We introduce a numerical framework for reliably estimating conditional von Neumann entropies, a central quantity in device-independent quantum cryptography and randomness generation. Our method is based on semidefinite relaxations derived from the Navascués--Pironio--Acín hierarchy and provides entropy bounds directly from observed statistics, assuming only the validity of quantum mechanics. The approach builds on a recent integral representation of entropy and substantially improves efficiency: it requires about half as many support variables as existing methods, while allowing these variables to be chosen projectively, leading to a significant reduction in runtime. These advances enable the practical certification of randomness and security even in noisy conditions, while integrating seamlessly with modern entropy accumulation theorems. Consequently, our framework becomes a versatile tool for quantum cryptographic protocols, broadening the possibilities for secure communication in untrusted environments.
We introduce a numerical framework for reliably estimating conditional von Neumann entropies, a central quantity in device-independent quantum cryptography and randomness generation. Our method is based on semidefinite relaxations derived from the Navascués--Pironio--Acín hierarchy and provides entropy bounds directly from observed statistics, assuming only the validity of quantum mechanics. The approach builds on a recent integral representation of entropy and substantially improves efficiency: it requires about half as many support variables as existing methods, while allowing these variables to be chosen projectively, leading to a significant reduction in runtime. These advances enable the practical certification of randomness and security even in noisy conditions, while integrating seamlessly with modern entropy accumulation theorems. Consequently, our framework becomes a versatile tool for quantum cryptographic protocols, broadening the possibilities for secure communication in untrusted environments.
The rates of several device-independent (DI) protocols, including quantum key-distribution (QKD) and randomness expansion (RE), can be computed via an optimization of the conditional von Neumann entropy over a particular class of quantum states. In this work we introduce a numerical method to compute lower bounds on such rates. We derive a sequence of optimization problems that converge to the conditional von Neumann entropy of systems defined on general separable Hilbert spaces. Using the Navascués-Pironio-Acín hierarchy we can then relax these problems to semidefinite programs, giving a computationally tractable method to compute lower bounds on the rates of DI protocols. Applying our method to compute the rates of DI-RE and DI-QKD protocols we find substantial improvements over all previous numerical techniques, demonstrating significantly higher rates for both DI-RE and DI-QKD. In particular, for DI-QKD we show a minimal detection efficiency threshold which is within the realm of current capabilities. Moreover, we demonstrate that our method is capable of converging rapidly by recovering all known tight analytical bounds up to several decimal places. Finally, we note that our method is compatible with the entropy accumulation theorem and can thus be used to compute rates of finite round protocols and subsequently prove their security.
Security proofs in quantum cryptography rely on conditional entropies. In a many-round protocol, their estimation is a challenging task; one must account for the most general attacks by an eavesdropper, including those that are not independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across all rounds. Chain rules address this problem by relating the conditional entropy of a structured, but non-i.i.d. process to a sum of entropy contributions from each round. They are a key ingredient in entropy accumulation theorems (EATs), which provide a versatile security proof framework for many protocols in quantum cryptography. Recently, chain rules in the setting of trusted devices have lead to tight i.i.d. reductions at a finite number of rounds, and whether analogous results can be recovered in the device-independent (DI) setting has not been addressed. Surprisingly, we show that a natural tightening of the chain rule of Dupuis et al. [Commun. Math. Phys. 379, 867-913, (2020)] that would answer this question affirmatively cannot hold, highlighting a limitation of the current DI security proof approach. Nonetheless, we show that an intermediate improvement is possible by proving a new chain rule in this setting. Following the framework of Arqand et al. [Phys. Rev. X 15, 041013 (2025)], we use our chain rule to provide a slightly tighter version of the Rényi EAT in certain contexts. In addition, we provide a self-contained framework that unifies existing chain rules and compares their applications, framing our results in a broader context.
