We show that concrete hardness assumptions about learning or cloning the output state of a random quantum circuit can be used as the foundation for secure quantum cryptography. In particular, under these assumptions we construct secure one-way state generators (OWSGs), digital signature schemes, quantum bit commitments, and private key encryption schemes. We also discuss evidence for these hardness assumptions by analyzing the best-known quantum learning algorithms, as well as proving black-box lower bounds for cloning and learning given state preparation oracles. Our random circuit-based constructions provide concrete instantiations of quantum cryptographic primitives whose security do not depend on the existence of one-way functions. The use of random circuits in our constructions also opens the door to NISQ-friendly quantum cryptography. We discuss noise tolerant versions of our OWSG and digital signature constructions which can potentially be implementable on noisy quantum computers connected by a quantum network. On the other hand, they are still secure against noiseless quantum adversaries, raising the intriguing possibility of a useful implementation of an end-to-end cryptographic protocol on near-term quantum computers. Finally, our explorations suggest that the rich interconnections between learning theory and cryptography in classical theoretical computer science also extend to the quantum setting.
We show that concrete hardness assumptions about learning or cloning the output state of a random quantum circuit can be used as the foundation for secure quantum cryptography. In particular, under these assumptions we construct secure one-way state generators (OWSGs), digital signature schemes, quantum bit commitments, and private key encryption schemes. We also discuss evidence for these hardness assumptions by analyzing the best-known quantum learning algorithms, as well as proving black-box lower bounds for cloning and learning given state preparation oracles. Our random circuit-based constructions provide concrete instantiations of quantum cryptographic primitives whose security do not depend on the existence of one-way functions. The use of random circuits in our constructions also opens the door to NISQ-friendly quantum cryptography. We discuss noise tolerant versions of our OWSG and digital signature constructions which can potentially be implementable on noisy quantum computers connected by a quantum network. On the other hand, they are still secure against noiseless quantum adversaries, raising the intriguing possibility of a useful implementation of an end-to-end cryptographic protocol on near-term quantum computers. Finally, our explorations suggest that the rich interconnections between learning theory and cryptography in classical theoretical computer science also extend to the quantum setting.
Founding Quantum Cryptography on Quantum Advantage, or, Towards Cryptography from #P-Hardness
Recent oracle separations [Kretschmer, TQC'21, Kretschmer et. al., STOC'23] have raised the tantalizing possibility of building quantum cryptography from sources of hardness that persist even if the polynomial hierarchy collapses. We realize this possibility by building quantum bit commitments and secure computation from unrelativized, well-studied mathematical problems that are conjectured to be hard for P#P -- such as approximating the permanents of complex Gaussian matrices, or approximating the output probabilities of random quantum circuits. Indeed, we show that as long as any one of the conjectures underlying sampling-based quantum advantage (e.g., BosonSampling, Random Circuit Sampling, IQP, etc.) is true, quantum cryptography can be based on the extremely mild assumption that P#P⊆(io)BQP/qpoly. We prove that the following hardness assumptions are equivalent. (1) The hardness of approximating the probability assigned to a randomly chosen string in the support of certain efficiently sampleable distributions (upto inverse polynomial multiplicative error).(2) The existence of one-way puzzles, where a quantum sampler outputs a pair of classical strings -- a puzzle and its key -- and where the hardness lies in finding the key corresponding to a random puzzle. These are known to imply quantum bit commitments [Khurana and Tomer, STOC'24]. (3) The existence of state puzzles, or one-way state synthesis, where it is hard to synthesize a secret quantum state given a public classical identifier. These capture the hardness of search problems with quantum inputs (secrets) and classical outputs (challenges). These are the first constructions of quantum cryptographic primitives (one-way puzzles, quantum bit commitments, state puzzles) from concrete, well-founded mathematical assumptions that do not imply the existence of classical cryptography.
Quantum mechanics provides cryptographic primitives whose security is grounded in hardness assumptions independent of those underlying classical cryptography. However, existing proposals require low-noise quantum communication and long-lived quantum memory, capabilities which remain challenging to realize in practice. In this work, we introduce a quantum digital signature scheme that operates with only classical communication, using the classical shadows of states produced by random circuits as public keys. We provide theoretical and numerical evidence supporting the conjectured hardness of learning the private key (the circuit) from the public key (the shadow). A key technical ingredient enabling our scheme is an improved state-certification primitive that achieves higher noise tolerance and lower sample complexity than prior methods. We realize this certification by designing a high-rate error-detecting code tailored to our random-circuit ensemble and experimentally generating shadows for 32-qubit states using circuits with ≥80 logical (≥582 physical) two-qubit gates, attaining 0.90 ± 0.01 fidelity. With increased number of measurement samples, our hardware-demonstrated primitives realize a proof-of-principle quantum digital signature, demonstrating the near-term feasibility of our scheme.
