Abstract We propose an exercise in which one attempts to deduce the formalism of quantum mechanics solely from phenomenological observations. The only assumed inputs are the multi-time probability distributions estimated from the results of sequential measurements of quantum observables; no presuppositions about the underlying mathematical structures are permitted. In the concluding Part II of the paper, we carry out the deduction of the formalism from the phenomenological inputs described in Part I. We show that the resulting formalism exhibits an affinity with Hilbert spaces, and we derive an explicit representation in terms of those mathematical structures. Analogues of the obtained elementary building blocks—such as projection operators—are readily identifiable within the standard formalism. However, once these building blocks are assembled according to the blueprint of the deduced bi-trajectory formalism, it becomes evident that the new and the standard formalisms differ substantially at the conceptual level. These differences do not negate the fact that both formalisms are in perfect agreement with respect to empirically testable predictions. Rather, the emergence of a novel, non-standard formulation should be seen as a relatively rare opportunity to reassess, from a fresh perspective, some of the long-standing foundational issues in the theory. The hope is that the new approach may prove more successful in addressing problems that have resisted resolution within the established theoretical framework.
Quantum mechanics is often perceived as conceptually paradoxical because it appears to conflict with deeply rooted intuitions about fixed reality, determinism, and observation. This paper does not propose a new physical theory. Instead, it offers an epistemological reframing of quantum mechanics: not as a direct mathematical unveiling of a fully fixed pre-existing reality, but as a highly precise description of phenomenological structures emerging through observational conditions and interaction. The paper explores: the distinction between mathematical predictive success and ontological completeness, the role of human perception in constructing “fixed reality” intuitions, the phenomenological nature of qualities such as color and temperature, the possibility that some conceptual tensions in quantum mechanics arise from assumptions inherited from macroscopic cognition, and how quantum theory may be interpreted as describing observable structures rather than fixed hidden states. The work intentionally avoids mystical, anti-scientific, or consciousness-centric interpretations of quantum mechanics. It does not deny the existence of reality, nor reject modern physics. Rather, it attempts to clarify what exactly mathematical models are describing when applied to quantum phenomena. This text is positioned as a conceptual and phenomenological reorganization of perspective — a small doorway toward reconsidering how humans frame “reality” itself.
It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.
``Quantum'' stands for for the concepts (both operational and formal) which had to be added to classical physics in order to understand otherwise unexplainable observed phenomena such as the structure of the spectral lines in atomic spectra. While the basic part of classical mechanics deals with the (essentially) reversible dynamics, quantum required adding the notions of ``measurement'' and (possibly non-local) ``correlations'' to the discussion. Crucially, all this comes with a ``probabilistic calculus''. The corresponding mathematical formalism was considered to have reached maturity in [von Neumann 1932], but there are some manifest problems with that formalism: (i) While measurements are applied to physical systems, application of their formal counterpart (i.e. a self-adjoint linear operator) to the vector representing that state of the system in no way reflects how the state changes during the act of measurement. Analogously, the composite of two self-adjoint operators has no physical significance while in practice measurements can be effectuated sequentially. More generally, the formal types in von Neumann's formalism do not reflect the nature of the corresponding underlying concept at all! (ii) Part of the problem regarding the measurements discussed above is that in the von Neumann formalism there is no place for storage, manipulation and exchange of the classical data obtained from measurements. Protocols such as quantum teleportation involving these cannot be given a full formal description. (iii) The behavioral properties of quantum entanglement which for example enable continuous data exchange using only finitary communication are hidden in the formalism. In [Abramsky and Coecke 2004] we addressed all these problems, and in addition provided a purely categorical axiomatization of quantum mechanics. The concepts of the abstract quantum mechanics are formulated relative to a strongly compact closed category with biproducts (of which the category FdHilb of finite dimensional Hilbert spaces and linear maps is an example). Preparations, measurements, either destructive or not, classical data exchange are all morphisms in that category, and their types fully reflect their kinds. Correctness properties of standard quantum protocols can be abstractly proven. Surprisingly, in this seemingly purely qualitative setting even the quantitative Born rule arises, that is the rule which tells you how to calculate the probabilities. Indeed, each such category has as endomorphism Hom of the tensor unit an abelian semiring of `scalars', and a special subset of these scalars will play the role of weights: each scalar induces a natural transformation which propagates through physical processes, and when a `state' undergoes a `measurement', the composition of the corresponding morphisms gives rise to the weight. Hence the probabilistic weights live within the category of processes. J. von Neumann. Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik. Springer-Verlag (1932). English translation in Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Princeton University Press (1955). S. Abramsky and B. Coecke. A categorical semantics of quantum protocols. In the proceedings of LiCS'04 (2004). An extended version is available at arXiv:quant-ph/0402130 A more reader friendly version entitled `Quantum information flow, concretely, abstractly' is at http://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/Bob/Papers/QPL.pdf
Quantum mechanics (QM) is not just a theory of micro-objects: it is our current fundamental theory of motion. It expresses a deeper understanding of Nature than classical mechanics. Precisely as classical mechanics, the conventional formulation of QM describes evolution of states and observables in time. Precisely as classical mechanics, this is not sufficient to deal with general relativistic systems, because these systems do not describe evolution in time; they describe correlations between observables. Therefore, a formulation of QM slightly more general than the conventional one – or a quantum version of the relativistic classical mechanics discussed in the previous chapter – is needed. In this chapter I discuss the possibility of such a formulation. In the last section I discuss the general physical interpretation of QM. QM can be formulated in a number of more or less equivalent formalisms: canonical (Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators), covariant (Feynman's sum-over-histories), algebraic (states as linear functionals over an abstract algebra of observables) and others. Generally, but not always, we are able to translate these formalisms into one another, but often what is easy in one formulation is difficult in another. A generalrelativistic sum-over-histories formalism has been developed by Jim Hartle. Here I focus on the canonical formalism, because the canonical formalism has provided the mathematical completeness and precision needed to explicitly construct the mathematical apparatus of quantum gravity. Later I will consider alternative formalisms.
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state
S with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state
S is a subset of a state space
S={Z}, such that
S always contains many elements
Z. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of
S cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements
Z, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of
S is described in terms of sequential time
n∈N, which is updated according to
n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time
n can be separated from relational time
t, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each
n, in which
t represents the knowledge at sequential time
n about the temporal relations between present and past events.