Through the analysis of the interpretations of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, the paper aims to demonstrate the following thesis: the Duhem-Quine thesis \non empirical underdetermination can be extended to the claim that not only the empirical data, but also the empirical data together with the mathematical formalism of a physical \ntheory do not suffice to determine completely our theories of physical reality. As a consequence, beyond observational data and mathematical physics, cultural and social factors \nas well as the value-preferences of physicists also play role as constitutive elements of physical theories. For example, the indeterminist interpretations of quantum mechanics are not neutral but value-laden, and deterministic interpretations, which insist on classical determinism as a value, are also possible. On the other hand, the thesis of the underdetermination of physical reality by mathematical physics confirms neither radical relativism, nor extreme versions of sociology of science. On the contrary, the mathematical formalism to be interpreted is autonomous – and in this sense “objective” – to a great extent with respect to cultural, social and other non-scientific factors and, therefore, there is a firm consensus regarding it in science. \n
Through the analysis of the interpretations of quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, the paper aims to demonstrate the following thesis: the Duhem-Quine thesis \non empirical underdetermination can be extended to the claim that not only the empirical data, but also the empirical data together with the mathematical formalism of a physical \ntheory do not suffice to determine completely our theories of physical reality. As a consequence, beyond observational data and mathematical physics, cultural and social factors \nas well as the value-preferences of physicists also play role as constitutive elements of physical theories. For example, the indeterminist interpretations of quantum mechanics are not neutral but value-laden, and deterministic interpretations, which insist on classical determinism as a value, are also possible. On the other hand, the thesis of the underdetermination of physical reality by mathematical physics confirms neither radical relativism, nor extreme versions of sociology of science. On the contrary, the mathematical formalism to be interpreted is autonomous – and in this sense “objective” – to a great extent with respect to cultural, social and other non-scientific factors and, therefore, there is a firm consensus regarding it in science. \n
In previous chapters we argued that the empirically successful formalism of quantum mechanics supports equally well two mutually incompatible general ontologies: the inherently indeterministic and generally accepted Copenhagen interpretation and Bohm's completely deterministic one. This underdetermination of the interpretation by the formalism is not simply an apparent one of two equivalent theories since there is no way to translate the terms of one of these ontologies into those of the other. This case could be seen as presenting a challenge to the scientific realist who seeks from successful scientific theories a true representation of the world. Furthermore, we suggest that the actual historical competition between these theories and the selection of Copenhagen over Bohm illustrate that such an historically contingent process is not meaningfully distinct from the rational reconstruction and logical judgment of the victorious theory. What is deemed successful and put on offer by the scientific community for the philosopher of science to justify after the fact is itself a contingent and nonunique product. UNDERDETERMINATION The origin of the underdetermination of scientific theories, what we refer to here as the so-called Duhem–Quine thesis, is typically located in Pierre Duhem's The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (first published in 1906). There Duhem was quite explicit about what he took to be the basis for judging whether or not a given physical theory is acceptable.
This chapter repeats for quantum mechanics the comparison carried out for relativity in Chapter 5. Its thesis is that the same three interpretative families, neo-Kantian, empiricist and scientific realist, reappear in the philosophical reception of quantum mechanics, but in a more radical form, because the dispute now reaches the meaning of the quantum state, of probability and of measurement. The chapter first identifies what the formalism established in Chapter 4 leaves open and treats the Copenhagen framework as a point of departure rather than a unified doctrine. It then reconstructs the neo-Kantian interpretation (the Kantian affinities of Bohr’s complementarity, Cassirer, Grete Hermann and contemporary transcendental perspectives), the empiricist interpretation (Heisenberg’s observability principle, instrumentalism, Schlick, Frank, Reichenbach and van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism) and, on equal terms, the realist interpretation: Einstein and the EPR argument, Popper’s propensities, the de Broglie–Bohm theory, Bell’s beables and local causality, realist modal interpretations, and the Everett and collapse programmes. The realist family is the most developed of the three in quantum mechanics, but it is also internally plural: it affirms that the theory refers to a mind-independent reality while disagreeing about whether that reality consists of particles, fields, propensities, branching worlds or definite and possible properties. On this basis the chapter compares the three interpretations of causality and of stationary action. Causality appears as a relativized condition of objective description, as a statistical relation without surplus content, or as an objective but non-local structure; stationary action appears as a coordination axiom of quantum dynamics, as an empirically equivalent formulation, or as a real dynamical structure that in Bohm’s theory directly guides motion. The result confirms the pattern of Chapter 5 and identifies the precise point, the relation between quantum possibility and actuality, from which the BBMT bridge of Chapter 7 will start.
