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arXiv:2609.07860

Snakes on a Hyper-Plane: Dynamical and Ontological Locality in Everettian Quantum Mechanics

Travis Norsen

quant-phSubmitted Sep 7, 2026• Announced Sep 9, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

An apparently emerging consensus holds that Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM), in the Spacetime State Realism (SSR) version of Wallace and Timpson, involves ontological non-locality (i.e., non-separability) but is fully compatible with the dynamical notion of locality usually taken to be required by relativity. The claim of dynamical locality is based on the fact that the local beables postulated by the theory (namely, Reduced Density Matrices, RDMs, associated with localized regions) are not affected by interventions outside their past light cones. However, the theory's non-separability means that it posits non-local beables (namely RDMs for non-localized regions) in addition to the local ones. We argue here that the involvement of non-local beables introduces complications for extant formulations of dynamical locality and at least suggests, contrary to the emerging consensus, that SSR EQM should perhaps not be considered compatible with relativistic causality after all.

Comments
13 pages, 5 figures

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An apparently emerging consensus holds that Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM), in the Spacetime State Realism (SSR) version of Wallace and Timpson, involves ontological non-locality (i.e., non-separability) but is fully compatible with the dynamical notion of locality usually taken to be required by relativity. The claim of dynamical locality is based on the fact that the local beables postulated by the theory (namely, Reduced Density Matrices, RDMs, associated with localized regions) are not affected by interventions outside their past light cones. However, the theory's non-separability means that it posits non-local beables (namely RDMs for non-localized regions) in addition to the local ones. We argue here that the involvement of non-local beables introduces complications for extant formulations of dynamical locality and at least suggests, contrary to the emerging consensus, that SSR EQM should perhaps not be considered compatible with relativistic causality after all.
Abstract This chapter defends the idea that the Everett (many-worlds) interpretation is, given Hamiltonians with only local interactions, dynamically local at both the level of fundamental and emergent ontology. At the level of fundamental ontology because the complete state of a given spacetime region will be fixed by the complete state on a spacelike hypersurface that obstructs the past light cone of that first region. At the level of emergent ontology because the dynamics of the emergent ontology will be grounded in the dynamics of the fundamental ontology. If the world-notion in the many-worlds interpretation is understood in terms of emergent ontology, then it will follow that the dynamical locality holds also at the level of worlds. Our picture pairs dynamical locality with kinematical nonlocality (non-separability). The chapter articulates how the demands of Lorentz covariance are fully satisfied in this picture. In our view, failure of kinematical locality is a harmless, indeed beneficial (if nonclassical), feature and it coexists with dynamical locality and Lorentz covariance. It has sometimes been suggested that—along the lines indicated by Deutsch and Hayden—seeking a kinematically local theory is nonetheless to be preferred or is, perhaps, required. The chapter revisits and restates some of our previous arguments to the effect that reintroducing kinematical locality in this way is both unnecessary and undesirable: the benefits of the move, such as they are, are not worth the costs.
According to a common view, Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) is a local theory because it avoids nonlocal action at a distance, and this is an important point in EQM's favor. Unlike collapse theories, EQM does not allow an action on one system to change the reduced density matrix (RDM) of a remote entangled system - a clear case of nonlocal action. However, EQM does allow an action on one system to change the global state of the system and its remote entangled partners. We argue that such changes should also count as nonlocal actions, meaning EQM is not local after all. First, we consider an argument to the contrary, which deems such global changes to be mere extrinsic changes, whereas nonlocal action requires intrinsic changes to the remote system. We respond that the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is problematic and cannot hold the weight of this argument. We then try to clarify when actions that change global states count as nonlocal actions. We argue that it is when the global states are essential explanatory mechanisms of the theory. In EQM, the global state is needed to explain why, in an anti-correlated Bell state, Alice's measuring spin-up ensures that she encounters only the branch where Bob measures spin-down.
It is sometimes said that a reason to prefer Everettian quantum mechanics is that it allows one to avoid the kind of spooky action at a distance that is a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. There is a straightforward argument to show EQM has this virtue, however some advocates argue that this requires we see branching as a local causal process. I explain this reasoning and then show why, given the way Everettians standardly conceive of worlds and branching as emergent phenomena, branching need not be viewed as a causal process for EQM to be relativistically local. Forthcoming in Local Quantum Mechanics, OUP 2026.
Using a 'reformulation of Bell's theorem', Waegell and McQueen, (2020) argue that any local theory which does not involve retro-causation or fine-tuning must be a many-worlds theory. Moreover they argue that non-separable many-worlds theories whose ontology is given by the wavefunction involve superluminal causation, as opposed to separable many-worlds theories (e.g. Waegell, 2021; Deutsch and Hayden 2000). I put forward three claims. (A) I challenge their argument for relying on a non-trivial, unquestioned assumption about elements of reality which allows Healey's approach (Healey, 2017b) to evade their claim. In an attempt to respond to (A), Waegell and McQueen may restrict their claim to theories which satisfy such an assumption, however, I also argue that (B) their argument fails to prove even the so weakened claim, as exemplified by theories that are both non-separable and local. Finally, (C) by arguing for the locality of the decoherence-based Everettian approach (Wallace, 2012) I refute Waegell and McQueen's claim that wavefunction-based ontologies, and more generally non-separable ontologies, involve superluminal causation. I close with some doubtful remarks about separable Everettian interpretations as compared to non-separable ones.
Local realism has been the subject of much discussion in modern physics, partly because our deepest theories of physics appear to contradict one another in regard to whether reality is local. According to general relativity, it is, as physical quantities (perceptible or not) in two spacelike separated regions cannot affect one another. Yet, in quantum theory, it has traditionally been thought that local realism cannot hold and that such effects do occur. This apparent discrepancy between the two theories is resolved by Everettian quantum theory, as first proven by Deutsch & Hayden (2000). In this paper, I will explain how local realism is respected in quantum theory and review the advances in our understanding of locality since Deutsch & Hayden's work, including the concept of local branching and the more general analysis by Raymond-Robichaud (2021)
The question of whether Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) justifies the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy has recently come to the fore. Metaphysical indeterminacy has been argued to emerge from three sources: coherent superpositions, the indefinite number of branches in the quantum multiverse and the nature of these branches. This paper reviews the evidence and concludes that those arguments don't rely on EQM alone and rest on metaphysical auxiliary assumptions that transcend the physics of EQM. We show how EQM can be ontologically interpreted without positing metaphysical indeterminacy by adopting a deflationary attitude towards branches. Two ways of developing the deflationary view are then proposed: one where branches are eliminated, and another where they are reduced to the universal quantum state.