Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2611.04539

Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky Mach-Zehnder receiver

Ryohei Mizusawa, Álvaro Navarrete, Akihiro Mizutani, Kiyoshi Tamaki

quant-phSubmitted Nov 3, 2026• Announced Nov 4, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We prove the security of phase-encoded decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution for a Mach-Zehnder receiver with imbalanced beam splitters and two threshold detectors that leak fine-grained information about the detection patterns. For this, we derive a lower bound on Bob's single-photon contributions and combine it with the decoy-state method and a recent phase-error framework for leaky receivers. The leakage-induced correction to the phase-error rate is independent of channel loss, providing a loss-tolerant treatment of receiver leakage even in the presence of beam-splitter imbalance. Our results provide a practical route toward loss-tolerant security proofs for imperfect QKD receivers in the presence of receiver leakage.

AI Summary

Phase-encoded decoy-state BB84 receivers can leak physical detection patterns, including single versus double clicks, which standard qubit squashing models do not preserve. This paper derives an asymptotic security bound for a Mach–Zehnder receiver with two threshold detectors, imbalanced beam splitters, and pattern-conditioned leakage. The proof virtually measures the total photon number in the two main interference modes without changing detection records or emitted leakage. An operator inequality lower-bounds the probability of exactly one main-mode photon using main-click statistics and the frequency of main clicks with no clicks in either neighboring satellite window. Three-intensity decoy estimation then bounds events with one emitted photon and one main-mode photon; all other events are tagged. Shared satellite windows and adaptive attacks are handled through odd/even martingale concentration. If the fidelity between the two key-basis single-click leakage states is at least $\gamma^2$, the target-event phase-error rate obeys $e_{\rm ph}\leq e_X+(1-p_d^-)(1-\gamma)/2$, where $p_d^-$ is a calibrated dark-count lower bound. This additive leakage penalty is independent of channel loss. Entrance transmittance need only lie within a calibration interval; exit transmittance need not be characterized. Illustrative simulations find that changing $\gamma$ from $1$ to $1/\sqrt{2}$ reduces cutoff distance from approximately 290 to 277 km for balanced splitters, and from 269 to 195 km for entrance transmittance 0.7. The analysis assumes equal, mode-independent detector efficiencies, fresh pattern-conditioned leakage, and protected-input timing. Unequal dark counts are treated by additional tagging. Efficiency mismatch, detector memory, input-dependent or arbitrary joint main–satellite leakage, and complete finite-key security remain outside scope.

No sign of AI-generated textStrong assumptions

Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2611.04539
Comments
20 pages, 4 figures

Related papers

Phase-error estimation for quantum key distribution with leaky receivers

Álvaro Navarrete, Margarida Pereira, Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo +3 more

Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) receivers may leak information about their measurement outcomes and settings to the channel (e.g., through detector backflashes or back-reflected Trojan-horse light) that could compromise the protocol's security. Here we present a simple finite-key security proof based on phase-error estimation for prepare-and-measure QKD in the presence of either a priori information leakage about the basis choices and/or a posteriori information leakage about the measurement outcomes. The proof requires only a bound on the distinguishability of the side-channel states. Furthermore, the analysis is modular and compatible with existing security proofs that address detector and source imperfections, making it applicable to a wide range of practical QKD implementations.

quant-pharXiv:2608.09674•Aug 11, 2026•1 citation

Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source

Kiyoshi Tamaki, Marcos Curty, Marco Lucamarini

In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a minimum number of assumptions. Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would allow for larger tolerance against device imperfections in the actual implementations. However, even in this device-independent scenario, one assumption seems unavoidable, that is, the presence of a protected space devoid of any unwanted information leakage in which the legitimate parties can privately generate, process and store their classical data. In this paper we relax this unrealistic and hardly feasible assumption and introduce a general formalism to tackle the information leakage problem in most of existing QKD systems. More specifically, we prove the security of optical QKD systems using phase and intensity modulators in their transmitters, which leak the setting information in an arbitrary manner. We apply our security proof to cases of practical interest and show key rates similar to those obtained in a perfectly shielded environment. Our work constitutes a fundamental step forward in guaranteeing implementation security of quantum communication systems.

arXiv:1803.06045•New Journal of Physics•Jun 20, 2016•109 citations

Quantum key distribution with imperfectly isolated devices

Xoel Sixto, Álvaro Navarrete, Margarida Pereira +3 more

Abstract Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) assume that there is no unwanted information leakage about the state preparation process. However, this assumption is impossible to guarantee in practice, as QKD systems can leak information to the channel due to device imperfections or the active action of an eavesdropper. Here, we solve this pressing issue by introducing a security proof in the presence of information leakage from all state preparation settings for arguably the most popular QKD scheme, namely the decoy-state BB84 protocol. The proof requires minimal experimental characterization, as only a single parameter related to the isolation of the source needs to be determined, thus providing a clear path for bridging the gap between theory and practice. Moreover, if information about the state of the side channels is available, this can be readily incorporated into the analysis to further improve the resulting performance.

