When should a given operational phenomenology be deemed to admit of a classical explanation? When it can be realized in a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. The case for answering the question in this fashion has been made in many previous works and motivates research on the notion of generalized noncontextuality. Many criticisms and concerns have been raised, however, regarding the definition of this notion and of the possibility of testing it experimentally. In this work, we respond to some of the most common of these objections. One such objection is that the existence of a classical record of which laboratory procedure was actually performed in each run of an experiment implies that the operational equivalence relations that are a necessary ingredient of any proof of the failure of noncontextuality do not hold, and consequently that conclusions of nonclassicality based on these equivalences are mistaken. We explain why this concern is unfounded. Our response affords the opportunity for us to clarify certain facts about generalized noncontextuality, such as the possibility of having proofs of its failure based on a consideration of the subsystem structure of composite systems. Similarly, through our responses to each of the other objections, we elucidate some under-appreciated facts about the notion of generalized noncontextuality and experimental tests thereof.
When should a given operational phenomenology be deemed to admit of a classical explanation? When it can be realized in a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. The case for answering the question in this fashion has been made in many previous works and motivates research on the notion of generalized noncontextuality. Many criticisms and concerns have been raised, however, regarding the definition of this notion and of the possibility of testing it experimentally. In this work, we respond to some of the most common of these objections. One such objection is that the existence of a classical record of which laboratory procedure was actually performed in each run of an experiment implies that the operational equivalence relations that are a necessary ingredient of any proof of the failure of noncontextuality do not hold, and consequently that conclusions of nonclassicality based on these equivalences are mistaken. We explain why this concern is unfounded. Our response affords the opportunity for us to clarify certain facts about generalized noncontextuality, such as the possibility of having proofs of its failure based on a consideration of the subsystem structure of composite systems. Similarly, through our responses to each of the other objections, we elucidate some under-appreciated facts about the notion of generalized noncontextuality and experimental tests thereof.
It is useful to have a criterion for when the predictions of an operational theory should be considered classically explainable. Here we take the criterion to be that the theory admits of a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. Existing works on generalized noncontextuality have focused on experimental scenarios having a simple structure: typically, prepare-measure scenarios. Here, we formally extend the framework of ontological models as well as the principle of generalized noncontextuality to arbitrary compositional scenarios. We leverage a process-theoretic framework to prove that, under some reasonable assumptions, every generalized-noncontextual ontological model of a tomographically local operational theory has a surprisingly rigid and simple mathematical structure — in short, it corresponds to a frame representation which is not overcomplete. One consequence of this theorem is that the largest number of ontic states possible in any such model is given by the dimension of the associated generalized probabilistic theory. This constraint is useful for generating noncontextuality no-go theorems as well as techniques for experimentally certifying contextuality. Along the way, we extend known results concerning the equivalence of different notions of classicality from prepare-measure scenarios to arbitrary compositional scenarios. Specifically, we prove a correspondence between the following three notions of classical explainability of an operational theory: (i) existence of a noncontextual ontological model for it, (ii) existence of a positive quasiprobability representation for the generalized probabilistic theory it defines, and (iii) existence of an ontological model for the generalized probabilistic theory it defines.
Generalized noncontextuality is a well-studied notion of classicality that is applicable to a single system, as opposed to Bell locality. It relies on representing operationally indistinguishable procedures identically in an ontological model. However, operational indistinguishability depends on the set of operations that one may use to distinguish two procedures: we refer to this set as the reference of indistinguishability. Thus, whether or not a given experiment is noncontextual depends on the choice of reference. The choices of references appearing in the literature are seldom discussed, but typically relate to a notion of system underlying the experiment. This shift in perspective then begs the question: how should one define the extent of the system underlying an experiment? Our paper primarily aims at exposing this question rather than providing a definitive answer to it. We start by formulating a notion of relative noncontextuality for prepare-and-measure scenarios, which is simply noncontextuality with respect to an explicit reference of indistinguishability. We investigate how verdicts of relative noncontextuality depend on this choice of reference, and in the process introduce the concept of the noncontextuality graph of a prepare-and-measure scenario. We then discuss several proposals that one may appeal to in order to fix the reference to a specific choice, and relate these proposals to different conceptions of what a system really is. With this discussion, we advocate that whether or not an experiment is noncontextual is not as absolute as often perceived.
