Decoupling local classicality from classical explainability: A noncontextual model for bilocal classical theory and a locally-classical but contextual theory
Sina Soltani, Marco Erba, David Schmid, John H. Selby
quant-phSubmitted Nov 24, 2025• Announced Nov 25, 2025• 0 citations
We construct an ontological model for the theory known as bilocal classical theory doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.102.052216. To our knowledge, this is only the second time that an ontological model has been constructed for an entire theory, rather than just for some particular scenarios within a theory. This result refutes a conjecture from doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.102.052216 which suggested that there might be no local-realist ontological model for bilocal classical theory. Moreover, it is the first time that an ontological model has been constructed for a theory that fails to be locally tomographic, showing that the assumption of local tomography underpinning the structure theorem in doi.org/10.22331/q-2024-03-14-1283 is a genuine limitation of the theorem. This demonstrates that in general there is no tension between failures of local tomography and classical explainability (i.e., generalised noncontextuality). In fact, bilocal classical theory is in many ways more simply understood via the underlying ontological model than it is within its original formulation (much as how odd-dimensional stabiliser subtheories can be more simply understood via Spekkens' toy theory). Furthermore, this result naturally leads to the question, does every locally-classical theory admit of an ontological model? By constructing a concrete counterexample, we show that this is not the case. Our findings demonstrate that there is no straightforward relationship between theories being locally-classical, and them being classically-explainable. This shows that the fundamental status of compositional properties (such as local tomography) is not a technical side-issue, but a central and unavoidable question for a coherent understanding even of classicality itself.
We construct an ontological model for the theory known as bilocal classical theory doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.102.052216. To our knowledge, this is only the second time that an ontological model has been constructed for an entire theory, rather than just for some particular scenarios within a theory. This result refutes a conjecture from doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.102.052216 which suggested that there might be no local-realist ontological model for bilocal classical theory. Moreover, it is the first time that an ontological model has been constructed for a theory that fails to be locally tomographic, showing that the assumption of local tomography underpinning the structure theorem in doi.org/10.22331/q-2024-03-14-1283 is a genuine limitation of the theorem. This demonstrates that in general there is no tension between failures of local tomography and classical explainability (i.e., generalised noncontextuality). In fact, bilocal classical theory is in many ways more simply understood via the underlying ontological model than it is within its original formulation (much as how odd-dimensional stabiliser subtheories can be more simply understood via Spekkens' toy theory). Furthermore, this result naturally leads to the question, does every locally-classical theory admit of an ontological model? By constructing a concrete counterexample, we show that this is not the case. Our findings demonstrate that there is no straightforward relationship between theories being locally-classical, and them being classically-explainable. This shows that the fundamental status of compositional properties (such as local tomography) is not a technical side-issue, but a central and unavoidable question for a coherent understanding even of classicality itself.
It is useful to have a criterion for when the predictions of an operational theory should be considered classically explainable. Here we take the criterion to be that the theory admits of a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. Existing works on generalized noncontextuality have focused on experimental scenarios having a simple structure: typically, prepare-measure scenarios. Here, we formally extend the framework of ontological models as well as the principle of generalized noncontextuality to arbitrary compositional scenarios. We leverage a process-theoretic framework to prove that, under some reasonable assumptions, every generalized-noncontextual ontological model of a tomographically local operational theory has a surprisingly rigid and simple mathematical structure — in short, it corresponds to a frame representation which is not overcomplete. One consequence of this theorem is that the largest number of ontic states possible in any such model is given by the dimension of the associated generalized probabilistic theory. This constraint is useful for generating noncontextuality no-go theorems as well as techniques for experimentally certifying contextuality. Along the way, we extend known results concerning the equivalence of different notions of classicality from prepare-measure scenarios to arbitrary compositional scenarios. Specifically, we prove a correspondence between the following three notions of classical explainability of an operational theory: (i) existence of a noncontextual ontological model for it, (ii) existence of a positive quasiprobability representation for the generalized probabilistic theory it defines, and (iii) existence of an ontological model for the generalized probabilistic theory it defines.
An operational probabilistic theory where all systems are classical, and all pure states of composite systems are entangled, is constructed. The theory is endowed with a rule for composing an arbitrary number of systems, and with a nontrivial set of transformations. Hence, we demonstrate that the presence of entanglement is independent of the existence of incompatible measurements. We then study a variety of phenomena occurring in the theory, some of them contradicting both classical and quantum theories, including cloning, entanglement swapping, dense coding, additivity of classical capacities, nonmonogamous entanglement, hypersignaling. We also prove the existence, in the theory, of a universal processor. The theory is causal and satisfies the no-restriction hypothesis. At the same time, it violates a number of information-theoretic principles enjoyed by quantum theory, most notably, local discriminability, purity of parallel composition of states, and purification. Moreover, we introduce an exhaustive procedure to construct generic operational probabilistic theories, and a sufficient set of conditions to verify their consistency. In addition, we prove a characterization theorem for the parallel composition rules of arbitrary theories, and specialize it to the case of bilocal-tomographic theories. We conclude pointing out some open problems. In particular, on the basis of the fact that every separable state of the theory is a statistical mixture of entangled states, we formulate a no-go conjecture for the existence of a local-realistic ontological model.
