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What kind of noise guarantees security for the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise key exchange?

Róbert Mingesz, Gergely Vadai, Zoltán Gingl

Published Jan 1, 2014• 14 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This article is a supplement to our recent one about the analysis of the noise properties in the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system [Gingl and Mingesz, PLOS ONE 9 (2014) e96109, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096109]. Here we use purely mathematical statistical derivations to prove that only normal distribution with special scaling can guarantee security. Our results are in agreement with earlier physical assumptions [Kish, Phys. Lett. A 352 (2006) 178-182, doi: 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.11.062]. Furthermore, we have carried out numerical simulations to show that the communication is clearly unsecure for improper selection of the noise properties. Protection against attacks using time and correlation analysis is not considered in this paper.

Related papers

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This paper is a supplement to our recent one about the analysis of the noise properties in the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system [Gingl and Mingesz, PLOS ONE 9 (2014) e96109, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0096109]. Here, we use purely mathematical statistical derivations to prove that only normal distribution with special scaling can guarantee security. Our results are in agreement with earlier physical assumptions [Kish, Phys. Lett. A 352 (2006) 178–182, doi: 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.11.062]. Furthermore, we have carried out numerical simulations to show that the communication is clearly unsecure for improper selection of the noise properties. Protection against attacks using time and correlation analysis is not considered in this paper. Related simulations are available at http://www.noise.inf.u-szeged.hu/Research/kljn/ .

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This article is a supplement to our recent one about the analysis of the noise properties in the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system [Gingl and Mingesz, PLOS ONE 9 (2014) e96109, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096109]. Here we use purely mathematical statistical derivations to prove that only normal distribution with special scaling can guarantee security. Our results are in agreement with earlier physical assumptions [Kish, Phys. Lett. A 352 (2006) 178-182, doi: 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.11.062]. Furthermore, we have carried out numerical simulations to show that the communication is clearly unsecure for improper selection of the noise properties. Protection against attacks using time and correlation analysis is not considered in this paper.
This paper is a supplement to our recent one about the analysis of the noise properties in the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system [Gingl and Mingesz, PLOS ONE 9 (2014) e96109, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0096109]. Here, we use purely mathematical statistical derivations to prove that only normal distribution with special scaling can guarantee security. Our results are in agreement with earlier physical assumptions [Kish, Phys. Lett. A 352 (2006) 178–182, doi: 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.11.062]. Furthermore, we have carried out numerical simulations to show that the communication is clearly unsecure for improper selection of the noise properties. Protection against attacks using time and correlation analysis is not considered in this paper. Related simulations are available at http://www.noise.inf.u-szeged.hu/Research/kljn/ .
The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system provides a way of exchanging secure keys by using classical physics (electricity and thermodynamics). Several theoretical studies have addressed the performance and applicability of the communication protocol, and they have indicated that it is protected against all known types of attacks. However, until now, there have been very few real physical implementations and experimental tests of the protocol. With our work, we continue filling this gap. Details of implementing a KLJN based system are presented using a dedicated hardware and an off-the-shelf solution as well. Furthermore, the results of experimental tests and analysis of the performance will be presented.
The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system has been introduced as a simple, very low cost and efficient classical physical alternative to quantum key distribution systems. The ideal system uses only a few electronic components-identical resistor pairs, switches and interconnecting wires-in order to guarantee perfectly protected data transmission. We show that a generalized KLJN system can provide unconditional security even if it is used with significantly less limitations. The more universal conditions ease practical realizations considerably and support more robust protection against attacks. Our theoretical results are confirmed by numerical simulations.
The Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system provides a way of exchanging theoretically secure keys by measuring random voltage and current through the wire connecting two different resistors at Alice's and Bob's ends. Recently new advanced protocols for the KLJN method have been proposed with enhanced performance. In this paper, we analyze the KLJN system and compare with the "intelligent" KLJN (iKLJN) scheme. That task requires determination of the applied resistors and identification of various superpositions of known and unknown noise components. Some statistical tools will be explored to determine how the duration of the bit exchange window (averaging time) influences the performance of the secure bit exchange.
In this paper we determine the noise properties needed for unconditional security for the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system using simple statistical analysis. It has already been shown using physical laws that resistors and Johnson-like noise sources provide unconditional security. However real implementations use artificial noise generators, therefore it is a question if other kind of noise sources and resistor values could be used as well. We answer this question and in the same time we provide a theoretical basis to analyze real systems as well.