The notion of quantum state plays a fundamental role within the Standard account of Quantum Mechanics (SQM) as established by Dirac and von Neumann during 1930s and up to the present. In this work we expose the deep inconsistencies that exist within the multiple definitions of the notion of quantum state that are provided within this axiomatic formulation. As we will argue, these different inconsistent definitions continue to be -- even today -- uncritically confused within the mainstream physical and philosophical literature leading to self-contradictory statements and wrong conclusions. We end with a discussion regarding the untenability of this concept for any rational understanding of theoretical physics.
The notion of quantum state plays a fundamental role within the Standard account of Quantum Mechanics (SQM) as established by Dirac and von Neumann during 1930s and up to the present. In this work we expose the deep inconsistencies that exist within the multiple definitions of the notion of quantum state that are provided within this axiomatic formulation. As we will argue, these different inconsistent definitions continue to be -- even today -- uncritically confused within the mainstream physical and philosophical literature leading to self-contradictory statements and wrong conclusions. We end with a discussion regarding the untenability of this concept for any rational understanding of theoretical physics.
The distinction between pure states and mixed states is a kernel ingredient of what is considered to be the standard formulation of quantum mechanics and plays today a kernel role in foundational debates about the meaning of quantum probability, the separability of quantum systems, the definition and measure of entanglement, etc. In this work we attempt to expose the many inconsistencies introduced by this distinction and the serious consequences this has for many ongoing research programs within quantum physics which apply these notions uncritically.
Despite its power as the conceptual basis for a huge range of physical phenomena in atomic and subatomic physics, quantum mechanics still suffers from a lack of clarity regarding the physical meaning of its fundamental theoretical concepts, such as those of quantum state and of quantum theoretical quantities or variables , dealt with by the known mathematical-theoretical rules. These concepts have generally been considered as not giving a direct description of physical systems, for they do not correspond to what is usually understood by `physical states' or `physical properties', notably characterized by definite numerical values such as those obtained from measurement. The situation has been tentatively expressed in terms of various `interpretations', conceived not only with regard to the physical meanings of mathematical quantities, but also in connection with philosophical statements about `physical reality'. The question of whether or not quantum theoretical quantities describe definite physical systems existing in nature has therefore generally been considered as beyond the possibilities of physics, because of the definitions that are commonly taken for `physical state' and `physical quantity'. We sketch the main ideas on this problem and propose a possible way out of the puzzle, in terms of an extension of the meaning given to the concepts of the physical state and physical quantity of a system, which would allow one, without any theoretical change in quantum mechanics, to speak consistently of real quantum systems as having definite physical properties .
Abstract The book starts with a description of classical mechanics then discusses the quantum phenomena that require us to give up our commonsense classical intuitions. We consider the physical and conceptual arguments that led to the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics and how the standard theory explains quantum phenomena. This includes a discussion of how the theory’s two dynamical laws work with the standard interpretation of states to explain determinate measurement records, quantum statistics, interference effects, entanglement, decoherence, and quantum nonlocality. A careful understanding of how the standard theory works ultimately leads to the quantum measurement problem. We consider how the measurement problem threatens the logical consistency of the standard theory then turn to a discussion of the main proposals for resolving it. This includes collapse formulations of quantum mechanics like Wigner’s extension of the standard theory and the GRW approach and no-collapse formulations like pure wave mechanics, the various many-worlds theories, and Bohmian mechanics. In discussing alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we pay particular attention to the explanatory role played by each theory’s empirical ontology and associated metaphysical commitments and the conceptual trade-offs between theoretical options.
We argue that the notion of pure sate within Standard Quantum Mechanics is presently applied within the specialized literature in relation to two mutually inconsistent definitions. While the first (operational purity) provides a basis-dependent definition which makes reference to the certain prediction of measurement outcomes, the latter (trace-invariant purity) provides a purely abstract invariant definition which lacks operational content. In this work we derive a theorem which exposes the serious inconsistencies existent within these two incompatible definitions of purity.
Different level sources of possible inconsistencies of Quantum Physics are studied. The point of view is defended that inconsistencies may arise due to improper philosophical foundations of Quantum Physics but that there is a way out to each of the up to now suggested purely mathematical inconsistencies of each of the main mathematical formulations of Quantum mechanics. An example is worked out explicitly. The point of view is also supported that even if the above statement may be correct, i.e., that no purely mathematical inconsistencies exist in each of the main mathematical formulations, it is highly worthwhile to study alternatives as those offered by the Lie-Admissible Formulations of Quantum Mechanics.
The relationship between physical notions and the structures expressing them is an issue of primary importance the history and philosophy of pre-modern natural philosophy and of modern science. Historical evidence suggests that, when investigating the relationship between physics and mathematics, one should pay attention to the material, sensually perceivable forms mediating it: spoken or written words, drawings, artefacts, descriptions of experimental set-ups or, as the case discussed the present paper, symbolic notation. The reason for this is that, historically, physical notions and their expressions have very often been developed as one, and only distinguished from each other at a later stage. This was for example the case with what we today regard as mathematical and classical mechanics, which were developed the course of the eighteenth century as the discipline of the analysis of motion. When considered from a later point of view, both the physical notions and the concepts involved historical developments appear as being in flux, vague, and, as far as the side is concerned, non-rigorous. In such cases, verbal description, mechanical artefacts or symbols do not simply mediate between physical notions and structures, as might be the case at a later stage, but represent both of them one, allowing the historical actors to construct and manipulate physical-mathematical meaning by following, at times, their physical reasoning and, at times, their criteria of rigour. The history of quantum mechanics offers many examples of how new physics and new mathematics can emerge as one, with symbolic notation playing a central role shaping both. Among the many creators of quantum theory, Paul Dirac was particularly sensitive to questions of notation: