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Lecture notes in computer science

Public Discussion Must Be Back and Forth in Secure Message Transmission

Takeshi Koshiba, Shinya Sawada

Published Jan 1, 2011• 2 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_22

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In the problem of Secure Message Transmission in the public discussion model (SMT-PD), a Sender wants to send a message to a Receiver privately and reliably. Sender and Receiver are connected by n channels, up to t < n of which may be maliciously controlled by a computationally unbounded adversary, as well as one public channel, which is reliable but not private. The SMT-PD abstraction has been shown instrumental in achieving secure multi-party computation on sparse networks, where a subset of the nodes are able to realize a broadcast functionality, which plays the role of the public channel. However, the implementation of such public channel in point-topoint networks is highly costly and non-trivial, which makes minimizing the use of this resource an intrinsically compelling issue. In this paper, we present the first SMT-PD protocol with sublinear (i.e., logarithmic in m, the message size) communication on the public channel. In addition, the protocol incurs a private communication complexity of O ( mn n−t), which, as we also show, is optimal. By contrast, the best known bounds in both public and private channels were linear. Furthermore, our protocol has an optimal round complexity of (3, 2), meaning three rounds, two of which must invoke the public channel. Finally, we ask the question whether some of the lower bounds on resource use for a single execution of SMT-PD can be beaten on average through amortization. In other words, if Sender and Receiver must send several messages back and forth (where later messages depend on earlier ones), can they do better than the naïve solution of repeating an SMT-PD protocol each time? We show that amortization can indeed drastically reduce the use of the public channel: it is possible to limit the total number of uses of the public channel to two, no matter how many messages are ultimately sent between two nodes. (Since two uses of the public channel are required to send any reliable communication whatsoever, this is best possible.) Key words: Secure message transmission, information-theoretic security, almost-everywhere secure computation, randomness extractors.
Secure message transmission assumes n channels between a sender and a receiver such that up to t channels are under the control of a computationally unlimited adversary. In secure message transmission by public discussion protocol, sender and receiver have access to a public authenticated channel. In this paper we show that if n ¿ t + 1, a secure protocol requires at least 3 rounds of communication and 2 rounds invocation of the public channel. This gives a complete answer to a question raised by Garay and Ostrovsky in Eurocrypt 2008. We also describe a round optimal protocol that has constant transmission rate over the public channel.
In a secure message transmission (SMT) scenario, a sender wants to send a message in a private and reliable way to a receiver. Sender and receiver are connected by n wires, t of which can be controlled by an adaptive adversary with unlimited computational resources. In Eurocrypt 2008, Garay and Ostrovsky considered an SMT scenario where sender and receiver have access to a public discussion channel and showed that secure and reliable communication is possible when n ≥ t + 1. In this paper, we will show that a secure protocol requires at least three rounds of communication and two rounds invocation of the public channel and hence give a complete answer to the open question raised by Garay and Ostrovsky. We also describe a round optimal protocol that has constant transmission rate over the public channel.