It is commonly believed that failures of tomographic completeness undermine assessments of nonclassicality in noncontextuality experiments. In this work, we study how such failures can indeed lead to mistaken assessments of nonclassicality. We then show that proofs of the failure of noncontextuality are robust to a very broad class of failures of tomographic completeness, including the kinds of failures that are likely to occur in real experiments. We do so by showing that such proofs actually rely on a much weaker assumption that we term relative tomographic completeness : namely, that one's experimental procedures are tomographic for each other . Thus, the failure of noncontextuality can be established even with coarse-grained, effective, emergent, or virtual degrees of freedom. This also implies that the existence of a deeper theory of nature (beyond that being probed in one's experiment) does not in and of itself pose any challenge to proofs of nonclassicality. To prove these results, we first introduce a number of useful new concepts within the framework of generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs). Most notably, we introduce the notion of a GPT s u b s y s t e m , generalizing a range of preexisting notions of subsystems (including those arising from tensor products, direct sums, decoherence processes, virtual encodings, and more). We also introduce the notion of a s h a d o w of a GPT fragment, which captures the information lost when one's states and effects are unknowingly not tomographic for one another.
The existence of incompatible measurements is often believed to be a feature of quantum theory which signals its inconsistency with any classical worldview. To prove the failure of classicality in the sense of Kochen-Specker noncontextuality, one does indeed require sets of incompatible measurements. However, a more broadly applicable notion of classicality is the existence of a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. In particular, this notion can imply constraints on the representation of outcomes even within a single nonprojective measurement. We leverage this fact to demonstrate that measurement incompatibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for proofs of the failure of generalized noncontextuality. Furthermore, we show that every proof of the failure of generalized noncontextuality in a quantum prepare-measure scenario can be converted into a proof of the failure of generalized noncontextuality in a corresponding scenario with no incompatible measurements.
Generalized noncontextuality is a well-studied notion of classicality that is applicable to a single system, as opposed to Bell locality. It relies on representing operationally indistinguishable procedures identically in an ontological model. However, operational indistinguishability depends on the set of operations that one may use to distinguish two procedures: we refer to this set as the reference of indistinguishability. Thus, whether or not a given experiment is noncontextual depends on the choice of reference. The choices of references appearing in the literature are seldom discussed, but typically relate to an implicit notion of a system underlying the experiment. This shift in perspective then begs the question: how should one define the extent of the system underlying an experiment? This question depends in part on one's beliefs in the universe being fundamentally continuous or fundamentally composite. To draw a coherent picture of the possible approaches one may use, we start by formulating a notion of noncontextuality for prepare-and-measure scenarios with respect to an explicit reference of indistinguishability. We investigate how verdicts of noncontextuality depend on this choice of reference, and in the process we introduce the concept of the noncontextuality graph of a prepare-and-measure scenario. We then discuss several proposals that one may appeal to in order to fix the reference to a specific choice, and we relate these proposals to different conceptions of what a system really is. With this discussion, we advocate that whether or not an experiment is noncontextual is not as absolute as often perceived. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
When it isn't possible to tell two distinct experimental procedures apart purely from their input/output statistics, then it seems a plausible hypothesis that the two procedures must be physically identical. We call such a hypothesis "noncontextuality", an instance of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Read in the contrapositive, this hypothesis entails that any physical distinctions between two experimental procedures must necessarily lead to a difference in their operational statistics. The results I present in this thesis concern the failure of this hypothesis -- a failure dubbed "contextuality" -- when one tries to embed an operational theory (such as quantum theory) in the ontological models framework. The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates the failure of noncontextuality for deterministic ontological models of quantum theory, i.e., those ontological models where the ontic/physical state of the system fixes the outcome of any projective measurement on the system in a deterministic manner. This thesis goes beyond the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem by asking what operational facts must be verified in experiments to conclude that Nature does not admit noncontextual ontological models, not even indeterministic ones. This leads to noncontextuality inequalities that are robust to noise in the preparations and measurements. In the particular case of quantum theory, these inequalities are meaningful even when unsharp measurements (or POVMs) are allowed, a feature not shared by the traditional approach to KS-noncontextuality where unsharp measurements are excluded by fiat: allowing them renders even trivial POVMs (proportional to identity) maximally KS-contextual. The sense in which trivial POVMs are indeed "trivial" (or "noncontextual") is clear in our approach: they are simply too noisy to lead to violation of our noncontextuality inequalities.