ (Ω), E ), it also includes quantum mechanical systems modeled by a Hilbert space H and a pure state ψ ∊ H (or a mixed state ρ ∊ S ( H )), if we take N = B ( H ) and Ф the state defined by Ф( X ) = 〈 ψ, X ψ 〉 (or Ф ( X ) = tr(ρ X )) for X ∊ B ( H ). Note that in this course we shall relax the conditions on N and Φ and work with involutive algebras and positive normalized functionals, that is, *-algebraic probability spaces. A striking feature of quantum probability (also called noncommutative probability) is the existence of several notions of independence. This is the starting point of this course, which intends to give an introduction to the theory of quantum stochastic processes with independent increments. However, before we come to these processes, we will give a general introduction to quantum probability. In Section 1.2, we recall the basic definitions of quantum probability and discuss some fundamental differences between classical probability and quantum probability. In Section 1.3 we address the question ‘Why do we need Quantum Probability?’ We discuss the EPR experiment and the Kochen–Specker Theorem, which show that we cannot model quantum physics with classical probability spaces because the values of observable quantities do not exist unless we specify which measurement we will carry out and which quantities we will determine. In this sense quantum physics requires a more radical description of chance.
Quantum physics consists of a formal core that is universally agreed upon (basically being a piece of mathematics with suggestive names for concepts matching related concepts of experimental culture) and an interpretational halo (trying to make this relation more precise) that remains highly disputed even after more than 90 years of modern quantum physics. The latter is the subject of the interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Part II), where many interpretations coexist and compete for the attention of those interested in what quantum physics really means. In this chapter, an axiomatic introduction to the undisputed formal core of quantum physics is given. The axioms described present nonrelativistic quantum statistical mechanics in the Schrödinger picture. The relativistic case is outside the scope of these axioms, as it must be treated by quantum field theory; see Chapter 7. As in any axiomatic setting (necessary for a formal discipline), there are a number of different but equivalent sets of axioms or postulates that can be used to define formal quantum physics. Since they are equivalent, their choice is a matter of convenience. The choice presented here is a formulation featuring three aspects: It emphasises the similarity of quantum mechanics and classical mechanics, gives most direct access to statistical mechanics, and is free from allusions to measurement. The reason for the first is that this similarity serves as a guide to meaning. From the axiomatic setting for quantum mechanics presented below, classical mechanics (in the Koopman setting discussed in Section 7.10) is obtained by simply restricting the operators to be diagonal, so that all operations happen pointwise on the diagonal elements. Thus, multiplication is commutative, and one can identify operators and functions. In particular, the density operator degenerates into a probability density. Therefore, the quantum case appears as a generalization of the classical case allowing for noncommutativity, so that both q-observables and the density operator are (usually infinite-dimensional) operators. The reason for the second is that statistical mechanics is the main tool for applications of quantum physics to the macroscopic systems we are familiar with. The reason for the third is that realistic measurements constitute a complex process involving macroscopic detectors, hence should be explained by quantum statistical mechanics rather than be part of the axiomatic foundations themselves. (This is in marked contrast to other foundations, and distinguishes the present system of axioms.)
Abstract By formulating the axioms of quantum mechanics, von Neumann also laid the foundations of a “quantum probability theory”. As such, it is regarded a generalization of the “classical probability theory” due to Kolmogorov. Outside of quantum physics, however, Kolmogorov’s axioms enjoy universal applicability. This raises the question of whether quantum physics indeed requires such a generalization of our conception of probability or if von Neumann’s axiomatization of quantum mechanics was contingent on the absence of a general theory of probability in the 1920s. This work argues in favor of the latter position. In particular, it shows how to construct a mathematically rigorous theory for non-relativistic N -body quantum systems subject to a time-independent scalar potential, which is based on Kolmogorov’s axioms and physically natural random variables. Though this theory is provably distinct from its quantum-mechanical analog, it nonetheless reproduces central predictions of the latter. Further work may make an empirical comparison possible. Moreover, the approach can in principle be adapted to other classes of quantum-mechanical models. Part II of this series discusses the empirical violation of Bell inequalities in the context of this approach. Part III addresses the projection postulate and the question of measurement.
The theory of probability and the quantum theory, the one mathematical and the other physical, are related in that each admits a number of very different interpretations. It has been proposed that the conceptual problems of the quantum theory could be, if not resolved, at least mitigated by a proper interpretation of probability. We rather show, through a historical and analytical overview of probability and quantum theory, that if some interpretations of the one and the other go along particularly well, none follows in a unique way.