arXiv:2611.04129
Quantum identity authentication protocol via perturbed probability amplitudes
Xiangqun Fu, Zheng Han, Hongwei Li, Chun Zhou, Shuo Zhang, Jianhong Shi, Tan Li, Wansu Bao
Abstract
Quantum identity authentication is an effective solution for establishing mutual trust between communicating parties in the post-quantum era. To address the risk of partial secret information leakage under special measurements, this paper designs a quantum identity authentication protocol based on perturbed probability amplitudes. The protocol first proposes a method of encoding a random sequence onto the probability amplitudes of quantum entangled states, forming perturbed probability amplitudes, thereby reducing the involvement of shared information between the sender and receiver. Furthermore, it presents a method for generating n-bit random authentication information based on the n-bit pre-shared information, enhancing the randomness of the authentication information relative to an attacker. The proposed protocol can resist impersonation attack, CNOT attack, and entanglement measurement attack, and ensures backward security. Under equivalent security conditions, the amount of shared information is 1/n that in Chen et al.'s scheme and half that in Dutta et al.'s scheme. And each bit of the secret message has no risk of leakage under special measurements. It can also be extended to a bi-directional quantum identity authentication protocol.
AI Summary
The paper addresses quantum identity authentication with pre-shared secret information, focusing on the risk that particular measurements can reveal part of that secret. It proposes encoding a random sequence in the probability amplitudes of entangled states, producing “perturbed probability amplitudes” intended to reduce the protocol’s reliance on shared information. A second component generates $n$-bit random authentication information from an $n$-bit pre-shared secret, with the aim of making authentication data less predictable to an attacker. The abstract claims resistance to impersonation, CNOT, and entanglement-measurement attacks, together with backward security. It also claims that individual secret-message bits are not exposed by the special measurements considered. Under what it describes as equivalent security conditions, the required shared information is reported to be $1/n$ of that in Chen et al.’s scheme and one-half of that in Dutta et al.’s scheme. The construction is additionally said to admit a bidirectional authentication extension. Only the title and abstract are available, so the state preparation, authentication checks, security assumptions, and derivations of these resource comparisons cannot be assessed here. The abstract does not specify quantitative attack-success bounds, a composable security definition, noise tolerance, or implementation requirements. It states no explicit limitations and does not indicate whether its security claims cover general attacks beyond the named strategies.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the abstract only. Automated: it can be wrong.