The rates of quantum cryptographic protocols are usually expressed in terms of a conditional entropy minimized over a certain set of quantum states. In particular, in the device-independent setting, the minimization is over all the quantum states jointly held by the adversary and the parties that are consistent with the statistics that are seen by the parties. Here, we introduce a method to approximate such entropic quantities. Applied to the setting of device-independent randomness generation and quantum key distribution, we obtain improvements on protocol rates in various settings. In particular, we find new upper bounds on the minimal global detection efficiency required to perform device-independent quantum key distribution without additional preprocessing. Furthermore, we show that our construction can be readily combined with the entropy accumulation theorem in order to establish full finite-key security proofs for these protocols.
The rates of quantum cryptographic protocols are usually expressed in terms of a conditional entropy minimized over a certain set of quantum states. In particular, in the device-independent setting, the minimization is over all the quantum states jointly held by the adversary and the parties that are consistent with the statistics that are seen by the parties. Here, we introduce a method to approximate such entropic quantities. Applied to the setting of device-independent randomness generation and quantum key distribution, we obtain improvements on protocol rates in various settings. In particular, we find new upper bounds on the minimal global detection efficiency required to perform device-independent quantum key distribution without additional preprocessing. Furthermore, we show that our construction can be readily combined with the entropy accumulation theorem in order to establish full finite-key security proofs for these protocols.
The rates of several device-independent (DI) protocols, including quantum key-distribution (QKD) and randomness expansion (RE), can be computed via an optimization of the conditional von Neumann entropy over a particular class of quantum states. In this work we introduce a numerical method to compute lower bounds on such rates. We derive a sequence of optimization problems that converge to the conditional von Neumann entropy of systems defined on general separable Hilbert spaces. Using the Navascués-Pironio-Acín hierarchy we can then relax these problems to semidefinite programs, giving a computationally tractable method to compute lower bounds on the rates of DI protocols. Applying our method to compute the rates of DI-RE and DI-QKD protocols we find substantial improvements over all previous numerical techniques, demonstrating significantly higher rates for both DI-RE and DI-QKD. In particular, for DI-QKD we show a minimal detection efficiency threshold which is within the realm of current capabilities. Moreover, we demonstrate that our method is capable of converging rapidly by recovering all known tight analytical bounds up to several decimal places. Finally, we note that our method is compatible with the entropy accumulation theorem and can thus be used to compute rates of finite round protocols and subsequently prove their security.
Security proofs in quantum cryptography rely on conditional entropies. In a many-round protocol, their estimation is a challenging task; one must account for the most general attacks by an eavesdropper, including those that are not independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across all rounds. Chain rules address this problem by relating the conditional entropy of a structured, but non-i.i.d. process to a sum of entropy contributions from each round. They are a key ingredient in entropy accumulation theorems (EATs), which provide a versatile security proof framework for many protocols in quantum cryptography. Recently, chain rules in the setting of trusted devices have lead to tight i.i.d. reductions at a finite number of rounds, and whether analogous results can be recovered in the device-independent (DI) setting has not been addressed. Surprisingly, we show that a natural tightening of the chain rule of Dupuis et al. [Commun. Math. Phys. 379, 867-913, (2020)] that would answer this question affirmatively cannot hold, highlighting a limitation of the current DI security proof approach. Nonetheless, we show that an intermediate improvement is possible by proving a new chain rule in this setting. Following the framework of Arqand et al. [Phys. Rev. X 15, 041013 (2025)], we use our chain rule to provide a slightly tighter version of the Rényi EAT in certain contexts. In addition, we provide a self-contained framework that unifies existing chain rules and compares their applications, framing our results in a broader context.
