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Springer eBooks

Mathematical Physics and Philosophy of Physics (with Special Consideration of J. von Neumann’s Work)

Miklós Rédei

Published Jan 1, 2002• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-94-017-1785-4_18

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Abstract As Heisenberg began to promulgate his version of the new quantum philosophy as the ‘Copenhagen spirit’, John von Neumann undertook to purge quantum mechanics of its defects and make it comprehensible to Göttingen’s prince of mathematics, David Hilbert. The result is familiar to any student of physical science. Von Neumann separated the continuous, deterministic, and reversible evolution of the wavefunction from its discontinuous, indeterministic, and irreversible ‘collapse’ in an act of measurement. He saw no reason why the first process should not continue all the way up the chain to the observer’s conscious mind, where the second process occurs. Bohr had little to say about von Neumann’s theory, other than it was ‘wrongly put’. Von Neumann also closed the door that Born had left ajar. Causality could not be restored to the quantum domain by supposing the existence of ‘hidden variables’, as these, according to his reasoning, were mathematically impossible.

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Few things in physics have caused so much hand-wringing as von Neumann's collapse hypothesis. Unable to derive it mathematically, von Neumann attributed it to interaction with the observer's brain! Few physicists agreed, but tweaks of von Neumann's measurement theory did not lead to collapse, and Shimony and Brown proved theorems establishing `the insolubility of the quantum measurement problem'. Many different `interpretations' of quantum mechanics were put forward, none gained a consensus, and some scholars suggested that the foundations of quantum mechanics were flawed to begin with. Yet, in the last ninety years, no-one looked into now von Neumann had arrived at his collapse hypothesis! Von Neumann based his argument on the experiment of Compton and Simon. But, by comparing readings from von Neumann's book and the Compton-Simon paper, we find that the experiment provides no evidence for the collapse hypothesis; von Neumann had misread it completely! We suggest that von Neumann had relied on his phenomenal memory rather than the printed Compton-Simon paper, and his memory had failed him for once. Our finding has considerable implications for physics, which -- briefly sketched here -- will be discussed elsewhere in detail. An Appendix raises some questions for historians of physics.

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Abstract As Heisenberg began to promulgate his version of the new quantum philosophy as the ‘Copenhagen spirit’, John von Neumann undertook to purge quantum mechanics of its defects and make it comprehensible to Göttingen’s prince of mathematics, David Hilbert. The result is familiar to any student of physical science. Von Neumann separated the continuous, deterministic, and reversible evolution of the wavefunction from its discontinuous, indeterministic, and irreversible ‘collapse’ in an act of measurement. He saw no reason why the first process should not continue all the way up the chain to the observer’s conscious mind, where the second process occurs. Bohr had little to say about von Neumann’s theory, other than it was ‘wrongly put’. Von Neumann also closed the door that Born had left ajar. Causality could not be restored to the quantum domain by supposing the existence of ‘hidden variables’, as these, according to his reasoning, were mathematically impossible.
Few things in physics have caused so much hand-wringing as von Neumann's collapse hypothesis. Unable to derive it mathematically, von Neumann attributed it to interaction with the observer's brain! Few physicists agreed, but tweaks of von Neumann's measurement theory did not lead to collapse, and Shimony and Brown proved theorems establishing `the insolubility of the quantum measurement problem'. Many different `interpretations' of quantum mechanics were put forward, none gained a consensus, and some scholars suggested that the foundations of quantum mechanics were flawed to begin with. Yet, in the last ninety years, no-one looked into now von Neumann had arrived at his collapse hypothesis! Von Neumann based his argument on the experiment of Compton and Simon. But, by comparing readings from von Neumann's book and the Compton-Simon paper, we find that the experiment provides no evidence for the collapse hypothesis; von Neumann had misread it completely! We suggest that von Neumann had relied on his phenomenal memory rather than the printed Compton-Simon paper, and his memory had failed him for once. Our finding has considerable implications for physics, which -- briefly sketched here -- will be discussed elsewhere in detail. An Appendix raises some questions for historians of physics.
In 1933, Kolmogorov synthesized the basic concepts of probability that were in general use at the time into concepts and deductions from a simple set of axioms that said probability was a σ-additive function from a boolean algebra of events into [0, 1]. In 1932, von Neumann realized that the use of probability in quantum mechanics required a different concept that he formulated as a σ-additive function from the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space onto [0,1]. In 1935, Birkhoff & von Neumann replaced Hilbert space with an algebraic generalization. Today, a slight modification of the Birkhoff-von Neumann generalization is called “quantum logic”. A central problem in the philosophy of probability is the justification of the definition of probability used in a given application. This is usually done by arguing for the rationality of that approach to the situation under consideration. A version of the Dutch book argument given by de Finetti in 1972 is often used to justify the Kolmogorov theory, especially in scientific applications. As von Neumann in 1955 noted, and his criticisms still hold, there is no acceptable foundation for quantum logic. While it is not argued here that a rational approach has been carried out for quantum physics, it is argued that (1) for many important situations found in behavioral science that quantum probability theory is a reasonable choice, and (2) that it has an arguably rational foundation to certain areas of behavioral science, for example, the behavioral paradigm of Between Subjects experiments.