The rates of several device-independent (DI) protocols, including quantum key-distribution (QKD) and randomness expansion (RE), can be computed via an optimization of the conditional von Neumann entropy over a particular class of quantum states. In this work we introduce a numerical method to compute lower bounds on such rates. We derive a sequence of optimization problems that converge to the conditional von Neumann entropy of systems defined on general separable Hilbert spaces. Using the Navascués-Pironio-Acín hierarchy we can then relax these problems to semidefinite programs, giving a computationally tractable method to compute lower bounds on the rates of DI protocols. Applying our method to compute the rates of DI-RE and DI-QKD protocols we find substantial improvements over all previous numerical techniques, demonstrating significantly higher rates for both DI-RE and DI-QKD. In particular, for DI-QKD we show a minimal detection efficiency threshold which is within the realm of current capabilities. Moreover, we demonstrate that our method is capable of converging rapidly by recovering all known tight analytical bounds up to several decimal places. Finally, we note that our method is compatible with the entropy accumulation theorem and can thus be used to compute rates of finite round protocols and subsequently prove their security.
The prepare-and-measure framework based on energy constraints offers a practical middle ground between fully device-dependent and device-independent quantum cryptography. The only assumption on an otherwise uncharacterized prepare-and-measure device is that the energy of the prepared states is bounded. Existing security analyses of this framework assume that the preparation and measurement devices share at most classical correlations, and under this assumption certified lower bounds on the extractable randomness have been established. Recent work has shown that an adversary who pre-distributes entanglement between the devices can mount attacks that are strictly more powerful than those available when the devices share only classical correlations, reducing the extractable randomness below the previously certified rates. This leaves open the fundamental question of whether randomness can be certified at all in this scenario.
We address this open question by constructing semidefinite programming relaxations of the guessing probability by adapting the Navascués-Pironio-Acín hierarchy to the energy-constrained setting where shared entanglement between the devices is permitted. Our relaxations yield certified lower bounds on the extractable randomness without enforcing any restrictions on the dimensions of the quantum state shared between the preparation and measurement devices. We show that these certified lower bounds are strictly positive for a range of energy values, thereby answering the open question affirmatively: certified randomness generation is theoretically possible in the energy-constrained SDI framework even in the presence of a fully quantum adversary.
The rates of quantum cryptographic protocols are usually expressed in terms of a conditional entropy minimized over a certain set of quantum states. In particular, in the device-independent setting, the minimization is over all the quantum states jointly held by the adversary and the parties that are consistent with the statistics that are seen by the parties. Here, we introduce a method to approximate such entropic quantities. Applied to the setting of device-independent randomness generation and quantum key distribution, we obtain improvements on protocol rates in various settings. In particular, we find new upper bounds on the minimal global detection efficiency required to perform device-independent quantum key distribution without additional preprocessing. Furthermore, we show that our construction can be readily combined with the entropy accumulation theorem in order to establish full finite-key security proofs for these protocols.
Device-independent security is the gold standard for quantum cryptography: not only is security based entirely on the laws of quantum mechanics, but it holds irrespective of any a priori assumptions on the quantum devices used in a protocol, making it particularly applicable in a quantum-wary environment. While the existence of device-independent protocols for tasks such as randomness expansion and quantum key distribution has recently been established, the underlying proofs of security remain very challenging, yield rather poor key rates, and demand very high quality quantum devices, thus making them all but impossible to implement in practice. We introduce a technique for the analysis of device-independent cryptographic protocols. We provide a flexible protocol and give a security proof that provides quantitative bounds that are asymptotically tight, even in the presence of general quantum adversaries. At a high level our approach amounts to establishing a reduction to the scenario in which the untrusted device operates in an identical and independent way in each round of the protocol. This is achieved by leveraging the sequential nature of the protocol and makes use of a newly developed tool, the “entropy accumulation theorem” of Dupuis, Fawzi, and Renner [ Entropy Accumulation, preprint, 2016]. As concrete applications we give simple and modular security proofs for device-independent quantum key distribution and randomness expansion protocols based on the CHSH inequality. For both tasks, we establish essentially optimal asymptotic key rates and noise tolerance. In view of recent experimental progress, which has culminated in loophole-free Bell tests, it is likely that these protocols can be practically implemented in the near future.