arXiv:2309.04899 · Fluctuation and Noise Letters

Transient Attacks Against the VMG-KLJN Secure Key Exchanger

Shahriar Faysal Ferdous, László B. Kish

Published Oct 6, 2023• 1 citation

Abstract

The security vulnerability of the Vadai, Mingesz, and Gingl (VMG) Kirchhoff–Law–Johnson–Noise (KLJN) key exchanger, as presented in the publication “Nature, Science Report 5 (2015) 13653”, has been exposed to transient attacks. Recently an effective defense protocol was introduced (Appl. Phys. Lett. 122 (2023) 143503) to counteract mean-square voltage-based (or mean-square current-based) transient attacks targeted at the ideal KLJN framework. In this study, this same mitigation methodology has been employed to fortify the security of the VMG-KLJN key exchanger. It is worth noting that the protective measures need to be separately implemented for the HL and LH scenarios. This conceptual framework is corroborated through computer simulations, demonstrating that the application of this defensive technique substantially mitigates information leakage to a point of insignificance.

DOI: 10.1142/s0219477524500081

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