Anticipating Q-day security concerns, major CDNs and cloud providers are migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While existing literature benchmarks PQC performance, empirical research evaluating real-world adoption data remains scarce. We present an empirical assessment of PQC deployment across seven critical protocols (HTTPS, LDAPS, SMTPS, IMAP-SSL, POP3-SSL, TELNETS, and RDP) using 10,000 target IP addresses per protocol. At the origin-server level, PQC algorithm support reaches 9.1% for HTTPS and 7.39% for LDAPS, while falling below 1% for all other evaluated protocols. At the entity level, PQC support is 11% for HTTPS and 5.4% for LDAPS, while the remaining protocols have less than 5% of entities supporting PQC on the hosted servers. We further correlate these adoption trends against organizational digital and financial footprint, and industry sectors, yielding a multi-dimensional empirical assessment of PQC deployment. Finally, at the domain level, we perform a comparative analysis of PQC adoption in Cloudflare-hosted domains against baseline Cloudflare datasets. Collectively, our findings provide critical insights into the current state of PQC readiness over Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Anticipating Q-day security concerns, major CDNs and cloud providers are migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While existing literature benchmarks PQC performance, empirical research evaluating real-world adoption data remains scarce. We present an empirical assessment of PQC deployment across seven critical protocols (HTTPS, LDAPS, SMTPS, IMAP-SSL, POP3-SSL, TELNETS, and RDP) using 10,000 target IP addresses per protocol. At the origin-server level, PQC algorithm support reaches 9.1% for HTTPS and 7.39% for LDAPS, while falling below 1% for all other evaluated protocols. At the entity level, PQC support is 11% for HTTPS and 5.4% for LDAPS, while the remaining protocols have less than 5% of entities supporting PQC on the hosted servers. We further correlate these adoption trends against organizational digital and financial footprint, and industry sectors, yielding a multi-dimensional empirical assessment of PQC deployment. Finally, at the domain level, we perform a comparative analysis of PQC adoption in Cloudflare-hosted domains against baseline Cloudflare datasets. Collectively, our findings provide critical insights into the current state of PQC readiness over Transport Layer Security (TLS).
With the anticipated arrival of Q-day, quantum computers threaten current cryptographic schemes for encryption and digital signatures. In response, major content delivery networks and cloud service providers are already adopting Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The current state-of-the-art focuses on benchmarking the operational performance of implementing PQC, but the real-world adoption status remains under-researched. This work utilizes large-scale SSH fingerprint data from a proprietary scanning tool to analyze PQC adoption across 1.52 million hosts and 27,012 entities. Our study shows that the PQC transition in the SSH protocol is underway but highly polarized: 45.2% of SSH hosts on port 22 support PQC, while 54.8% remain classical-only. At the entity level, 39.9% have enabled PQC on at least one host, whereas 60.1% have no PQC support. By correlating PQC adoption with industry, geography, and organizational size (digital and financial), this study provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of PQC adoption status in SSH infrastructure.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is becoming an important component of long-term trust in Internet-facing infrastructure. Publicly observable PQC support provides evidence of externally visible deployment, but does not necessarily reflect the overall progress of an organisation's post-quantum migration. This distinction matters when observable deployment is used as an indicator of organisational readiness or progress towards migration deadlines. We present a measurement study of observable PQC deployment across 4,665 UK organisations spanning ten sectors. We measure post-quantum key-exchange support across HTTPS and SMTP STARTTLS endpoints, attribute reachable endpoints to their underlying infrastructure providers where possible, and statistically examine protocol-, sector-, and provider-level deployment patterns. Among reachable endpoints, 44.0\% of HTTPS services supported at least one evaluated PQC key-exchange group, compared with 6.4\% of SMTP services. Among organisations reachable over both protocols, HTTPS support was significantly more common than SMTP support (matched odds ratio 16.89). Although deployment varied across sectors, infrastructure provider identity was substantially more predictive than organisational sector, and observable deployment was highly concentrated among a small number of providers. Only 144 organisations supported PQC across both web and email infrastructure, highlighting an uneven and fragmented migration landscape. No post-quantum certificate signatures were observed across the measured endpoints. These findings show that observable PQC deployment is currently shaped predominantly by infrastructure-provider deployment decisions and should not be interpreted as a complete measure of organisational migration readiness.
