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arXiv:2610.36145

They Will See Johnny's Message: A Measurement Study of Post-Quantum Cryptography Across Email Delivery Paths

Jaehwan Park, Sunghyun Park, Kevin Nam, Doowon Kim

Published Oct 26, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) attacks make the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) urgent for email. This paper presents a systematic measurement that jointly examines PQC deployment across email service stages, negotiation by communicating peers, and usable message encryption. Endpoint-level support alone does not establish PQC readiness across email workflows because submission, relay, and access use independently negotiated Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections. We therefore combine three snapshots of relay, submission, access, and webmail services associated with the Tranco Top~1M domains with controlled tests of mail clients, sending servers, and OpenPGP and S/MIME implementations. Our measurements reveal a transition concentrated among a few providers, with available capability not consistently translating into actual use. Fewer than half of the domains in each service panel support PQC, and Google alone accounts for approximately 87\% of hybrid-capable relay domains. Only two of eight tested sending providers negotiate PQC with our receiver, although five accept it inbound. When TLS groups are restricted to PQC, four of the six incompatible senders fall back to plaintext where unencrypted SMTP remains permitted. At the message layer, limited native key generation, key-format incompatibilities, and backend integration failures further constrain usable PQC encryption.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2610.36145

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Harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) attacks make the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) urgent for email. This paper presents a systematic measurement that jointly examines PQC deployment across email service stages, negotiation by communicating peers, and usable message encryption. Endpoint-level support alone does not establish PQC readiness across email workflows because submission, relay, and access use independently negotiated Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections. We therefore combine three snapshots of relay, submission, access, and webmail services associated with the Tranco Top~1M domains with controlled tests of mail clients, sending servers, and OpenPGP and S/MIME implementations. Our measurements reveal a transition concentrated among a few providers, with available capability not consistently translating into actual use. Fewer than half of the domains in each service panel support PQC, and Google alone accounts for approximately 87% of hybrid-capable relay domains. Only two of eight tested sending providers negotiate PQC with our receiver, although five accept it inbound. When TLS groups are restricted to PQC, four of the six incompatible senders fall back to plaintext where unencrypted SMTP remains permitted. At the message layer, limited native key generation, key-format incompatibilities, and backend integration failures further constrain usable PQC encryption.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is becoming an important component of long-term trust in Internet-facing infrastructure. Publicly observable PQC support provides evidence of externally visible deployment, but does not necessarily reflect the overall progress of an organisation's post-quantum migration. This distinction matters when observable deployment is used as an indicator of organisational readiness or progress towards migration deadlines. We present a measurement study of observable PQC deployment across 4,665 UK organisations spanning ten sectors. We measure post-quantum key-exchange support across HTTPS and SMTP STARTTLS endpoints, attribute reachable endpoints to their underlying infrastructure providers where possible, and statistically examine protocol-, sector-, and provider-level deployment patterns. Among reachable endpoints, 44.0\% of HTTPS services supported at least one evaluated PQC key-exchange group, compared with 6.4\% of SMTP services. Among organisations reachable over both protocols, HTTPS support was significantly more common than SMTP support (matched odds ratio 16.89). Although deployment varied across sectors, infrastructure provider identity was substantially more predictive than organisational sector, and observable deployment was highly concentrated among a small number of providers. Only 144 organisations supported PQC across both web and email infrastructure, highlighting an uneven and fragmented migration landscape. No post-quantum certificate signatures were observed across the measured endpoints. These findings show that observable PQC deployment is currently shaped predominantly by infrastructure-provider deployment decisions and should not be interpreted as a complete measure of organisational migration readiness.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computing threatens widely deployed public-key cryptographic algorithms used to secure Internet communications, including those employed by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Consequently, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is being progressively incorporated into TLS, particularly through hybrid key exchange mechanisms that combine classical and post-quantum algorithms. However, the actual adoption of these mechanisms across Internet services remains insufficiently characterized, especially in emerging and regional contexts. This paper addresses this gap through a measurement study of post-quantum TLS key exchange adoption among Brazilian Internet services. We analyze the top-10,000 ranked .br domains from the Tranco list, actively probing each service to identify the negotiated TLS version and key exchange group. Our results show that TLS 1.3 is already predominant, accounting for 87.3% of the measured HTTPS services with a valid TLS version, and that 4,697 of the 8,697 services with a valid key exchange group (54.0%) negotiated a post-quantum or hybrid mechanism. This adoption is highly concentrated in a single group, X25519MLKEM768, which accounts for 98.5% of the observed PQC negotiations. These findings indicate that post-quantum or hybrid key exchange mechanisms have already reached a significant deployment scale among Brazilian Internet services.
