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arXiv:2605.27424

Agreement and Compatibility in Wigner's Friend Paradox

Julio C. F. Silva, B. F. Rizzuti, Cristhiano Duarte

quant-phSubmitted May 19, 2026• Announced May 21, 2026• 0 citations• Revised Jun 27, 2026 (v2)
v1 · May 19, 2026v2 · Jun 27, 2026
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Abstract

There has been an upsurge of interest in the consequences for quantum physics of the so-called Wigner's Friend Paradox. In its original formulation, the paradox has been turned inside out, and virtually every aspect of it has been looked into. Consequently, it is becoming widely accepted that we can find the potentially puzzling consequences of Wigner's thought experiment only in light of its many-parties extensions. Nonetheless, this contribution returns to the source. Reframing the question as an inference problem, we advance a radically Bayesian interpretation that shows no contradiction between Wigner's and Wigner's Friend's descriptions-neither classically nor quantumly. Therefore, with no paradoxical conclusion. In doing so, we flesh out and expose previously untouched aspects of Wigner's thought experiment, in particular, the fact that compatibility and agreement are fundamental to our understanding of it. Also, by conservatively extending Wigner's original setup and incorporating what we call the 'benefit of the doubt', we see how either Wigner's or his Friend's description can be driven to match one another's -- an impossibility if either agent does not keep an open mind.