The relationship between cryptography and learning theory has long been a central theme in the foundations of theoretical computer science: cryptographic primitives can imply hardness of learning, while hardness of learning can in turn be used to construct cryptographic schemes. Recent works have begun exploring analogous connections in the quantum setting, relating the average-case hardness of learning quantum states (AHL) to cryptographic primitives such as one-way state generators (OWSG). Despite recent progress exploring this for pure states, the relationship for mixed states has remained an open question.
In this work, we prove that the existence of AHL for mixed quantum states is equivalent to the existence of inefficiently verifiable one-way state generators (IV-OWSGs). As a consequence, this relates mixed-state AHL to EFI pairs. Moreover, as a corollary of existing results, we obtain a separation between IV-OWSGs and OWSGs relative to the SWAP oracle.
There is a large body of work studying what forms of computational hardness are needed to realize classical cryptography. In particular, one-way functions and pseudorandom generators can be built from each other, and thus require equivalent computational assumptions to be realized. Furthermore, the existence of either of these primitives implies that P ≠ N P , which gives a lower bound on the necessary hardness.One can also define versions of each of these primitives with quantum output: respectively one-way state generators and pseudorandom state generators. Unlike in the classical setting, it is not known whether either primitive can be built from the other. Although it has been shown that pseudorandom state generators for certain parameter regimes can be used to build one-way state generators, the implication has not been previously known in full generality. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, the existence of one-way state generators has no known implications in complexity theory.We show that pseudorandom states compressing n bits to log n + 1 qubits can be used to build one-way state generators and pseudorandom states compressing n bits to ω ( log n ) qubits are one-way state generators. This is a nearly optimal result since pseudorandom states with fewer than c log n -qubit output can be shown to exist unconditionally. We also show that any one-way state generator can be broken by a quantum algorithm with classical access to a P P oracle.An interesting implication of our results is that a t ( n ) -copy one-way state generator exists unconditionally, for every t ( n ) = o ( n / log n ) . This contrasts nicely with the previously known fact that O ( n ) -copy one-way state generators require computational hardness. We also outline a new route towards a black-box separation between one-way state generators and quantum bit commitments.
Quantum cryptographic primitives beyond key distribution remain a less well understood area of research. In classical cryptography, one-way functions underpin nearly all standard cryptographic protocols, motivating the search for meaningful quantum analogues and for a clear understanding of the physical and computational mechanisms that could enforce one-wayness. In this article, we review quantum one-way functions and a range of closely related quantum-state primitives, including one-way state generators, pseudorandom quantum states, and efficiently indistinguishable pairs of states. We discuss both computational and information-theoretic notions of quantum one-wayness, emphasizing the different adversarial models and security assumptions that underlie these constructions. We compare and contrast the various proposed primitives, and clarify their conceptual relationships. Particular emphasis is placed on questions of physical realizability, experimental feasibility, and robustness to noise. Finally, we outline open problems and future directions toward the development of practical quantum cryptographic primitives beyond key distribution, and the emergence of a broader quantum-cryptographic ecosystem.
In quantum cryptography, there could be a new world, Microcrypt, where cryptography is possible but one-way functions (OWFs) do not exist. Many quantum analogues of OWFs and pseudorandom generators (PRGs) that are potentially weaker than OWFs have been introduced, and their useful applications have been demonstrated. However, Microcrypt still lacks enough foundations on which they are based compared with the classical cryptographic world. In classical cryptography, many hardness assumptions on concrete mathematical problems have been introduced, such as the discrete logarithm (DL) problems or the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problems on concrete group structures related to finite fields or elliptic curves. They are then abstracted to generic hardness assumptions such as the DL and DDH assumptions over group actions. Finally, based on these generic assumptions, primitives and applications are constructed. The goal of the present paper is to introduce several abstracted generic hardness assumptions in Microcrypt, which could connect concrete mathematical hardness assumptions with applications. Our assumptions are based on a quantum analogue of group actions. A group action is a tuple ( G , S , ⋆ ) of a group G , a set S , and an operation ⋆ : G × S → S . We introduce a quantum analogue of group actions, which we call quantum group actions (QGAs), where G is a subgroup of unitary operators, S is a set of states, and ⋆ is the application of a unitary on a state. By endowing QGAs with some reasonable hardness assumptions, we introduce a natural quantum analogue of the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and pseudorandom group actions. As an application, we construct classical-query pseudorandom function-like state generators (PRFSGs) based on these assumptions. PRFSGs are a quantum analogue of pseudorandom functions (PRFs), and have many applications such as IND-CPA SKE, EUF-CMA MAC, and private-key quantum money schemes. We also show that those assumptions are implied by non-adaptive pseudorandom unitaries (PRUs). Because classical group actions are instantiated with many concrete mathematical hardness assumptions, our QGAs could also have concrete (even OWFs-free) instantiations. We provide some candidate instantiations based on random circuits and IQP circuits.