arXiv:2411.13948•Quantum Science and Technology•May 21, 2025•16 citations

Finite-key security analysis of decoy-state QKD with source and detector imperfections

Xoel Sixto, Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo, Margarida Pereira +3 more

Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most widely adopted approach for overcoming the limitations of imperfect single-photon sources. However, existing security proofs typically either neglect important device imperfections or rely on assumptions that are difficult to justify in realistic high-speed implementations, such as the independent and identically distributed nature of the emitted signals. In this work, we combine and extend several recent theoretical advances to provide a comprehensive analytical finite-key security proof for decoy-state QKD that simultaneously incorporates multiple practically relevant transmitter and receiver imperfections, including state-preparation flaws, bit and basis side-channel leakage and correlations, setting-independent intensity fluctuations, and detection-efficiency mismatches.

quant-pharXiv:2606.29943•Jun 30, 2026•1 citation

Security of practical phase-coding quantum key distribution

Hong-Wei Li, Zheng-Qiang Yin, Zheng‐Fu Han +2 more

Security proof of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) has attracted a lot of attentions in recent years. Most of real-life QKD implementations are based on phase-coding BB84 protocol, which usually use Unbalanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (UMZI) as the information encoder and decoder. However, the long arm and short arm of UMZI will introduce different loss in practical experimental realizations, the state emitted by Alice's side is nolonger perfect BB84 states correspondingly. In this paper, we will give the security analysis in this situation. Counterintuitively, active compensation for this different loss will only lower the secret key bit rate.

arXiv:0911.2938•Quantum Information and Computation•Sep 1, 2010•8 citations

Security of decoy-state quantum key distribution with correlated bit-and-basis encoders

Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo, Margarida Pereira, Alessandro Marcomini +2 more

Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) modulators inevitably introduce correlations, causing the state emitted in a given round to depend on the setting choices made in previous rounds. These correlations break the round-by-round independence structure on which many widely used security proof techniques rely, leaving a significant gap between available theoretical guarantees and the reality of practical implementations. In this work, we develop a fully analytical finite-key security proof for decoy-state BB84 against general coherent attacks that rigorously incorporates correlations introduced by Alice's bit-and-basis encoder, while requiring only partial characterization of such correlations. Crucially, it does so without requiring the round partitioning of the data used for phase-error estimation introduced in previous works, showing that this technique is not indispensable for dealing with correlated encoders, and resulting in improved finite-key performance. Moreover, we also analyze the case of ideal single-photon sources, and our results reveal a counterintuitive effect: in the presence of strong encoding correlations, decoy-state BB84 can outperform single-photon implementations.

