arXiv:2611.04539
Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky Mach-Zehnder receiver
Ryohei Mizusawa, Álvaro Navarrete, Akihiro Mizutani, Kiyoshi Tamaki
Abstract
We prove the security of phase-encoded decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution for a Mach-Zehnder receiver with imbalanced beam splitters and two threshold detectors that leak fine-grained information about the detection patterns. For this, we derive a lower bound on Bob's single-photon contributions and combine it with the decoy-state method and a recent phase-error framework for leaky receivers. The leakage-induced correction to the phase-error rate is independent of channel loss, providing a loss-tolerant treatment of receiver leakage even in the presence of beam-splitter imbalance. Our results provide a practical route toward loss-tolerant security proofs for imperfect QKD receivers in the presence of receiver leakage.
AI Summary
Phase-encoded decoy-state BB84 receivers can leak physical detection patterns, including single versus double clicks, which standard qubit squashing models do not preserve. This paper derives an asymptotic security bound for a Mach–Zehnder receiver with two threshold detectors, imbalanced beam splitters, and pattern-conditioned leakage. The proof virtually measures the total photon number in the two main interference modes without changing detection records or emitted leakage. An operator inequality lower-bounds the probability of exactly one main-mode photon using main-click statistics and the frequency of main clicks with no clicks in either neighboring satellite window. Three-intensity decoy estimation then bounds events with one emitted photon and one main-mode photon; all other events are tagged. Shared satellite windows and adaptive attacks are handled through odd/even martingale concentration. If the fidelity between the two key-basis single-click leakage states is at least $\gamma^2$, the target-event phase-error rate obeys $e_{\rm ph}\leq e_X+(1-p_d^-)(1-\gamma)/2$, where $p_d^-$ is a calibrated dark-count lower bound. This additive leakage penalty is independent of channel loss. Entrance transmittance need only lie within a calibration interval; exit transmittance need not be characterized. Illustrative simulations find that changing $\gamma$ from $1$ to $1/\sqrt{2}$ reduces cutoff distance from approximately 290 to 277 km for balanced splitters, and from 269 to 195 km for entrance transmittance 0.7. The analysis assumes equal, mode-independent detector efficiencies, fresh pattern-conditioned leakage, and protected-input timing. Unequal dark counts are treated by additional tagging. Efficiency mismatch, detector memory, input-dependent or arbitrary joint main–satellite leakage, and complete finite-key security remain outside scope.
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- DOI
- 10.48550/arxiv.2611.04539
- Comments
- 20 pages, 4 figures