Comments
26 pages, no figures, typos corrected, references added

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There has been an upsurge of interest in the consequences for quantum physics of the so-called Wigner's Friend Paradox. In its original formulation, the paradox has been turned inside out, and virtually every aspect of it has been looked into. Consequently, it is becoming widely accepted that we can find the potentially puzzling consequences of Wigner's thought experiment only in light of its many-parties extensions. Nonetheless, this contribution returns to the source. Reframing the question as an inference problem, we advance a radically Bayesian interpretation that shows no contradiction between Wigner's and Wigner's Friend's descriptions-neither classically nor quantumly. Therefore, with no paradoxical conclusion. In doing so, we flesh out and expose previously untouched aspects of Wigner's thought experiment, in particular, the fact that compatibility and agreement are fundamental to our understanding of it. Also, by conservatively extending Wigner's original setup and incorporating what we call the 'benefit of the doubt', we see how either Wigner's or his Friend's description can be driven to match one another's -- an impossibility if either agent does not keep an open mind.
Abstract There has been an upsurge of interest in the consequences for quantum physics of the so-called Wigner’s Friend Paradox. In its original formulation, the paradox has been turned inside out, and virtually every aspect of it has been looked into. Consequently, it is becoming widely accepted that we can find the potentially puzzling consequences of Wigner’s thought experiment only in light of its many-parties extensions. Nonetheless, this contribution returns to the source. Reframing the question as an inference problem, we advance a radically Bayesian interpretation that shows no contradiction between Wigner’s and Wigner’s Friend’s descriptions—neither classically nor quantumly. Therefore, with no paradoxical conclusion. In doing so, we flesh out and expose previously untouched aspects of Wigner’s thought experiment, in particular, the fact that compatibility and agreement are fundamental to our understanding of it, and that a rigorous notion of compatibility is the key to paving the way for the agents to reach an agreement. Also, by conservatively extending Wigner’s original setup and incorporating what we call the’benefit of the doubt’, we see how either Wigner’s or his Friend’s description can be driven to match one another’s—an impossibility if either agent does not keep an open mind.
There has been a surge of recent interest in the Wigner's Friend paradox, sparking several novel thought experiments and no-go theorems. The main narrative has been that Wigner's Friend highlights a counterintuitive feature that is unique to quantum theory, and which is closely related to the quantum measurement problem. Here, we challenge this view. We argue that the gist of the Wigner's Friend paradox can be reproduced without assuming quantum physics, and that it underlies a much broader class of enigmas in the foundations of physics and philosophy. To show this, we first consider several recently proposed Extended Wigner's Friend scenarios, and demonstrate that some of their implications for the absoluteness of observations can be reproduced by classical thought experiments that involve the duplication of agents. Crucially, some of these classical scenarios are technologically much easier to implement than their quantum counterparts. Then, we argue that the essential structural ingredient of all these scenarios is a feature that we call "Restriction A": that a physical theory cannot give us a probabilistic description of the observations of all agents. Finally, we argue that this difficulty is at the core of other puzzles in the foundations of physics and philosophy, and demonstrate this explicitly for cosmology's Boltzmann brain problem. Our analysis suggests that Wigner's Friend should be studied in a larger context, addressing a frontier of human knowledge beyond quantum foundations: to obtain reliable predictions for experiments in which these predictions can be privately but not intersubjectively verified.
Abstract We take a fresh look at Wigner’s Friend thought-experiment and some of its more recent variants and extensions, such as the Frauchiger-Renner (FR) Paradox. We discuss various solutions proposed in the literature, focusing on a few questions: What is the correct epistemic interpretation of the multiplicity of state assignments in these scenarios? Under which conditions can one include classical observers into the quantum state descriptions, in a way that is still compatible with traditional Quantum Mechanics? Under which conditions can one system be admitted as an additional ‘observer’ from the perspective of another background observer? When can the standard axioms of multi-agent Epistemic Logic (that allow “knowledge transfer” between agents) be applied to quantum-physical observers? In the last part of the paper, we propose a new answer to these questions, sketch a particular formal implementation of this answer, and apply it to obtain a principled solution to Wigner Friend-type paradoxes.
We present a discussion of the extended Wigner's friend thought experiment proposed by Frauchiger and Renner in [1]. We show by using various arguments, including textbook quantum mechanics and the ontological approach of Contexts, Systems, Modalities (CSM), that no contradiction arises if one admits that agents must agree on what is considered as a system and what is not. In such a contextually objective approach of quantum mechanics, the apparent contradiction is automatically removed. We also discuss why this mutual agreement between agents is already implicit in the standard formulations of quantum mechanics, and why removing it leads to inconsistencies.
The Wigner's friend thought experiment was intended to illustrate the difficulty one has in describing an agent as a quantum system when that agent performs a measurement. While it does pose a challenge to the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory, most modern interpretations have no trouble in resolving the difficulty. Recently, a number of extensions of Wigner's ideas have been proposed. We provide a gentle introduction to six such arguments, modifying the specifics of many of them so that they are as simple and unified as possible. In particular, we show that all of the arguments hinge on assumptions about correlations between measurement outcomes that are not accessible to any observer, even in principle. We then provide a critical analysis of each argument, focusing especially on how well one can motivate the required assumptions regarding these inaccessible correlations. Although we argue that some of these assumptions are not entirely well-motivated, all of the arguments do shed light on the nature of quantum theory, especially when concerning the description of agents and their measurements.
The famous Wigner's friend experiment considers an observer-the friend-and a superobserver-Wigner-who treats the friend as a quantum system and her interaction with other quantum systems as unitary dynamics. This is at odds with the friend describing this interaction via collapse dynamics, if she interacts with the quantum system in a way that she would consider a measurement. These different descriptions constitute the Wigner's friend paradox. Extended Wigner's friend experiments combine the original thought experiment with non-locality setups. This allows for deriving local friendliness inequalities, similar to Bell's theorem, which can be violated for certain extended Wigner's friend scenarios. A Wigner's friend paradox and the violation of local friendliness inequalities require that no classical record exists, which reveals the result the friend observed during her measurement. Otherwise, Wigner agrees with his friend's description and no local friendliness inequality can be violated. In this article, I introduce classical communication between Wigner and his friend and discuss its effects on the simple as well as extended Wigner's friend experiments. By controlling the properties of a (quasi) classical communication channel between Wigner and the friend, one can regulate how much outcome information about the friend's measurement is revealed. This gives a smooth transition between the paradoxical description and the possibility of violating local friendliness inequalities, on the one hand, and the effectively collapsed case, on the other hand.