In this thesis we explore the questions of what should be considered a "classical" theory, and which aspects of quantum theory cannot be captured by any theory that respects our intuition of classicality. This exploration is divided in two parts: in the first we review classical results of the literature, such as the Kochen-Specker theorem, von Neumann's theorem, Gleason's theorem, as well as more recent ideas, such as the distinction between ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic ontological models, Spekkens' definition of contextuality, Hardy's ontological excess baggage theorem and the PBR theorem. The second part is concerned with pinning down what should be the "correct" definition of contextuality. We settle down on the definition advocated by Abramsky and Branderburger, motivated by the Fine theorem, and show the connection of this definition with the work of George Boole. This definition allows us to unify the notions of locality and noncontextuality, and use largely the same tools to characterize how quantum mechanics violates these notions of classicality. Exploring this formalism, we find a new family of noncontextuality inequalities. We conclude by reviewing the notion of state-independent contextuality.
Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003
Since being defined by Kochen and Specker, and separately by Bell, contextuality has been proposed as one of the key phenomena that distinguishing quantum theory from classical theories. However, with the rise of quantum information contextuality's position as the leading definition of the quantum/classical boundary has been called into question. This is due to the fact that a contextual explanation is required by subtheories that offer no exponential quantum computational advantage over classical computation. In this thesis, submitted in requirement for a PhD in physics with quantum information, we shall explore this unwanted contextuality, and show that generalized contextuality is more prevalent than was previously thought. \n \nFirst we will show that the single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, which was previously thought of as a non-contextual subtheory, requires a generalized contextual ontological model, when transformations are included in the operational description. In addition to this we show that the even smaller single-rebit stabilizer subtheory, a strict subtheory of the single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, must also admit a generalized contextual ontological model, again when transformations are included in the operational description. We then show that both these subtheories require negatively represented quasi-probability representations, re-establishing the link between contextuality and negativity for transformations. We also investigate the representation of transformations in generic quasi-probability representations, showing that under a reasonable assumption almost-all unitaries must be negatively represented by a finite quasi-probability representation. \n \nSecond we will investigate the efficiently simulable n-qubit stabilizer subtheory, which exhibits all forms of contextuality and thus represents the main obstacle to identifying contextuality as a resource for quantum computation. To this end we present an attempt at constructing a model based on a frame-switching Wigner function. This leads us to constructing a contextual ψ-epistemic ontological model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism. We shall see that this model is outcome deterministic, which is one of the core assumptions in the definition of traditional non-contextuality. This model then will lead us to a result that proves that any ontological model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism requires at least n-1 generators to be encoded in the ontology of the model. As n-1 generators represents almost full knowledge about the stabilizer state, we therefore posit that ψ-onicity, a more controversial notion of non-classicality, is actually the resource for quantum computation.
When it isn't possible to tell two distinct experimental procedures apart purely from their input/output statistics, then it seems a plausible hypothesis that the two procedures must be physically identical. We call such a hypothesis "noncontextuality", an instance of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Read in the contrapositive, this hypothesis entails that any physical distinctions between two experimental procedures must necessarily lead to a difference in their operational statistics. The results I present in this thesis concern the failure of this hypothesis -- a failure dubbed "contextuality" -- when one tries to embed an operational theory (such as quantum theory) in the ontological models framework. The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates the failure of noncontextuality for deterministic ontological models of quantum theory, i.e., those ontological models where the ontic/physical state of the system fixes the outcome of any projective measurement on the system in a deterministic manner. This thesis goes beyond the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem by asking what operational facts must be verified in experiments to conclude that Nature does not admit noncontextual ontological models, not even indeterministic ones. This leads to noncontextuality inequalities that are robust to noise in the preparations and measurements. In the particular case of quantum theory, these inequalities are meaningful even when unsharp measurements (or POVMs) are allowed, a feature not shared by the traditional approach to KS-noncontextuality where unsharp measurements are excluded by fiat: allowing them renders even trivial POVMs (proportional to identity) maximally KS-contextual. The sense in which trivial POVMs are indeed "trivial" (or "noncontextual") is clear in our approach: they are simply too noisy to lead to violation of our noncontextuality inequalities.