Time synchronization is a crucial requirement in quantum key distribution (QKD)8 protocols, ensuring accurate key generation via the correct assignment of bits of raw key and9 enabling eavesdropping detection via the precise recording of photon statistics. State-of-the-art10 experiments typically use an extra channel to synchronize the clocks of the transmitter and receiver11 via classical signals. In this work, we study the possibility of performing clock synchronization12 via the signals used for the key generation, which are already present in decoy-state-based BB8413 protocols.14 Without altering the protocol in any way, we use the different mean photon numbers of the15 signal and decoy states for time synchronization without a dedicated physical channel capable of16 clock synchronization. The proposed method relies only on the photons sent and received for17 key generation and does not require any change to the QKD protocol. The only change in the18 experiment is on the software level, thus making it very simple to implement.19 We demonstrate clock synchronization method in a simulation of a specific fiber-based QKD20 experiment. Like other decoy-state-based BB84 protocols, it is based on weak coherent pulses.21 In this simulation, we investigate the parameter space to find limits and optimal choices of our22 proposed method.23 In addition to the non-protocol-altering clock synchronization method, we also discuss an24 approach that significantly improves performance in lossy channels by introducing an additional25 decoy state with a very high mean photon number.26 By eliminating the need for an extra channel capable of clock synchronization, both methods27 proposed potentially reduce the complexity and cost of QKD systems and improve their agility
Time synchronization is a crucial requirement in quantum key distribution (QKD)8 protocols, ensuring accurate key generation via the correct assignment of bits of raw key and9 enabling eavesdropping detection via the precise recording of photon statistics. State-of-the-art10 experiments typically use an extra channel to synchronize the clocks of the transmitter and receiver11 via classical signals. In this work, we study the possibility of performing clock synchronization12 via the signals used for the key generation, which are already present in decoy-state-based BB8413 protocols.14 Without altering the protocol in any way, we use the different mean photon numbers of the15 signal and decoy states for time synchronization without a dedicated physical channel capable of16 clock synchronization. The proposed method relies only on the photons sent and received for17 key generation and does not require any change to the QKD protocol. The only change in the18 experiment is on the software level, thus making it very simple to implement.19 We demonstrate clock synchronization method in a simulation of a specific fiber-based QKD20 experiment. Like other decoy-state-based BB84 protocols, it is based on weak coherent pulses.21 In this simulation, we investigate the parameter space to find limits and optimal choices of our22 proposed method.23 In addition to the non-protocol-altering clock synchronization method, we also discuss an24 approach that significantly improves performance in lossy channels by introducing an additional25 decoy state with a very high mean photon number.26 By eliminating the need for an extra channel capable of clock synchronization, both methods27 proposed potentially reduce the complexity and cost of QKD systems and improve their agility
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems provide a method for two users to exchange a provably secure key. Synchronizing the users' clocks is an essential step before a secure key can be distilled. Qubit-based synchronization protocols directly use the transmitted quantum states to achieve synchronization and thus avoid the need for additional classical synchronization hardware. Previous qubit-based synchronization protocols sacrifice secure key either directly or indirectly, and all known qubit-based synchronization protocols do not efficiently use all publicly available information published by the users. Here, we introduce a Bayesian probabilistic algorithm that incorporates all published information to efficiently find the clock offset without sacrificing any secure key. Additionally, the output of the algorithm is a probability, which allows us to quantify our confidence in the synchronization. For demonstration purposes, we present a model system with accompanying simulations of an efficient three-state BB84 prepare-and-measure protocol with decoy states. We use our algorithm to exploit the correlations between Alice's published basis and mean photon number choices and Bob's measurement outcomes to probabilistically determine the most likely clock offset. We find that we can achieve a 95 percent synchronization confidence in only 4140 communication bin widths, meaning we can tolerate clock drift approaching 1 part in 4140 in this example when simulating this system with a dark count probability per communication bin width of 8×10-4 and a received mean photon number of 0.01.
Precise synchronization between a transmitter and receiver is crucial for quantum communications protocols such as quantum key distribution (QKD) to efficiently correlate the transmitted and received signals and increase the signal-to-noise ratio. In this work, we introduce a synchronization technique that exploits a co-propagating classical optical communications link and tests its performance in a free-space QKD system. Previously, existing techniques required additional laser beams or relied on the capability to retrieve the synchronization from the quantum signal itself; this approach, however, is not applicable in high channel loss scenarios. On the contrary, our method exploits classical and quantum signals locked to the same master clock, allowing the receiver to synchronize both the classical and quantum communications links by performing a clock-data-recovery routine on the classical signal. In this way, by exploiting the same classical communications already required for post-processing and key generation, no additional hardware is required, and the synchronization can be reconstructed from a high-power signal. Our approach is suitable for both satellite and fiber infrastructures, where a classical and quantum channel can be transmitted through the same link.
