To-date, the most elaborated attempt to complete quantum mechanics by the addition of hidden variables is the de Broglie-Bohm (pilot wave) theory (dBBT). It endows particles with definite positions at all times. Their evolution is governed by a deterministic dynamics. By construction, however, the individual particle trajectories generically defy detectability in principle. Of late, this lore might seem to have been called into question in light of so-called weak measurements. Due to their characteristic weak coupling between the measurement device and the system under study, they permit the experimental probing of quantum systems without essentially disturbing them. It is natural therefore to think that weak measurements of velocity in particular offer to actually observe the particle trajectories. If true, such a claim would not only experimentally demonstrate the incompleteness of quantum mechanics: it would provide support of dBBT in its standard form, singling it out from an infinitude of empirically equivalent alternative choices for the particle dynamics. Here we examine this possibility. Our result is deflationary: weak velocity measurements constitute no new arguments, let alone empirical evidence, in favour of standard dBBT; One must not naïvely identify weak and actual positions. Weak velocity measurements admit of a straightforward standard quantum mechanical interpretation, independent of any commitment to particle trajectories and velocities. This is revealed by a careful reconstruction of the physical arguments on which the description of weak velocity measurements rests. It turns out that for weak velocity measurements to be reliable, one must already presuppose dBBT in its standard form: in this sense, they can provide no new argument, empirical or otherwise, for dBBT and its standard guidance equation.
To-date, the most elaborated attempt to complete quantum mechanics by the addition of hidden variables is the de Broglie-Bohm (pilot wave) theory (dBBT). It endows particles with definite positions at all times. Their evolution is governed by a deterministic dynamics. By construction, however, the individual particle trajectories generically defy detectability in principle. Of late, this lore might seem to have been called into question in light of so-called weak measurements. Due to their characteristic weak coupling between the measurement device and the system under study, they permit the experimental probing of quantum systems without essentially disturbing them. It is natural therefore to think that weak measurements of velocity in particular offer to actually observe the particle trajectories. If true, such a claim would not only experimentally demonstrate the incompleteness of quantum mechanics: it would provide support of dBBT in its standard form, singling it out from an infinitude of empirically equivalent alternative choices for the particle dynamics. Here we examine this possibility. Our result is deflationary: weak velocity measurements constitute no new arguments, let alone empirical evidence, in favour of standard dBBT; One must not naïvely identify weak and actual positions. Weak velocity measurements admit of a straightforward standard quantum mechanical interpretation, independent of any commitment to particle trajectories and velocities. This is revealed by a careful reconstruction of the physical arguments on which the description of weak velocity measurements rests. It turns out that for weak velocity measurements to be reliable, one must already presuppose dBBT in its standard form: in this sense, they can provide no new argument, empirical or otherwise, for dBBT and its standard guidance equation.
Abstract Pilot wave theory endows particles with de nite positions at all times governed by deterministic dynamics. However, individual particle trajectories are generically undetectable by experiment. This idea might seem to be contested in light of two proposals: (1) So-called ‘weak velocity measurements’, allegedly detecting Bohmian trajectories by weakly probing a quantum system without essentially disturbing it, and (2) the so-called ‘surrealistic’ trajectories experiment which supposedly establishes a conflict between the ‘actual’ position of a particle and its position derived from pilot wave theory. Although both attempts shed light on the nature of Bohmian particles, neither constitute empirical or theoretical evidence in favour or against pilot wave theory. Both instances admit a straightforward standard quantum mechanical interpretation compatible with the predictions of Bohmian theories. It is concluded that the puzzles arise from the absence of a coherent account of what quantum mechanical measurements signify.
