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arXiv:2608.18644

Branching (Almost) Everywhere And All at Once

Alyssa Ney

quant-phphysics.hist-phSubmitted Aug 19, 2026• Announced Aug 20, 2026
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Abstract

It is sometimes said that a reason to prefer Everettian quantum mechanics is that it allows one to avoid the kind of spooky action at a distance that is a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. There is a straightforward argument to show EQM has this virtue, however some advocates argue that this requires we see branching as a local causal process. I explain this reasoning and then show why, given the way Everettians standardly conceive of worlds and branching as emergent phenomena, branching need not be viewed as a causal process for EQM to be relativistically local. Forthcoming in Local Quantum Mechanics, OUP 2026.

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38 pages

Related papers

Local Quantum Mechanics

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Introduction

Alyssa Ney

The aim of this volume is to develop and evaluate the suggestion that if one adopts the interpretation of quantum mechanics initially proposed by Hugh Everett, today frequently referred to as the “many-worlds interpretation,” then one can avoid the kind of nonlocality that is often thought to be a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches, and thus permit the compatibility of these two pillars of modern physics: quantum mechanics and special relativity. Although this is an idea that seems to have been recognized by Everett and is sometimes touted as a reason to prefer his approach to interpreting quantum mechanics over others, the precise way in which Everett’s interpretation achieves this locality, indeed whether it even does achieve locality, has been debated, including among the interpretation’s proponents. The aim of this introductory chapter is to provide readers with a background of this debate concerning the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics. We begin with a brief historical introduction to Everett’s proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics and its later development into the many-worlds interpretation. The following section discusses how the by now well-established phenomenon of quantum entanglement seems to imply what Albert Einstein, in a 1947 letter to Max Born, called “spooky action at a distance,” and a tension with special relativity. We then discuss why one might think that the many-worlds interpretation allows one to avoid nonlocality in this sense. The next sections bring the reader up to date with how the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics has been debated both by critics and proponents of the interpretation. As we will see, the desire to understand Everettian quantum mechanics as an interpretation that avoids nonlocality has opened up some interesting debates concerning both what it means to say an interpretation of quantum mechanics is local and over the metaphysical and mathematical interpretation of Everettian quantum mechanics itself. This introductory chapter concludes with a summary of the contributions to the present volume in the context of this ongoing debate.

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It is sometimes said that a reason to prefer Everettian quantum mechanics is that it allows one to avoid the kind of spooky action at a distance that is a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. There is a straightforward argument to show EQM has this virtue, however some advocates argue that this requires we see branching as a local causal process. I explain this reasoning and then show why, given the way Everettians standardly conceive of worlds and branching as emergent phenomena, branching need not be viewed as a causal process for EQM to be relativistically local. Forthcoming in Local Quantum Mechanics, OUP 2026.
Abstract Initially proposed by Hugh Everett III as the “theory of the universal wave function,” the many worlds interpretation has since been developed and refined into one of the most influential ways of giving meaning to quantum mechanics. This volume explores the idea that if one adopts the many worlds interpretation, then one can avoid what Einstein called “spooky action at a distance,” the non-locality that is supposed to be a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches. The essays in this volume articulate a clear and defensible formulation of the argument from locality for preferring the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics over its rivals and evaluate it. They question in what sense those in quantum foundations should care about locality, in particular, whether and how an interpretation of quantum mechanics must avoid action at a distance in order to maintain consistency with special relativity. Finally, these essays assess whether the many worlds theory needs a particular metaphysical or mathematical interpretation in order to achieve the aim of providing a local interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Abstract One influential argument for the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is the idea that the Everettian view allows us to preserve locality. Evidently this argument assumes that preserving locality is something we should all aspire to—but what is the justification for treating locality as a theoretical desideratum? But there is no good reason for Everettians—or indeed anyone else—to aspire to “locality” as a general feature of their theory. It is true that certain specific ways in which nonlocality may be implemented have undesirable properties and should probably be avoided, but that does not mean that nonlocality itself is always undesirable—nonlocal theories should be assessed on their individual merits, rather than dismissed as a general class. Thus the “argument from locality” for the Everett interpretation is not compelling unless it is coupled with some justification for why the specific kind of locality instantiated by the Everettian picture is worth pursuing.
The nature of branching in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics remains an open question, particularly regarding its locality and compatibility with special relativity. This paper challenges the conventional view that branching is either global or local, demonstrating instead that it is nonlocal for entangled systems. Through a new analysis of the EPR-Bohm experiment, I argue that global branching has several potential issues and can hardly be justified. At the same time, I argue that branching cannot be entirely local, as entangled particles exhibit simultaneous, spacelike-separated branching, manifesting an apparent action at a distance within individual worlds. However, while nonlocal branching suggests the emergence of a preferred Lorentz frame within each world, the multiverse as a whole retains full Lorentz invariance, ensuring no superluminal signaling. By refining the ontology of branching and resolving tensions between MWI and relativistic constraints, this analysis may help advance our understanding of quantum nonlocality and also strengthen MWI's standing as a viable interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The aim of this volume is to develop and evaluate the suggestion that if one adopts the interpretation of quantum mechanics initially proposed by Hugh Everett, today frequently referred to as the “many-worlds interpretation,” then one can avoid the kind of nonlocality that is often thought to be a consequence of quantum entanglement according to other approaches, and thus permit the compatibility of these two pillars of modern physics: quantum mechanics and special relativity. Although this is an idea that seems to have been recognized by Everett and is sometimes touted as a reason to prefer his approach to interpreting quantum mechanics over others, the precise way in which Everett’s interpretation achieves this locality, indeed whether it even does achieve locality, has been debated, including among the interpretation’s proponents. The aim of this introductory chapter is to provide readers with a background of this debate concerning the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics. We begin with a brief historical introduction to Everett’s proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics and its later development into the many-worlds interpretation. The following section discusses how the by now well-established phenomenon of quantum entanglement seems to imply what Albert Einstein, in a 1947 letter to Max Born, called “spooky action at a distance,” and a tension with special relativity. We then discuss why one might think that the many-worlds interpretation allows one to avoid nonlocality in this sense. The next sections bring the reader up to date with how the locality of Everettian quantum mechanics has been debated both by critics and proponents of the interpretation. As we will see, the desire to understand Everettian quantum mechanics as an interpretation that avoids nonlocality has opened up some interesting debates concerning both what it means to say an interpretation of quantum mechanics is local and over the metaphysical and mathematical interpretation of Everettian quantum mechanics itself. This introductory chapter concludes with a summary of the contributions to the present volume in the context of this ongoing debate.
According to a common view, Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) is a local theory because it avoids nonlocal action at a distance, and this is an important point in EQM's favor. Unlike collapse theories, EQM does not allow an action on one system to change the reduced density matrix (RDM) of a remote entangled system - a clear case of nonlocal action. However, EQM does allow an action on one system to change the global state of the system and its remote entangled partners. We argue that such changes should also count as nonlocal actions, meaning EQM is not local after all. First, we consider an argument to the contrary, which deems such global changes to be mere extrinsic changes, whereas nonlocal action requires intrinsic changes to the remote system. We respond that the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is problematic and cannot hold the weight of this argument. We then try to clarify when actions that change global states count as nonlocal actions. We argue that it is when the global states are essential explanatory mechanisms of the theory. In EQM, the global state is needed to explain why, in an anti-correlated Bell state, Alice's measuring spin-up ensures that she encounters only the branch where Bob measures spin-down.