The aim of the article is to analyze the ontological foundations of quantum mechanics and the relationship of various interpretations of quantum mechanics with the question of truth in scientific knowledge. The theoretical material (various interpretations of quantum mechanics) was analyzed. The research methods were analysis, comparative-historical and institutional approaches. On the basis of the study, it can be concluded that physicists are only able to predict the probabilities of physical phenomena or processes, without any knowledge of the structure of entity in itself. The study helps to complement the theoretical picture of the ontology of quantum mechanics and to get an idea about the development prospects of the methodology of physical sciences. We should not ascribe properties that are unobservable in experience to the entity because science can truly interpret only the representation of entity in itself in experience and the ways of dealing with it, not future events or possible states of the entity. Otherwise, science “slides” down to the level of dialectical (rhetorical) exercises based not on true premises, but on generally accepted or “authoritative” biases, which gives room to extreme forms of relativism and takes natural scientists away from studying nature to inventing empirically unsupported hypotheses. When, in accordance with the Cartesian ontology, the scientist assumes that the entity is as the “subject” observes it (that is, the “reflection” of the entity in consciousness is identified with entity in itself), this assumption leads the scientist to attempts to “scientifically” describe the future events or the possible states of the entity. The criterion for the truth of a scientific theory put forward by Einstein in his dispute with Bohr remains a fundamentally unattainable ideal. Cognition of nature is probabilistically and fundamentally incomplete since a person can consciously comprehend natural phenomena only within the framework of their representation in the existing being. The probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is due to the impossibility of knowing things as they exist by themselves, that is, as they exist outside of representation in the mind of the observer. This does not mean that physical entities did not exist before their knowledge: they existed potentially, but were not valid for the observer, that is, conscious. Quantum physics is as incomplete as any other physical theory when compared with an unattainable ideal, but this fact does not negate its truth for modern scientists since quantum theory is based on the results of verified experiments.
The idea of resolving a philosophical problem by reference to the authority of science is problematic. Nevertheless, such attempts spread among philosophers especially after the development of quantum theory. In this thesis I will argue that quantum mechanics cannot be used to support any forms of idealism or relativism. To this end, I introduce a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics which is in many respects more favorable than the other alternatives suggested so far. The interpretation that I propose is based on a recent approach, namely the theory of decoherence to replace the postulate of wave-function collapse. The major advantage of the realist interpretation that I propose is that it does not change the ^deterministic character of quantum mechanics. I also introduce a sufficient condition for progress in science and argue that according to this criterion the decoherence theory should be accepted as a progress over the quantum mechanics.
Purpose This work examines assumptions of positivism and the traditional scientific method. Design/methodology/approach Insights from quantum mechanics are explored especially as they relate to method, measurement and what is knowable. An argument is made that how social scientists, particularly sociologists, understand the nature of “reality out there” and describe the social world may be challenged by quantum ideas. The benefits of utilized mixed methods, considering quantum insights, cannot be overstated. Findings It is the proposition of this work that insights from modern physics alter the understanding of the world “out there.” Wheeler suggested that the most profound implication from modern physics is that “there is no out there” (1982; see also Baggott, 1992). Grappling with how modern physics may alter understanding in the social sciences will be difficult; however, that does not mean the task should not be undertaken (see Goswami, 1993). A starting point for the social sciences may be relinquishing an old mechanistic science that depends on the establishment of an objective, empirically based, verifiable reality. Mechanistic science demands “one true reality – a clear-cut reality on which everyone can agree…. Mechanistic science is by definition reductionistic…it has had to try to reduce complexity to oversimplification and process to statis. This creates an illusionary world…that has little or nothing to do with the complexity of the process of the reality of creation as we know, experience, and participate in it” (Goswami, 1993, pp. 64, 66). Research limitations/implications Many physicists have popularized quantum ideas for others interested in contemplating the implications of modern physics. Because of the difficulty in conceiving of quantum ideas, the meaning of the quantum in popular culture is far removed from the parent discipline. Thus, the culture has been shaped by the rhetoric and ideas surrounding the basic quantum mathematical formulas. And, over time, as quantum ideas have come to be part of the popular culture, even the link to the popularized literature in physics is lost. Rather, quantum ideas may be viewed as cultural formations that take on a life of their own. Practical implications The work allows a critique of positivist method and provides insight on how to frame qualitative methodology in a new way. Social implications The work utilizes popularized ideas in quantum theory: the preeminent theory that describes all matter. Little work in sociology utilizes this perspective in understanding research methods. Originality/value Quantum insights have rarely been explored in highlighting limitations in positivism. The current work aims to build on quantum insights and how these may help us better understand the social world around us.
This paper argues that, where deterministic and indeterministic formulations agree on empirically corroborated structure while differing in their completion of structure that remains empirically underdetermined, features invariant across these formulations warrant ontological commitment, whereas any warrant attaching to features that vary across them is categorically more provisional. Because deterministic and indeterministic completions are always formally available, while additional grounds for preferring particular completions are contingent and defeasible, empirically corroborated structure alone cannot determine whether reality is fundamentally deterministic or indeterministic, or whether that very distinction belongs only to specific representations of it.
On this basis, I advance a model-invariance criterion according to which structural features are candidates for realist commitment insofar as they are empirically corroborated within a regime and preserved across the admissible formulations of that structure. I show how such invariant content can be characterised in mathematically intelligible ways, yielding a fallibilist form of structural realism grounded in model-invariance rather than in the specific form of any given mathematical representation. Features such as conservation relations, invariant measures, symmetries, and probability or correlation structures over observable histories may satisfy this criterion. By contrast, the localisation of modal selection---whether in fine-grained initial conditions, stochastic outcomes, or state-update and collapse mechanisms---may vary across empirically admissible formulations and therefore constitute a gauge-like representational freedom.
This framework offers a realist ontology for modern physics that combines empirical openness with resistance to metaphysical overreach.