arXiv:2606.01349

Non-Absoluteness, Tracking, and Intersubjectivity in Perspectival Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: A Conceptual and Formal Analysis

Herve Zwirn

quant-phSubmitted May 31, 2026• Announced Jun 2, 2026• 0 citations• Revised Oct 7, 2026 (v3)

Abstract

This paper offers a conceptual and formal analysis of non-absoluteness in perspectival interpretations of quantum mechanics. Extended Wigner-type experiments reveal a fundamental tension between the universality of quantum mechanics, the absoluteness of observed events, and the possibility of intersubjective agreement. I argue that denying observer-independent events cannot remain a mere interpretive slogan: it requires a precise account of how perspectival statements, tracking assumptions, meta-level descriptions, and intersubjective communication are to be formulated. Many existing approaches either implicitly reintroduce observer-independent structure or leave key notions underdetermined. Within this framework, Convivial Solipsism provides a coherent account of non-absolute events, preserving the universality of quantum mechanics while rejecting the need for a global viewpoint. To make this claim precise, the paper introduces the basic elements of a formal perspectival logic designed to distinguish well-formed perspectival statements from illegitimate unindexed or absolutizing statements. The paper concludes that scientific objectivity need not rest on observer-independent facts, but can instead be grounded in the internal coherence of perspectival structures.

Comments: 33 pages, 1 figure, 2 tables

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