Different level sources of possible inconsistencies of Quantum Physics are studied. The point of view is defended that inconsistencies may arise due to improper philosophical foundations of Quantum Physics but that there is a way out to each of the up to now suggested purely mathematical inconsistencies of each of the main mathematical formulations of Quantum mechanics. An example is worked out explicitly. The point of view is also supported that even if the above statement may be correct, i.e., that no purely mathematical inconsistencies exist in each of the main mathematical formulations, it is highly worthwhile to study alternatives as those offered by the Lie-Admissible Formulations of Quantum Mechanics.
Different level sources of possible inconsistencies of Quantum Physics are studied. The point of view is defended that inconsistencies may arise due to improper philosophical foundations of Quantum Physics but that there is a way out to each of the up to now suggested purely mathematical inconsistencies of each of the main mathematical formulations of Quantum mechanics. An example is worked out explicitly. The point of view is also supported that even if the above statement may be correct, i.e., that no purely mathematical inconsistencies exist in each of the main mathematical formulations, it is highly worthwhile to study alternatives as those offered by the Lie-Admissible Formulations of Quantum Mechanics.
The philosophy of physics is continuous with physics itself. Just as certain issues in the Foundations of Mathematics have been discussed by both mathematicians and by philosophers of mathematics, so certain issues in the philosophy of physics have been discussed by both physicists and by philosophers of physics. And just as there are issues of a more epistemological kind that tend to concern philosophers of mathematics more than they do working mathematicians, so there are issues that concern philosophers of physics more than they do working physicists. In this brief report I shall try to give an account of the present state of the discussion in America of both kinds of issues, starting with the problems of quantum mechanics, which concern both physicists and philosophers, and ending with general questions about necessary truth and the analytic-synthetic distinction which concern only philosophers. The problem of ‘measurement’ in quantum mechanics Quantum mechanics asserts that if A and B are any two possible ‘states’ of a physical system, then there exists at least one state (and in fact a continuous infinity of states) which can be described as ‘superpositions of A and B ’. If A and B are the sorts of states talked about in classical physics – definite states of position, or momentum, or kinetic energy, etc. – then their superpositions may not correspond to classically thinkable states.
The notion of quantum state plays a fundamental role within the Standard account of Quantum Mechanics (SQM) as established by Dirac and von Neumann during 1930s and up to the present. In this work we expose the deep inconsistencies that exist within the multiple definitions of the notion of quantum state that are provided within this axiomatic formulation. As we will argue, these different inconsistent definitions continue to be -- even today -- uncritically confused within the mainstream physical and philosophical literature leading to self-contradictory statements and wrong conclusions. We end with a discussion regarding the untenability of this concept for any rational understanding of theoretical physics.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
With all its remarkable achievements, Quantum Mechanics as established in the fundamental papers written by Heisenberg, de Broglie, Schro¨dinger, Dirac, etc. contains some inconsistencies and internal contradictions. Quantum mechanics deals with quantum processes in which the number and the type of particles do not vary during their interaction, but only their energy and momentum states. The formalism of Quantum Mechanics is not capable of describing neither the variation of the number of particles, nor the transformation of one type of particle into another type. Even if in some cases the number of particles is allowed to change, this is somewhat forced and inconsistent. For example, Quantum Mechanics is not able to give a satisfactory explanation of the spontaneous emission, in which an electron situated on an excited energy level emits a quanta γ and decays to a lower energy level.
Quantum mechanics comes in a variety of different forms and formalisms. There is wave mechanics, matrix mechanics, Dirac's version of quantum mechanics, von Neumann's version of quantum mechanics. The philosopher of physics has to ask not only what quantum mechanics means, but also what it is. Orthodoxy in the philosophy of physics treats quantum mechanics as the general theory of microphysics which takes Hilbert space as its state space and which associates observables with certain special operators on that space. This amounts to a decision as to what quantum mechanics is. However it is a far from arbitrary decision. For the Hilbert space, or von Neumann, formalism summarizes and captures everything that is in the other versions of quantum mechanics, without any of the dubious mathematics of, for example, Dirac's version. Contemporary philosophers of physics take a very formal view of what quantum mechanics is, a view which has many advantages and some disadvantages. Whatever the disadvantages of focussing on the formalism of quantum mechanics - and it may lead to losing sight of the ‘physics' and possibly to a bias against Bohrian Copenhagenism - it is certainly true that the literate philosopher of physics must have some acquaintance with Hilbert space. There are in fact several topics we have to deal with, though we deal with them only very cursorily. (This chapter is no substitute for Jauch's classic text Foundations of Quantum Mechanics .)
These notes are an elaboration on: (i) a short course that I gave at the IPhT-Saclay in May-June 2012; (ii) a previous letter on reversibility in quantum mechanics. They present an introductory, but hopefully coherent, view of the main formalizations of quantum mechanics, of their interrelations and of their common physical underpinnings: causality, reversibility and locality/separability. The approaches covered are mainly: (ii) the canonical formalism; (ii) the algebraic formalism; (iii) the quantum logic formulation. Other subjects: quantum information approaches, quantum correlations, contextuality and non-locality issues, quantum measurements, interpretations and alternate theories, quantum gravity, are only very briefly and superficially discussed. Most of the material is not new, but is presented in an original, homogeneous and hopefully not technical or abstract way. I try to define simply all the mathematical concepts used and to justify them physically. These notes should be accessible to young physicists (graduate level) with a good knowledge of the standard formalism of quantum mechanics, and some interest for theoretical physics (and mathematics). These notes do not cover the historical and philosophical aspects of quantum physics.