quant-pharXiv:2605.11767•May 13, 2026•4 citations
We prove the security of phase-encoded decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution for a Mach-Zehnder receiver with imbalanced beam splitters and two threshold detectors that leak fine-grained information about the detection patterns. For this, we derive a lower bound on Bob's single-photon contributions and combine it with the decoy-state method and a recent phase-error framework for leaky receivers. The leakage-induced correction to the phase-error rate is independent of channel loss, providing a loss-tolerant treatment of receiver leakage even in the presence of beam-splitter imbalance. Our results provide a practical route toward loss-tolerant security proofs for imperfect QKD receivers in the presence of receiver leakage.
Phase-encoded decoy-state BB84 receivers can leak physical detection patterns, including single versus double clicks, which standard qubit squashing models do not preserve. This paper derives an asymptotic security bound for a Mach–Zehnder receiver with two threshold detectors, imbalanced beam splitters, and pattern-conditioned leakage.
The proof virtually measures the total photon number in the two main interference modes without changing detection records or emitted leakage. An operator inequality lower-bounds the probability of exactly one main-mode photon using main-click statistics and the frequency of main clicks with no clicks in either neighboring satellite window. Three-intensity decoy estimation then bounds events with one emitted photon and one main-mode photon; all other events are tagged. Shared satellite windows and adaptive attacks are handled through odd/even martingale concentration.
If the fidelity between the two key-basis single-click leakage states is at least γ2\gamma^2γ2, the target-event phase-error rate obeys eph≤eX+(1−pd−)(1−γ)/2e_{\rm ph}\leq e_X+(1-p_d^-)(1-\gamma)/2eph​≤eX​+(1−pd−​)(1−γ)/2, where pd−p_d^-pd−​ is a calibrated dark-count lower bound. This additive leakage penalty is independent of channel loss. Entrance transmittance need only lie within a calibration interval; exit transmittance need not be characterized. Illustrative simulations find that changing γ\gammaγ from 111 to 1/21/\sqrt{2}1/2​ reduces cutoff distance from approximately 290 to 277 km for balanced splitters, and from 269 to 195 km for entrance transmittance 0.7.
The analysis assumes equal, mode-independent detector efficiencies, fresh pattern-conditioned leakage, and protected-input timing. Unequal dark counts are treated by additional tagging. Efficiency mismatch, detector memory, input-dependent or arbitrary joint main–satellite leakage, and complete finite-key security remain outside scope.
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) receivers may leak information about their measurement outcomes and settings to the channel (e.g., through detector backflashes or back-reflected Trojan-horse light) that could compromise the protocol's security. Here we present a simple finite-key security proof based on phase-error estimation for prepare-and-measure QKD in the presence of either a priori information leakage about the basis choices and/or a posteriori information leakage about the measurement outcomes. The proof requires only a bound on the distinguishability of the side-channel states. Furthermore, the analysis is modular and compatible with existing security proofs that address detector and source imperfections, making it applicable to a wide range of practical QKD implementations.
In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a minimum number of assumptions. Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would allow for larger tolerance against device imperfections in the actual implementations. However, even in this device-independent scenario, one assumption seems unavoidable, that is, the presence of a protected space devoid of any unwanted information leakage in which the legitimate parties can privately generate, process and store their classical data. In this paper we relax this unrealistic and hardly feasible assumption and introduce a general formalism to tackle the information leakage problem in most of existing QKD systems. More specifically, we prove the security of optical QKD systems using phase and intensity modulators in their transmitters, which leak the setting information in an arbitrary manner. We apply our security proof to cases of practical interest and show key rates similar to those obtained in a perfectly shielded environment. Our work constitutes a fundamental step forward in guaranteeing implementation security of quantum communication systems.
Abstract Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) assume that there is no unwanted information leakage about the state preparation process. However, this assumption is impossible to guarantee in practice, as QKD systems can leak information to the channel due to device imperfections or the active action of an eavesdropper. Here, we solve this pressing issue by introducing a security proof in the presence of information leakage from all state preparation settings for arguably the most popular QKD scheme, namely the decoy-state BB84 protocol. The proof requires minimal experimental characterization, as only a single parameter related to the isolation of the source needs to be determined, thus providing a clear path for bridging the gap between theory and practice. Moreover, if information about the state of the side channels is available, this can be readily incorporated into the analysis to further improve the resulting performance.
Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most widely adopted approach for overcoming the limitations of imperfect single-photon sources. However, existing security proofs typically either neglect important device imperfections or rely on assumptions that are difficult to justify in realistic high-speed implementations, such as the independent and identically distributed nature of the emitted signals. In this work, we combine and extend several recent theoretical advances to provide a comprehensive analytical finite-key security proof for decoy-state QKD that simultaneously incorporates multiple practically relevant transmitter and receiver imperfections, including state-preparation flaws, bit and basis side-channel leakage and correlations, setting-independent intensity fluctuations, and detection-efficiency mismatches.
Security proof of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) has attracted a lot of attentions in recent years. Most of real-life QKD implementations are based on phase-coding BB84 protocol, which usually use Unbalanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (UMZI) as the information encoder and decoder. However, the long arm and short arm of UMZI will introduce different loss in practical experimental realizations, the state emitted by Alice's side is nolonger perfect BB84 states correspondingly. In this paper, we will give the security analysis in this situation. Counterintuitively, active compensation for this different loss will only lower the secret key bit rate.
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) modulators inevitably introduce correlations, causing the state emitted in a given round to depend on the setting choices made in previous rounds. These correlations break the round-by-round independence structure on which many widely used security proof techniques rely, leaving a significant gap between available theoretical guarantees and the reality of practical implementations. In this work, we develop a fully analytical finite-key security proof for decoy-state BB84 against general coherent attacks that rigorously incorporates correlations introduced by Alice's bit-and-basis encoder, while requiring only partial characterization of such correlations. Crucially, it does so without requiring the round partitioning of the data used for phase-error estimation introduced in previous works, showing that this technique is not indispensable for dealing with correlated encoders, and resulting in improved finite-key performance. Moreover, we also analyze the case of ideal single-photon sources, and our results reveal a counterintuitive effect: in the presence of strong encoding correlations, decoy-state BB84 can outperform single-photon implementations.