Bohmian mechanics, also referred to as the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory, represents a deterministic and nonlocal interpretation of quantum mechanics. Central to this framework is a description of quantum motion in terms of particle trajectories, whose reconciliation with relativity remains a fundamental challenge. Although relativistic guidance laws have been proposed, their predicted dynamics has remained experimentally untested. Here we use weak measurements in a single-photon interferometer to jointly reconstruct the photon energy and momentum weak values and the associated relativistic velocity field. The reconstructed average trajectories agree with theoretical predictions. Near destructive interference, the flow exhibits local reconstructed velocities exceeding the speed of light and negative values of the effective squared-mass parameter. Our results establish an experimental basis for investigating the physical meaning of quantum trajectories and their role in describing motion in relativistic spacetime.
We critically examine the role and status probabilities, as they enter via the Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis, play in the standard, deterministic interpretation of deBroglie’s and Bohm’s Pilot Wave Theory (dBBT), by considering interpretations of probabilities in terms of ignorance, typicality and Humean Best Systems, respectively. We argue that there is an inherent conflict between dBBT and probabilities, thus construed.\n The conflict originates in dBBT’s deterministic nature, rooted in the Guidance Equation. Inquiring into the latter’s role within dBBT, we find it explanatorily redundant (in particular for dBBT’s solution of the Measurement Problem, which only requires that the corpuscles possess definite positions), and subject to a number of difficulties. Following a suggestion from Bell, we propose to abandon the Guidance Equation, whilst retaining dBBT’s point particle-based Primitive Ontology, with positions as local beables. The resultant theory, which we identify as a stochastic, minimally deBroglie-Bohmian theory, describes a random walk through configuration space. Its probabilities, we propose, are best understood as dispositions of possible corpuscle configurations to manifest themselves. We subsequently evaluate the merits of sdBBT vis-à-vis dBBT, such as the justification of the Symmetrisation Postulate and the violation of the Action-Reaction Principle.\n Not only is sdBBT an attractive Bohmian theory that, whilst retaining dBBT's virtues, overcomes many of its shortcomings; it also sparks off a number of exciting follow-up questions, such as a comparison between sdBBT and other stochastic hidden-variable theories, e.g. Nelson Stochastics, or between sdBBT and the Everett interpretation.
The de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory asserts that a complete characterization of an N-particle system is given by its wave function together with the (at-all-times-defined) positions of the particles, with the wave function always satisfying the Schrödinger equation and the positions evolving according to the deterministic "guiding equation". A complete agreement with the predictive apparatus of standard quantum mechanics, including the uncertainty principle and the probabilistic Born rule, is then said to emerge from these equations, without having to confer any special status to measurements or observers. Two key elements behind the proof of this complete agreement are absolute uncertainty and the POVM theorem. The former involves an alleged "naturally emerging, irreducible limitation on the possibility of obtaining knowledge within pilot-wave theory" and the latter establishes that the outcome distributions of all measurements are described by POVMs. Here, we argue that the derivations of absolute uncertainty and the POVM theorem depend upon the questionable assumption that "information is always configurationally grounded". We explain in detail why the offered rationale behind such an assumption is deficient and explore the consequences of having to let go of it.
We define the de Broglie-Bohm (dBB) weak interpretation as the dBB interpretation restricted to particles in unbound states whose wave function is defined in the three-dimensional physical space, and the dBB strong interpretation as the usual dBB interpretation applied to all wave functions, in particular to particles in bound states whose wave function is defined in a 3N-dimensional configuration space in which N is the number of particules. We show that the current criticisms of the dBB interpretation do not apply to this weak interpretation and that, furthermore, there are theoritical and experimental reasons to justify the weak dBB interpretation. Theoretically, the main reason concern the continuity existing for such particles between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics: we demonstrate in fact that the density and the phase of the wave function of a single-particle (or a set of identical particles without interaction), when the Planck constant tends to 0, converges to the density and the action of a set of unrecognizable prepared classical particles that satisfy the statistical Hamilton-Jacobi equations. As the Hamilton-Jacobi action pilots the particle in classical mechanics, this continuity naturally concurs with the weak dBB interpretation. Experimentally, we show that the measurement results of the main quantum experiments (Young's slits experiment, Stern and Gerlach, EPR-B) are compatible with the de Broglie-Bohm weak interpretation and everything takes place as if these unbounded particles had trajectories. In addition, we propose two potential solutions to complete the dBB weak interpretation.
