Abstract As Heisenberg began to promulgate his version of the new quantum philosophy as the ‘Copenhagen spirit’, John von Neumann undertook to purge quantum mechanics of its defects and make it comprehensible to Göttingen’s prince of mathematics, David Hilbert. The result is familiar to any student of physical science. Von Neumann separated the continuous, deterministic, and reversible evolution of the wavefunction from its discontinuous, indeterministic, and irreversible ‘collapse’ in an act of measurement. He saw no reason why the first process should not continue all the way up the chain to the observer’s conscious mind, where the second process occurs. Bohr had little to say about von Neumann’s theory, other than it was ‘wrongly put’. Von Neumann also closed the door that Born had left ajar. Causality could not be restored to the quantum domain by supposing the existence of ‘hidden variables’, as these, according to his reasoning, were mathematically impossible.
Abstract As Heisenberg began to promulgate his version of the new quantum philosophy as the ‘Copenhagen spirit’, John von Neumann undertook to purge quantum mechanics of its defects and make it comprehensible to Göttingen’s prince of mathematics, David Hilbert. The result is familiar to any student of physical science. Von Neumann separated the continuous, deterministic, and reversible evolution of the wavefunction from its discontinuous, indeterministic, and irreversible ‘collapse’ in an act of measurement. He saw no reason why the first process should not continue all the way up the chain to the observer’s conscious mind, where the second process occurs. Bohr had little to say about von Neumann’s theory, other than it was ‘wrongly put’. Von Neumann also closed the door that Born had left ajar. Causality could not be restored to the quantum domain by supposing the existence of ‘hidden variables’, as these, according to his reasoning, were mathematically impossible.
The dominance of the Copenhagen interpretation is the result of a historical accident (Cushing, 1994). At the Solvay conference in 1927, Louis de Broglie put forward the deterministic pilot wave theory, described later. Never slow to criticize, Pauli jumped up and demolished de Broglie’s proposal, and de Broglie was so discouraged by this that he did not develop his interpretation any further. The Copenhagen interpretation was then developed by Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and many others, as described in the previous chapter. It was strongly supported by von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of hidden variables. Years later, in 1952, Bohm published a deterministic hidden variable theory, showing that there must be something wrong with von Neumann’s proof. The error was found by John Bell in 1966, as described in the last chapter, and he also showed how Pauli’s objections to de Broglie’s original idea can be answered. If this had been done at the conference in 1927, quantum mechanics could have been interpreted deterministically from the beginning. The essential mistake in the Copenhagen interpretation is to treat it as a complete account of the behaviour of each individual system. It is frequently claimed that it enables us to calculate, at least in principle, everything that can be measured. Thus Hooft (1997, p. 11) said that ‘The laws of quantum mechanics have been formulated very accurately. We know exactly how to compute anything we would like to know.’ Also Peierls (1997, p. 25) has said that quantum mechanics ‘had become a complete and consistent scheme capable of giving a unique answer to any questions relating to actual or possible observations’. Even if this were true, it would not imply that it is the final complete theory, for it is always possible that some new phenomenon might be found that cannot be calculated quantum-mechanically. However, it is not true: there are many phenomena such as the time of decay of a radioactive nucleus, or the direction a particle is scattered by a nucleus, that cannot be calculated, even in principle. Quantum mechanics is therefore an incomplete theory. We can only calculate the statistical properties of these systems, such as the half-life of a radioactive decay or the differential scattering cross-section that gives the probabilities that a particle is scattered through various angles. All measurements of quantum systems are of this statistical character. It might be thought that the possibility of making measurements on a single electron provides an exception to this. However, even in such cases the electron is continually bathed in a fluctuating background radiation from nearby atoms. Since this is variable, that electron is a member of an ensemble of electrons subject to different fluctuations. All these examples clearly demonstrate the statistical character of quantum mechanics. ‘I am rather firmly convinced’, Einstein (in Schilpp, 1949, pp. 666, 671) remarked, ‘that the essentially statistical character of contemporary quantum theory is solely to be ascribed to fact that this theory operates with an incomplete description of physical systems’. As a result, ‘the c-function is to be understood as the description not of a single system but of an ensemble of systems’. So, ‘if the statistical quantum theory does not pretend to describe the individual system completely, it appears unavoidable to look elsewhere for a complete description of the individual systems’. Thus ‘the difficulties of theoretical interpretation disappear, if one views the quantum-mechanical description as a description of an ensemble of systems’. If this is achieved, ‘the statistical theory would, within the framework of future physics, take an approximately analogous position to statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics’. ‘Thus, essentially, nothing has changed since Galileo or Newton or Faraday concerning the status of the ‘‘observer’’ or our ‘‘consciousness’’ or of our ‘‘information’’ in physics’ (Popper, 1982, p. 46). Once this is accepted, the quantum paradoxes that plagued the Copenhagen interpretation are easily resolved, as described below. In any textbook of quantum mechanics problems such as the calculation of the energy levels of the hydrogen atom are solved as if that hydrogen atom is alone in the universe. As Feynman (1972) remarked, ‘when we solve a quantum-mechanical problem, what we really do is to divide the universe into two parts – the system in which we are interested and the rest of the universe. We then usually act as if the system in which we are interested comprised the whole universe.’ In fact, however, every hydrogen atom on which measurements are made is surrounded by other atoms and exposed to their radiations. Quantum mechanics somehow takes this into account and gives the average behaviour of an ensemble of hydrogen atoms. A more detailed theory takes these influences into account. One attempt to do this is stochastic electrodynamics, described in a later section.