The emergence of quantum computing presents a fundamental challenge to the security of current Internet communication systems. Transport Layer Security (TLS), which forms the backbone of secure web communication, predominantly relies on classical public-key cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), both of which are susceptible to quantum attacks. This paper conducts a large scale empirical evaluation of post-quantum readiness across 32,011 domains, with a primary focus on real-world TLS deployments across diverse sectors by analysing negotiated TLS parameters, including protocol versions, cipher suites, key exchange mechanisms, and certificates. The results indicate that while modern protocols like TLS 1.3 and QUIC are gaining adoption, 15.70% of domains especially in critical sectors such as banking and government still rely on TLS 1.2. Furthermore, 49.3% of domains support hybrid post-quantum key exchange mechanisms (e.g., MLKEM768 with X25519), whereas 50.7% continue to use classical key exchange, reflecting partial transition. Notably, 0% adoption of hybrid post-quantum certificates was observed, leaving the authentication layer vulnerable to quantum-enabled attacks such as certificate forgery. The findings reveal uneven adoption of post-quantum mechanisms across sectors, where technology driven platforms are advancing more rapidly than legacy-dependent infrastructures. Overall, the study highlights that achieving complete quantum resilience requires a coordinated transition not only in key exchange mechanisms but also in certificate infrastructures. Without such comprehensive migration, Internet communication systems remain vulnerable to long-term threats, including Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks.
This thesis investigates the current state of Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in the industry, with a particular focus on its practical deployment, integration challenges, and performance implications.The study combines a structured analysis of academic literature, standardization efforts, and industry guidance with an experimental evaluation of PQC integration in widely used security protocols. The analysis shows that, while significant progress has been made in the standardization of quantum-resistant algorithms such as ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA, real-world adoption remains in an early and transitional phase. Organizations primarily focus on evaluation and pilot implementations, as deployment is constrained by interoperability issues, implementation maturity, and the complexity of migrating existing cryptographic infrastructures.To complement the conceptual analysis, experimental measurements were conducted for TLS, SSH, and IPsec to evaluate the performance impact of hybrid post-quantum cryptographic mechanisms. The results indicate that performance overhead is not uniform across components. In particular, post-quantum signature schemes introduce significant computational and network overhead, mainly due to increased key and certificate sizes. In contrast, hybrid key exchange mechanisms show only moderate performance impact across all evaluated protocols.The findings highlight that the primary challenge of PQC adoption lies not in algorithm design but in practical integration and large-scale migration. Hybrid cryptographic approaches emerge as the most viable strategy for enabling a gradual transition, balancing improved security against quantum threats with operational feasibility.Overall, this thesis demonstrates that PQC is transitioning from a theoretical research field to a practical engineering challenge, with significant implications for the future design of secure communication systems.
The problem of adopting quantum-resistant crypto-graphic network protocols or post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is critically important to democratizing quantum computing. The problem is urgent because practical quantum computers will break classical encryption in the next few decades. Past encrypted data has already been collected and can be de-crypted in the near future. The main challenges of adopting post-quantum cryptography lie in algorithmic complexity and hardware/software/network implementation. The grand question of how existing cyberinfrastructure will support post-quantum cryptography remains unanswered. This paper describes: i) the design of a novel Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) network instrument placed at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and a part of the FABRIC testbed; ii) the latest results on PQC adoption rate across a wide spectrum of network protocols (Secure Shell - SSH, Transport Layer Security - TLS, etc.); iii) the current state of PQC implementation in key scientific applications (e.g., OpenSSH or SciTokens); iv) the challenges of being quantum-resistant; and v) discussion of potential novel attacks. This is the first large-scale measurement of PQC adoption at national-scale supercomputing centers and FABRIC testbeds. Our results show that only OpenSSH and Google Chrome have successfully implemented PQC and achieved an initial adoption rate of 0.029 % (6,044 out of 20,556,816) for OpenSSH connections at NCSA coming from major Internet Service Providers or Autonomous Systems (ASes) such as OARNET, GTT, Google Fiber Webpass (U.S.) and Uppsala Lans Landsting (Sweden), with an overall increasing adoption rate year-over-year for 2023–2024. Our analyses identify pathways to migrate current applications to be quantum-resistant.
The advent of quantum computing poses significant threats to classical public-key cryptographic primitives such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. As many critical network and security protocols depend on these primitives for key exchange and authentication, there is an urgent need to understand their quantum vulnerability and assess the progress made towards integrating post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This survey provides a detailed examination of nine widely deployed protocols - TLS, IPsec, BGP, DNSSEC, SSH, QUIC, OpenID Connect, OpenVPN, and Signal Protocol - analysing their cryptographic foundations, quantum risks, and the current state of PQC migration. We find that TLS and Signal lead the transition with hybrid post-quantum key exchange already deployed at scale, while IPsec and SSH have standardised mechanisms but lack widespread production adoption. DNSSEC and BGP face the most significant structural barriers, as post-quantum signature sizes conflict with fundamental protocol constraints. Across all protocols, key exchange proves consistently easier to migrate than authentication, and protocol-level limitations such as message size and fragmentation often dominate over raw algorithm performance. We also discuss experimental deployments and emerging standards that are shaping the path towards a quantum-resistant communication infrastructure.