Time synchronization is crucial for quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. In order to compensate for the time drift caused by the Doppler effect and adapt to the unstable optical link in satellite-to-ground QKD, previous demonstrations generally adopted synchronization methods requiring additional hardware. In this paper, we present a novel synchronization method based on the detected quantum photons, thus simplifying additional hardware and reducing the complexity and cost. This method adopts target frequency scanning to realize fast frequency recovery, utilizes polynomial fitting to compensate for the Doppler effect, and takes use of the vacuum state in the decoy-state BB84 protocol to recover the time offset. This method can avoid the influence of synchronization light jitter, thus improving the synchronization precision and the secure keys as well. Successful satellite-to-ground QKD based on this new synchronization scheme has been conducted to demonstrate its feasibility and performance. The presented scheme provides an effective synchronization solution for quantum communication applications.
The performance of a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system is often limited by the multi-photon state emission of its source and the dark counts of its detectors. Here, we present two methods to improve its performance. The first method is decoy state QKD: the sender randomly sends out weak coherent states with various average photon numbers (which are named as signal state and decoy states). In [14,15], we have performed the first experimental implementation of decoy state QKD over 15km and 60km respectively, thus dramatically increasing the distance and secure key generation rate of practical QKD systems. Our work has been followed up by many research groups worldwide [16-18]. The second scheme is QKD with "dual detectors" [19]: the legitimate receiver randomly uses either a fast (but noisy) detector or a quiet (but slow) detector to measure the incoming quantum signals. The measurement results from the quiet detector can be used to upper bound the eavesdropper's information, while the measurement results from the fast detector are used to generate a secure key. We applied this idea to various QKD protocols. Simulation results demonstrated significant improvements in both BB84 protocol with ideal single photon source and Gaussian-modulated coherent states protocol.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties to communicate in absolute security based on the fundamental laws of physics. Up till now, it is widely believed that unconditionally secure QKD based on standard Bennett-Brassard (BB84) protocol is limited in both key generation rate and distance because of imperfect devices. Here, we solve these two problems directly by presenting new protocols that are feasible with only current technology. Surprisingly, our new protocols can make fiber-based QKD unconditionally secure at distances over 100km (for some experiments, such as GYS) and increase the key generation rate from O(η2) in prior art to O(η) where η is the overall transmittance. Our method is to develop the decoy state idea (first proposed by W.-Y. Hwang in "Quantum Key Distribution with High Loss: Toward Global Secure Communication", Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003)) and consider simple extensions of the BB84 protocol. This part of work is published in "Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution", . We present a general theory of the decoy state protocol and propose a decoy method based on only one signal state and two decoy states. We perform optimization on the choice of intensities of the signal state and the two decoy states. Our result shows that a decoy state protocol with only two types of decoy states—a vacuum and a weak decoy state—asymptotically approaches the theoretical limit of the most general type of decoy state protocols (with an infinite number of decoy states). We also present a one-decoy-state protocol as a special case of Vacuum+Weak decoy method. Moreover, we provide estimations on the effects of statistical fluctuations and suggest that, even for long distance (larger than 100km) QKD, our two-decoy-state protocol can be implemented with only a few hours of experimental data. In conclusion, decoy state quantum key distribution is highly practical. This part of work is published in "Practical Decoy State for Quantum Key Distribution", . We also have done the first experimental demonstration of decoy state quantum key distribution, over 15km of Telecom fibers. This part of work is published in "Experimental Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution Over 15km", .
Abstract Ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols require perfect single photon sources, detectors, and lossless channels. However, the present technology cannot ensure all of the requirements. Among the variants of practical QKD schemes, decoy state QKD in its present form approaches nearly the theoretical security. In any decoy state method, a compromise is made between the security of the key distribution and the rate of key generation by optimizing the two major protocol parameters: the number of decoy states and their relative intensities, and the length of the data string as well. Use of more number of decoy states and higher range of intensities though improve security, their optimization becomes too complex. Therefore, from practical consideration, some restrictions are to be imposed on the choice of decoy states and their intensities. In addition, the treatment of correlations among the laser pulses in security analysis is not fully understood. Normally, lack of correlations or randomness among the signal states is considered to gain security, but, in a different approach, described in the proposed protocol, additional correlation is introduced to improve key generation rate without compromising security. To do that, a one-way function is shared among the legitimate users to provide a semi-random choice of bases depending on the outcome of the receiver’s detector. The initial communication is made through a set of bits with predefined bases and intensity distribution. Then, with the help of the positive outcome of the receiver’s detector, the basis set as well as the length of the bit string for subsequent communications are computed. This results in correlation among the bases and the relative intensities of the signal states and provides a self-checking mechanism to identify eavesdropping. The security analysis of the protocol provides a low error rate and a relatively high key generation rate.