The rates of several device-independent (DI) protocols, including quantum key-distribution (QKD) and randomness expansion (RE), can be computed via an optimization of the conditional von Neumann entropy over a particular class of quantum states. In this work we introduce a numerical method to compute lower bounds on such rates. We derive a sequence of optimization problems that converge to the conditional von Neumann entropy of systems defined on general separable Hilbert spaces. Using the Navascués-Pironio-Acín hierarchy we can then relax these problems to semidefinite programs, giving a computationally tractable method to compute lower bounds on the rates of DI protocols. Applying our method to compute the rates of DI-RE and DI-QKD protocols we find substantial improvements over all previous numerical techniques, demonstrating significantly higher rates for both DI-RE and DI-QKD. In particular, for DI-QKD we show a minimal detection efficiency threshold which is within the realm of current capabilities. Moreover, we demonstrate that our method is capable of converging rapidly by recovering all known tight analytical bounds up to several decimal places. Finally, we note that our method is compatible with the entropy accumulation theorem and can thus be used to compute rates of finite round protocols and subsequently prove their security.
In device-independent (DI) quantum protocols, security statements are agnostic to the internal workings of the quantum devices-they rely solely on classical interactions with the devices and specific assumptions. Traditionally, such protocols are set in a non-local scenario, where two non-communicating devices exhibit Bell inequality violations. Recently, a new class of DI protocols has emerged that requires only a single device. In this setting, the assumption of no communication is replaced by a computational one: the device cannot solve certain post-quantum cryptographic problems. Protocols developed in this single-device computational setting-such as for randomness certification-have relied on ad hoc techniques, making their guarantees difficult to compare and generalize. In this work, we introduce a modular proof framework inspired by techniques from the non-local DI literature. Our approach combines tools from quantum information theory, including entropic uncertainty relations and the entropy accumulation theorem, to yield both conceptual clarity and quantitative security guarantees. This framework provides a foundation for systematically analyzing DI protocols in the single-device setting under computational assumptions. It enables the design and security proof of future protocols for DI randomness generation, expansion, amplification, and key distribution, grounded in post-quantum cryptographic hardness.
The defining feature of one-sided device-independent quantum key distribution is its asymmetric trust model in which only one party is characterized. This scenario sets an interesting middle ground between high key rates achievable by characterizing devices and the security of full device-independence. Here, we provide new tools, methods, and benchmarks for calculating key rates in this setting. To achieve this, we develop and compare two extensions of the NPA hierarchy and derive finite-size security bounds against general attacks with arbitrary device memory. The latter is based on the Generalized Entropy Accumulation Theorem. We then investigate the performance of various protocols: the BB84 protocol both with and without losses, a qutrit mutually unbiased bases protocol, and protocols based on Bell inequalties such as CHSH and I3322. We find that the choice of which party is characterized can strongly affects the key rate, surprisingly without a universal ordering. Our work thus offers a general toolbox for calculating key rates for one-sided device-independent QKD protocols.
Device-independent security is the gold standard for quantum cryptography: not only is security based entirely on the laws of quantum mechanics, but it holds irrespective of any a priori assumptions on the quantum devices used in a protocol, making it particularly applicable in a quantum-wary environment. While the existence of device-independent protocols for tasks such as randomness expansion and quantum key distribution has recently been established, the underlying proofs of security remain very challenging, yield rather poor key rates, and demand very high quality quantum devices, thus making them all but impossible to implement in practice. We introduce a technique for the analysis of device-independent cryptographic protocols. We provide a flexible protocol and give a security proof that provides quantitative bounds that are asymptotically tight, even in the presence of general quantum adversaries. At a high level our approach amounts to establishing a reduction to the scenario in which the untrusted device operates in an identical and independent way in each round of the protocol. This is achieved by leveraging the sequential nature of the protocol and makes use of a newly developed tool, the “entropy accumulation theorem” of Dupuis, Fawzi, and Renner [ Entropy Accumulation, preprint, 2016]. As concrete applications we give simple and modular security proofs for device-independent quantum key distribution and randomness expansion protocols based on the CHSH inequality. For both tasks, we establish essentially optimal asymptotic key rates and noise tolerance. In view of recent experimental progress, which has culminated in loophole-free Bell tests, it is likely that these protocols can be practically implemented in the near future.