The dominance of the Copenhagen interpretation is the result of a historical accident (Cushing, 1994). At the Solvay conference in 1927, Louis de Broglie put forward the deterministic pilot wave theory, described later. Never slow to criticize, Pauli jumped up and demolished de Broglie’s proposal, and de Broglie was so discouraged by this that he did not develop his interpretation any further. The Copenhagen interpretation was then developed by Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and many others, as described in the previous chapter. It was strongly supported by von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of hidden variables. Years later, in 1952, Bohm published a deterministic hidden variable theory, showing that there must be something wrong with von Neumann’s proof. The error was found by John Bell in 1966, as described in the last chapter, and he also showed how Pauli’s objections to de Broglie’s original idea can be answered. If this had been done at the conference in 1927, quantum mechanics could have been interpreted deterministically from the beginning. The essential mistake in the Copenhagen interpretation is to treat it as a complete account of the behaviour of each individual system. It is frequently claimed that it enables us to calculate, at least in principle, everything that can be measured. Thus Hooft (1997, p. 11) said that ‘The laws of quantum mechanics have been formulated very accurately. We know exactly how to compute anything we would like to know.’ Also Peierls (1997, p. 25) has said that quantum mechanics ‘had become a complete and consistent scheme capable of giving a unique answer to any questions relating to actual or possible observations’. Even if this were true, it would not imply that it is the final complete theory, for it is always possible that some new phenomenon might be found that cannot be calculated quantum-mechanically. However, it is not true: there are many phenomena such as the time of decay of a radioactive nucleus, or the direction a particle is scattered by a nucleus, that cannot be calculated, even in principle. Quantum mechanics is therefore an incomplete theory. We can only calculate the statistical properties of these systems, such as the half-life of a radioactive decay or the differential scattering cross-section that gives the probabilities that a particle is scattered through various angles. All measurements of quantum systems are of this statistical character. It might be thought that the possibility of making measurements on a single electron provides an exception to this. However, even in such cases the electron is continually bathed in a fluctuating background radiation from nearby atoms. Since this is variable, that electron is a member of an ensemble of electrons subject to different fluctuations. All these examples clearly demonstrate the statistical character of quantum mechanics. ‘I am rather firmly convinced’, Einstein (in Schilpp, 1949, pp. 666, 671) remarked, ‘that the essentially statistical character of contemporary quantum theory is solely to be ascribed to fact that this theory operates with an incomplete description of physical systems’. As a result, ‘the c-function is to be understood as the description not of a single system but of an ensemble of systems’. So, ‘if the statistical quantum theory does not pretend to describe the individual system completely, it appears unavoidable to look elsewhere for a complete description of the individual systems’. Thus ‘the difficulties of theoretical interpretation disappear, if one views the quantum-mechanical description as a description of an ensemble of systems’. If this is achieved, ‘the statistical theory would, within the framework of future physics, take an approximately analogous position to statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics’. ‘Thus, essentially, nothing has changed since Galileo or Newton or Faraday concerning the status of the ‘‘observer’’ or our ‘‘consciousness’’ or of our ‘‘information’’ in physics’ (Popper, 1982, p. 46). Once this is accepted, the quantum paradoxes that plagued the Copenhagen interpretation are easily resolved, as described below. In any textbook of quantum mechanics problems such as the calculation of the energy levels of the hydrogen atom are solved as if that hydrogen atom is alone in the universe. As Feynman (1972) remarked, ‘when we solve a quantum-mechanical problem, what we really do is to divide the universe into two parts – the system in which we are interested and the rest of the universe. We then usually act as if the system in which we are interested comprised the whole universe.’ In fact, however, every hydrogen atom on which measurements are made is surrounded by other atoms and exposed to their radiations. Quantum mechanics somehow takes this into account and gives the average behaviour of an ensemble of hydrogen atoms. A more detailed theory takes these influences into account. One attempt to do this is stochastic electrodynamics, described in a later section.