The physical meaning of the operators is not reducible to the intrinsic relations of the quantum system, since unitary transformations can find other operators satisfying the exact same relations. The physical meaning is determined empirically. I propose that the assignment of physical meaning to operators spreads through observation, along with the values of the observables, from the already observed degrees of freedom to the newly observed ones. I call this process "physication". I propose that quantum observations are nothing more than this assignment, which can be done unitarily. This approach doesn't require collapse, many-worlds, or a conspiratorial fine tuning of the initial conditions.
The physical meaning of the operators is not reducible to the intrinsic relations of the quantum system, since unitary transformations can find other operators satisfying the exact same relations. The physical meaning is determined empirically. I propose that the assignment of physical meaning to operators spreads through observation, along with the values of the observables, from the already observed degrees of freedom to the newly observed ones. I call this process "physication". I propose that quantum observations are nothing more than this assignment, which can be done unitarily. This approach doesn't require collapse, many-worlds, or a conspiratorial fine tuning of the initial conditions.
Abstract Hugh Everett thought it was preposterous to accept the Schrödinger equation as a fundamental law of quantum physics, but then assert that it is usually violated in any observation of quantum phenomena. Demanding that the Schrödinger equation always holds led him to the ‘many worlds’ interpretation. To avoid this conclusion, I propose that the Schrödinger equation is not fundamental, but that one should instead regard as primary a von Neumann version of the equation which lets the density matric evolve unitarily, but where conclusions reached concerning measurements always involve the non-unitary step of tracing out environmental degrees of freedom which always exist even if the system in question is the entire observable universe.
A type of mechanics will be presented that possesses some distinctive properties. On the one hand, its physical description & rules of operation are readily comprehensible & intuitively clear. On the other, it fully satisfies all observable predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Within it, particles exist at points in space, follow continuous, piecewise differentiable paths, and their linear momentum is equal to their mass times their velocity along their path. Yet the probabilities for position and momentum, conditioned on the state of the particle's environment, follow the rules of quantum theory. Indeed, all observable consequences of quantum theory are satisfied; particles can be entangled, have intrinsic spin, this spin is not local to the particle, particle identity can effect probabilities, and so forth. All the rules of quantum mechanics are obeyed, and all arise in a straightforward fashion. After this is established, connections will be drawn out between this type of mechanics and other types of quantum worlds; those that obey Bohmian mechanics, stochastic mechanics, the many worlds interpretation, and physical collapse. In the final section, a relativistic version of the mechanics will be presented.
This brief survey analyzes the epistemological implications about the role of observer in the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. As we know, the goal of most interpretations of quantum mechanics is to avoid the apparent intrusion of the observer into the measurement process. In the same time, there are implicit and hidden assumptions about his role. In fact, most interpretations taking as ontic level one of these fundamental concepts as information, physical law and matter bring us to new problematical questions. We think, that no interpretation of the quantum theory can avoid this intrusion until we do not clarify the nature of observer.
Abstract Here, some difficulties resulting from the application of any empirical acceptability conditions on sequences of single measurements are investigated. In particular, the often used acceptability requirement that each single measurement be made under the "same conditions" is discussed. In quantum mechanics, this means that each single measurement is made of the same physical quantity on a system in a ensemble of identically prepared systems. One of the resultant difficulties is that such an application leads to an infinite regression of sequences of single measurements. That is, it does not account for the fact that an observer must start the process of measurement or knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, it is seen that there are some basic sequences of single measurements for which an observer can not possibly know at the outset that the "same condition" requirements are satisfied. These include those measurements by which the homogeneity of space-time is tested. The possible relevance of these difficulties to physics is shown by first considering two possibilities of avoiding these difficulties. One is that the "same condition" requirements can be given the weaker interpretation that there be no physical principle forbidding an observer from knowing in terms of limit empirical means, that they are satisfied at the outset of any sequence. This gets rid of the infinite regression problem as it does not mean that an observer must know in fact that these requirements are satisfied. The other possibility is that if physics does not forbid one in principle from measuring an expectation value in an arbitrarily small time interval then both the basic sequence as well as those by which one knows the "same" requirements are satisfied can be relegated to arbitrarily small time intervals. As far as physics is concerned, then the epistemological difficulties while existing in these small intervals, do not exist for other times, or almost all time. It is then shown that quantum mechanics, as distinct from classical mechanics, and the special relativity require that an infinite time interval is necessary to measure, as a limit mean, any expectation value. Thus physics denies both the above possibilities as it forbids an observer from knowing even in principle, by any finite time that the "same" requirements are satisfied. Also, physics forbids the relegation of the epistemological problems to arbitrarily small time intervals.
Abstract I point out an underdetermination of physics, in particular of Quantum Mechanics: that of the relation between the operators and their physical meaning. The set of operators for which we attribute physical meaning is, from relational, structural, and dynamical points of view, indistinguishable from any set of operators obtained from the former by a unitary transformation that commutes with the Hamiltonian. The same is true for the structures inhabiting the world, in particular there are structures isomorphic to the structure of an observer, but they would attribute the meaning of position and other physical meanings to different operators. In particular, space itself is underdetermined from the structure of the theory. Different structures that are isomorphic to an observer would call “position” different observables, and consequently would call “space” different structures. I show that they are highly non-unique. A solution would be that all possible assignments of physical meaning to the operators allowed by the symmetries of the formalism are equally valid. But this leads to a problem: there would be no correlation between the content of the mind of an observer about the external world, and the actual properties of the external world. This has unexpected consequences: it refutes structural realism, and it shows that, in addition to the structure, the substance underlying the structures matters for consciousness to exist.