Abstract Hidden variables are hypothetical parameters that, if known, would deterministically specify quantum measurement outcomes, aiming to restore determinism and causality typical of classical mechanics. This work provides a modern and pedagogical exposition of John von Neumann’s 1932 proof on the incompatibility of hidden variables with quantum mechanics. We detail his two main conclusions: (1) dispersion-free ensembles (as defined within the framework of hidden variable theories) are incompatible with quantum mechanics; and (2) the quantum state provides a complete description of physical reality. We critically analyze the key assumptions in von Neumann’s proof, highlighting later challenges—particularly John Bell’s critique and the development of contextual hidden-variable theories by Kochen and Specker. This discussion clarifies von Neumann’s historical role as a pioneer in this debate, while showing how modern hidden-variable theories, such as Bohmian mechanics, remain compatible with quantum predictions. Conversion tables are included between this article’s notation and von Neumann’s original book.
Abstract Also physics has its impossibility statements. We compare them with the mathematical impossibility theorems and look into the history of one of them: the impossibility of building a perpetual motion machine. We also consider impossibilities in twentieth-century physics, in particular in quantum mechanics. For example, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations imply that it is impossible to measure both the place and momentum of a particle accurately. We also discuss von Neumann’s controversial proof that it is impossible to obtain a deterministic version of quantum mechanics by introducing hidden variables.
This thesis is an examination of the measurement problem from within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics where I take issue with von Neumann’s theory of measurement which argues for the subjective collapse of the wave function by a conscious observer. I argue that von Neumann’s postulate of collapse has led to several intractable philosophical and conceptual problems in its account of quantum measurement. I argue that these problems arise from von Neumann’s misreading of Bohr’s complementarity regarding the relationship between subject and object as distinct metaphysical entities. Instead, I offer a new way of defining the subject-object relation based on Don Howard’s reading of Bohr’s complementarity as subject-object nonseparability (SON). I argue that the SON principle has the potential of placing Copenhagen on more solid philosophical footing by viewing the subject-object relationship not as a causal relation, but as a relation of ontological dependence to avoid the idea of collapse altogether.
A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it. – Max Planck, 1936 The only way quantum theory allows us to interact with quantum systems is via quantum processes. Thus, the only way we can extract information about the state of a quantum system is to apply some non-deterministic process and observe which of the branches happened. For that reason, many people refer to the act of applying certain quantum processes as measurement and sometimes even as observation . A consequence of this unfortunate terminology is that one of the most touted ‘strange’ features of quantum theory is often misleadingly described as follows: ‘The mere act of observing a quantum state changes it.’ ‘Misleading’, since the concept of measurement described in the previous paragraph is far from the passive concept of observation familiar from our macroscopic world, but is rather a non-trivial process that will almost always drastically affect the quantum state. So, the mysterious aspect of quantum theory is not that ‘observation’ alters the quantum state but, rather, that it is impossible, even in principle, to ‘observe’ a quantum system in the classical sense. Given this fundamental restriction on how we can extract information from a quantum system, what can we learn about that system by means of a quantum process? The answer is, in fact, very little! First, performing a particular measurement could, for the vast majority of quantum states, yield any outcome i with a non-zero probability. In that case, obtaining an outcome i doesn't tell us much about what the state of the system was. Second, we say ‘was’, because the measurement will moreover irreversibly change the state according to the outcome. So rather than revealing the state of a system, a quantum measurement typically erases that state from history! Nonetheless, these quantum measurements are crucial to quantum theory since they constitute the only interface between us, in our classical world, and the quantum world. The great insight of the quantum computing community is that the non-deterministic changes induced by these quantum measurements are not a nuisance, but rather an extremely useful resource.
This article reviews the history of J. von Neumann’s analysis of hidden variables in quantum mechanics and the subsequent analysis by others. In his book The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, published in 1932, von Neumann performed an analysis of the consequences of introducing hidden parameters (hidden variables) into quantum mechanics. He arrived at two principal conclusions: first, hidden variables cannot be incorporated into the existing theory of quantum mechanics without major modifications, and second, if they did exist, the theory would have already failed in situations where it has been successfully applied. This analysis has been taken as an “incorrect proof” against the existence of hidden variables, possibly due to a mistranslation of the German word prufen. von Neumann’s so-called proof isn’t even wrong as such a proof does not exist, but it is an examination of the limitations imposed by internal consistency of the Hilbert space formulation of the theory. One of the earliest attempts to eliminate uncertainty, by D. Bohm, requires a major modification of quantum mechanics (observables are not represented by Hermitian operators), which supports von Neumann’s first principal conclusion. However, testing the Bohm theory requires constructing a physically impossible initial state. As such, the theory has no experimental consequences, so W. Pauli referred to it as an “uncashable check”. As there are no observable consequences, the Bohm theory is possibly a counterexample to von Neumann’s second conclusion that hidden variables in particular would have already led to a failure of the theory.