The emergence of quantum computing presents a fundamental challenge to the security of current Internet communication systems. Transport Layer Security (TLS), which forms the backbone of secure web communication, predominantly relies on classical public-key cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), both of which are susceptible to quantum attacks. This paper conducts a large scale empirical evaluation of post-quantum readiness across 32,011 domains, with a primary focus on real-world TLS deployments across diverse sectors by analysing negotiated TLS parameters, including protocol versions, cipher suites, key exchange mechanisms, and certificates. The results indicate that while modern protocols like TLS 1.3 and QUIC are gaining adoption, 15.70% of domains especially in critical sectors such as banking and government still rely on TLS 1.2. Furthermore, 49.3% of domains support hybrid post-quantum key exchange mechanisms (e.g., MLKEM768 with X25519), whereas 50.7% continue to use classical key exchange, reflecting partial transition. Notably, 0% adoption of hybrid post-quantum certificates was observed, leaving the authentication layer vulnerable to quantum-enabled attacks such as certificate forgery. The findings reveal uneven adoption of post-quantum mechanisms across sectors, where technology driven platforms are advancing more rapidly than legacy-dependent infrastructures. Overall, the study highlights that achieving complete quantum resilience requires a coordinated transition not only in key exchange mechanisms but also in certificate infrastructures. Without such comprehensive migration, Internet communication systems remain vulnerable to long-term threats, including Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks.
My research focuses on developing a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) framework for securing institutional email systems against future quantum computing threats, particularly the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attack. The study addresses a critical cybersecurity challenge faced by governments, healthcare institutions, universities, and organizations that rely on long-term confidentiality of sensitive communications.The proposed framework integrates the NIST-standardized ML-KEM-768 (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber) for key encapsulation and ML-DSA-65 (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) for digital signatures to provide quantum-resistant encryption and authentication. A hybrid cryptographic architecture combines PQC with AES-256-GCM to secure email content while maintaining compatibility with existing communication systems.A prototype was implemented using the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs v0.15.0) library and evaluated on resource-constrained hardware representative of institutions in developing countries (3-core Intel Core i5 processor and 4 GB RAM). Performance was measured over 100 benchmark iterations, comparing PQC algorithms with traditional RSA-2048 and ECDSA. The results showed that ML-KEM-768 achieved significantly faster key generation than RSA-2048 while maintaining low computational overhead, requiring less than 2% CPU utilization, under 8 MB of memory, and an end-to-end email processing latency of only 11–16 ms.The research introduces a formally specified HNDL threat model, evaluates the security implications of quantum-resistant cryptography in constrained environments, and discusses deployment considerations including certificate management, side-channel resistance, hybrid migration strategies, and institutional adoption. The work also identifies current limitations, such as the absence of forward secrecy and live production deployment, and proposes future enhancements including PQC-based key ratcheting, TLS integration, and real-world pilot deployments.This research contributes an end-to-end, standards-aligned, open-source framework demonstrating that post-quantum email security is practical and computationally feasible for resource-constrained institutions, particularly in developing economies, providing a pathway toward secure communication infrastructures resilient to future quantum attacks.
Abstract The prospect of cryptanalytically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) motivates a transition from classical cryptography to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Shor’s algorithm threatens widely deployed public-key schemes used for key establishment and digital signatures, while Grover’s algorithm reduces effective security margins for symmetric-key and hash-based primitives. The harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) threat further increases urgency because adversaries can store encrypted data today for future decryption, placing long-lived confidentiality requirements and trust infrastructure at risk. This survey frames PQC adoption as a standards-to-deployment program. We review the PQC design space and summarize deployment-critical constraints, including handshake and certificate size growth, latency under network loss, computational cost, memory and storage requirements, implementation complexity, and side-channel robustness. We then present an iterative migration pipeline covering cryptographic inventory, risk-based prioritization using data sensitivity and cryptoperiod, algorithm and parameter profile selection, hybrid classical and PQC constructions for backward compatibility, pilot validation with measurable go/no-go criteria, and long-term operations with crypto-agility. Finally, we connect standardization outputs to concrete integration surfaces and illustrate the workflow across transport layer security (TLS) and the web public key infrastructure (Web PKI), virtual private networks (VPNs) and internet protocol security (IPsec), and constrained Internet of things (IoT) deployments, and we summarize open challenges in interoperability, public key infrastructure (PKI) transition mechanics, implementation maturity and operational governance.
Anticipating Q-day security concerns, major CDNs and cloud providers are migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While existing literature benchmarks PQC performance, empirical research evaluating real-world adoption data remains scarce. We present an empirical assessment of PQC deployment across seven critical protocols (HTTPS, LDAPS, SMTPS, IMAP-SSL, POP3-SSL, TELNETS, and RDP) using 10,000 target IP addresses per protocol. At the origin-server level, PQC algorithm support reaches 9.1% for HTTPS and 7.39% for LDAPS, while falling below 1% for all other evaluated protocols. At the entity level, PQC support is 11% for HTTPS and 5.4% for LDAPS, while the remaining protocols have less than 5% of entities supporting PQC on the hosted servers. We further correlate these adoption trends against organizational digital and financial footprint, and industry sectors, yielding a multi-dimensional empirical assessment of PQC deployment. Finally, at the domain level, we perform a comparative analysis of PQC adoption in Cloudflare-hosted domains against baseline Cloudflare datasets. Collectively, our findings provide critical insights into the current state of PQC readiness over Transport Layer Security (TLS).