Time in Quantum Mechanics II

Valia Allori

L. M. Arévalo Aguilar, P. C. Garcia Quijas

We contend that the statement attributing to us the implication that the wave functions ?I(x, t) and ?II(x, t) are different cannot not be logically supported. On the contrary, throughout our paper ?Overcoming misconceptions in quantum mechanics with the time evolution operator? (Garcia Quijas and Ar?valo Aguilar 2007 Eur. J. Phys. 28 147) we constructed an argument to give support to the statement that the two wave functions ?I(x, t) and ?II(x, t) are the same. In other words, in our paper we really did appreciate that methods I and II lead to identical results.

Norifumi Yamada, Shin Takagi

A theoretical aspect of quantum mechanical probabilities is studied. In nonrelativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM) for a particle, Schrödinger's wave function assigns probabilities to possible places where the particle is found on a surface (hypersurface in Newtonian spacetime) of constant time. We may then ask if quantum mechanical probabilities can be defined for an exhaustive set of exclusive outcomes of observations made on a surface on which Newtonian time is not constant. Such a question may be said to belong to the study of the role of time in NRQM in a broad sense. Specifically we investigate the theoretical possibility of a probabilistic description of (I) where and how many times the particle intersects the surface, and of (II) where and how many times the particle is found on the surface. For each case we formulate two conditions for the success of a probabilistic description. They are the classifiability condition and the no-interference condition, both of which are conditions on the propagator of the particle. For each case it is proved that the former condition does not hold and that consequently a probabilistic description is theoretically impossible either for (I) or for (II).

Veiko Palge

Peter William Evans

This thesis is a study of the notion of time in modern physics, consisting of two parts. Part I takes seriously the doctrine that modern physics should be treated as the primary guide to the nature of time. To this end, it offers an analysis of the various conceptions of time that emerge in the context of various physical theories and, furthermore, an analysis of the relation between these conceptions of time and the more orthodox philosophical views on the nature of time. In Part II I explore the interpretation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics in light of the suggestion that an overly Newtonian conception of time might be contributing to some of the difficulties that we face in interpreting the quantum mechanical formalism. In particular, I argue in favour of introducing backwards-in-time causal influences as part of an alternative conception of time that is consistent with the picture of reality that arises in the context of the quantum formalism. Moreover, I demonstrate that this conception of time can already be found in a particular formulation of classical mechanics. One might see that one of the central themes of Part II originates from a failure to heed properly the doctrine of Part I: study into the nature of time should be guided by modern physics and thus we should be careful not to insert a preconceived Newtonian conception of time unwittingly into our interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism. Thus, whereas Part I is intended as a demonstration of methodology with respect to the study of time, Part II in a sense explores a confusion that can be seen as arising in the absence of this methodology.

Juan Gonzalo Muga, R. Sala Mayato, I. L. Egusquiza