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arXiv:2305.01525

The Explanation of Entanglement in Quantum Mechanics

H. S. Perlman

Published Apr 28, 2023• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

It is shown that quantum mechanics is, like thermodynamics, a phenomenological theory i.e., not a causal theory, ( not because it is a statistical theory - statistical theories with caused probability distributions can be regarded as causal) but because pure states, i.e., probability distributions of measurement values, cannot inhere in elementary particles and therefore cannot change when their world tubes intersect and hence they cannot be regarded as interacting causally. By a causal theory is meant a theory that specifies the changes in time of the states of causally interacting entities in its domain. The areas in quantum mechanics in which causal interactions are relevant include, though not explicitly, measurement and therefore the Born rule, and, explicitly, the unitary Schrodinger time development of states. The Born rule probabilities are shown to to refer not to conjoint superpositions of eigenstates but to classical mixtures of mutually exclusive eigenvalues and the Schrodinger time development of states is shown to refer to the time development of the states of non-causally interacting elementary particles and hence cannot be regarded as as a causal time development equation, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. The recognition that quantum mechanics is not a causal theory but a phenomenological theory like thermodynamics does not affect the way it is employed to calculate an predict and hence preserves its empirical success but it does allow a typically simple phenomenological theory explanation of entanglement and other apparently non-local phenomena.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2305.01525

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It is shown that quantum mechanics is, like thermodynamics, a phenomenological theory i.e., not a causal theory, ( not because it is a statistical theory - statistical theories with caused probability distributions can be regarded as causal) but because pure states, i.e., probability distributions of measurement values, cannot inhere in elementary particles and therefore cannot change when their world tubes intersect and hence they cannot be regarded as interacting causally. By a causal theory is meant a theory that specifies the changes in time of the states of causally interacting entities in its domain. The areas in quantum mechanics in which causal interactions are relevant include, though not explicitly, measurement and therefore the Born rule, and, explicitly, the unitary Schrodinger time development of states. The Born rule probabilities are shown to to refer not to conjoint superpositions of eigenstates but to classical mixtures of mutually exclusive eigenvalues and the Schrodinger time development of states is shown to refer to the time development of the states of non-causally interacting elementary particles and hence cannot be regarded as as a causal time development equation, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. The recognition that quantum mechanics is not a causal theory but a phenomenological theory like thermodynamics does not affect the way it is employed to calculate an predict and hence preserves its empirical success but it does allow a typically simple phenomenological theory explanation of entanglement and other apparently non-local phenomena.
This article examines the scope and limitations of quantum mechanics in its Schrödinger and Dirac formulations. Quantum theory provides an extraordinarily precise description of how physical states evolve, interfere, and produce measurable probabilities. However, like other foundational theories, it presupposes a specific mathematical structure—complex Hilbert spaces, linear unitary dynamics, an external time parameter, and the Born rule—that it does not itself explain. The work argues that quantum mechanics answers the question of how quantum states behave, but not the deeper question of why physical reality admits a state-based, probabilistic description at all. To address this missing level of explanation, the article places quantum mechanics within the broader framework of the Thermodynamic Imperative of Order (TIO) and the Granular Entropic Program (GEP). Within this framework, quantum states are interpreted as emergent, statistically stable macroscopic representations of typical correlations in high-dimensional configuration spaces. Linearity, unitarity, and the Born rule arise as necessary consequences of measure concentration and stability, rather than as fundamental postulates. The article does not propose modifications to quantum mechanics. Instead, it clarifies the domain of validity of the theory and explains why a framework with its structure and remarkable universality must exist if stable quantum phenomena are to be observed at all.
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We can use quantum theory to explain an enormous variety of phenomena by showing why they were to be expected and what they depend on. These explanations of probabilistic phenomena involve applications of the Born rule: to accept quantum theory is to let relevant Born probabilities guide one’s credences about presently inaccessible events. We use quantum theory to explain a probabilistic phenomenon by showing how its probabilities follow from a correct application of the Born rule, thereby exhibiting the phenomenon’s dependence on the quantum state to be assigned in circumstances of that type. This is not a causal explanation since a probabilistic phenomenon is not constituted by events that may manifest it: but each of those events does depend causally on events that actually occur in those circumstances. Born probabilities are objective and sui generis, but not all Born probabilities are chances.
Bell's theorem rules out developing a locally causal theory to describe quantum phenomena. Many take this to imply that any model of quantum entanglement must employ variables (called beables by Bell) which follow nonlocal rules, even though signaling is local. The alternative is to adopt an all-at-once (block universe) approach, with beables which may depend on both past and future inputs, even though signaling is causal. Within this lenient-causality approach (a.k.a. retrocausal), simple cases of entanglement have been successfully described by locally mediated stochastic toy models, i.e.,~toy models which are local in a sense which generalizes Bell's local causality. Developing a widely applicable reformulation of quantum mechanics along these lines is a grand challenge. This work presents a general framework for such models and theories, and identifies the corresponding ontic and epistemic states. The epistemic state is closely analogous to the quantum state, yielding an explanation for the collapse of the wavefunction. In the case of the models of the framework, it is clear what the information is about. The expression for the empirically verifiable predictions of the models in terms of the ontic and epistemic states displays remarkable parallels to the Born rule. A toy-model example is discussed.
An alternative formulation of quantum mechanics is proposed based on a principle that can be considered a generalization of the Born rule. The principle is composed of a mathematical expression and an associated interpretation, and establishes a correlation between the positions of a particle at two different times. Under reasonable conditions for the wave function, this correlation implies that the particles follow quasiclassical trajectories. It is also shown that the Born rule is equivalent to a particular case of the evolved principle. These features allow the principle to provide a unified explanation of the results of the statistical experiments and of the quasiclassical macroscopic evolution. There is a strong analogy between the quantum principle and a probabilistic principle which is necessary to derive empirical predictions from the mathematical formalism of probability theory. This principle is referred to by some authors as Cournot's principle, while other authors use the equivalent notion of typicality. In this paper probability theory and quantum mechanics are formulated in such a way as to explicitly include the two principles and to emphasize the very similar conceptual structure of the two theories.
Is quantum mechanics about 'states'? Or is it basically another kind of probability theory? It is argued that the elementary formalism of quantum mechanics operates as a well-justified alternative to 'classical' instantiations of a probability calculus. Its providing a general framework for prediction accounts for its distinctive traits, which one should be careful not to mistake for reflections of any strange ontology. The suggestion is also made that quantum theory unwittingly emerged, in Schroedinger's formulation, as a 'lossy' by-product of a quantum-mechanical variant of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. As it turns out, the effectiveness of quantum theory qua predictive algorithm makes up for the computational impracticability of that master equation.